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Abstract
Today most philosophers o f science believe that models play a central role in 
science and that one of the main functions o f scientific models is to represent 
systems in the world. Despite much talk of models and representation, however, it 
is not yet clear what representation in this context amounts to nor what conditions 
a certain model needs to meet in order to be a representation o f a certain system. In 
this thesis, I address these two questions. First, I will distinguish three senses in 
which something, a vehicle, can be said to be a representation o f something else, a 
target— which I will call respectively denotation, epistemic representation, and 
faithful epistemic representation— and I will argue that the last two senses are the 
most important in this context. I will then outline a general account of what makes 
a vehicle an epistemic representation o f a certain target for a certain user—which, 
according to the account I defend, is the fact that a user adopts what I call an 
interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target— and of what makes an 
epistemic representation of a certain target a faithful epistemic representation of 
it—which, according to the account I defend, is a specific sort of structural 
similarity between the vehicle and the target.
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Introduction
Most philosophers o f science today seem to agree on two basic points. The first is 
that models play a central role in science. The second is that models are not truth- 
apt— i.e. they are not capable o f being true or false. This has not always been so. 
Before the so-called syntactic view of theories fell into disgrace in the 1960s, 
philosophers of science did not take scientific models seriously. The supporters of 
the syntactic view used to take scientific theories to be collections of sentences or 
propositions and models to play at most a heuristic role in science. In the 1950s 
and 1960s, however, the syntactic view came under attack from various fronts and 
was ultimately repudiated by most of philosophers o f science (for an account of the 
process that led to the demise of the syntactic view and the reasons behind it, see 
(Suppe 1974b)). After the decline and fall of the syntactic view, the fortune of 
scientific models in philosophy of science changed dramatically. On the semantic 
view of theories, which originated with the work o f Patrick Suppes in the 1960s 
and can be considered the mainstream view of the structure of scientific theories 
today (see, for example, (van Fraassen 198) (Giere 1988, Ch. 4) (van Fraassen 
1989) (Suppes 1989) (French and Ladyman 1999) (da Costa and French 2003)), 
scientific theories are collections of models, which are the objects that satisfy the 
axioms of the theory and two sets of axioms are two formulations of the same 
theory if the same set of models satisfies them both. O n the wmodels-as-mediators” 
view, which is embraced in one form or another by all the contributors to (Morgan 
and Morrison 1999) and today is the main alternative to the semantic view, 
scientific theories are not collections of models. Rather models mediate between 
abstract theories and concrete systems in the world. O n both views, models play a 
crucial role in science— either scientific theories just consist of models or they play 
a crucial role in the application of theories to the world. But how do they play this 
role?
The second point on which most philosophers of science seem to agree despite 
their respective differences is that models are not truth-apt— they are not capable o f 
being true or false. Scientific models are more like a portrait or a map than like a
proposition or a Fregean thought, in that models are not deemed to be capable o f 
being true or false but only more or less faithful or accurate. So, how do models 
relate to the world? The most popular and promising answer to this question seems 
to be that they do so in the same way in which a portrait or a map do— which is by 
representing aspects or portions o f the world (see for example, (Cartwirght 1984), 
(Hughes 1997), (Giere 1999) (Giere 2004)). So for example, the Rutherford model 
represents the atom and the ideal pendulum model can be used to represent the 
tire-swing hanging from the tree in the garden.
Despite much talk of models as representations, however, there is widespread 
disagreement as to what it means to say that a certain model represents a certain 
system and as to how a certain model represents a certain system. In the literature, 
the last question is sometimes referred to as “the problem of scientific 
representation.” In the last decade or so, the problem of scientific representation 
has increasingly attracted the interest o f philosophers o f science. Unfortunately, 
this increase in interest in so-called scientific representation has not been 
accompanied by a comparable increase in our understanding o f how models 
represent systems in the world. This lack of progress, I suspect, is mainly due to the 
fact that not only it is not clear what the possible solutions to the problem exactly 
are but it is not even clear what the problem to be solved exactly is.
A casual reader of the literature that deals with the so-called problem of 
scientific representation might be tempted to believe that there is a well-defined set 
o f worked-out solutions to a clear problem. In fact, I suspect, that this is far from 
being true. In the literature, it is easy to come across labels such as ‘the inferential 
conception’, ‘the similarity conception’, or ‘the structural conception’. However, 
with the possible exception of the inferential conception, one would be hard 
pressed to find anywhere in the literature a clear formulation of the views labelled 
by these expressions that is explicitly endorsed by the alleged supporters of that 
view. W hat one can usually find is a number o f (mostly casual) remarks rather than 
anything akin to an account of representation. W ith a couple o f notable exceptions, 
in this thesis I will be largely unconcerned with what views on scientific
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representation some author or other holds. This is because too much guesswork 
and speculation would be involved in figuring out what most authors actually have 
in mind from what they have explicitly maintained and already too many authors 
writing on the topic have misinterpreted the scope and content o f each other’s 
remarks on the topic. What I will try to do, rather, is to formulate what I take to be 
the strongest possible version of the views these labels supposedly stand for, the one 
that I take to best vindicate the intuitions that their supporters seem to have. In 
most cases, I am not in the position to tell whether the views I will discuss under a 
certain label reflect the ones actually held by the people who are usually associated 
with that label but I hope they will be the views that best vindicate their intuitions 
about representation.
If, as I have claimed, it is far from clear what the possible solutions are, it is even 
less clear what the problems they are supposed to solve are. In the literature, there 
seems to be a host of (more or less closely-related) questions that are usually 
referred to as “the problem of scientific representation”. In fact, one o f the 
hypotheses that underlies this thesis is that, properly interpreted, the three 
conceptions of scientific representation mentioned above are not rival and mutually 
incompatible (as they are usually taken to be), but they are actually 
complementary— they should be seen as attempts to account for different notions 
o f representation.
One of the first tasks in tackling the so-called problem of scientific 
representation will therefore be that of distinguishing the different questions and 
problems that arise from the use of the notion of representation. In particular, I 
will distinguish three senses o f ‘representation’ that I take to be particularly 
important in this context— I call them denotation, epistemic representation and 
faithful epistemic representation. In this thesis, I will mainly focus on the notions of 
epistemic representation and faithful epistemic representation.1 Informally, an
1 This is not because I do not take the notion of denotation to be important. In fact, denotation 
plays a crucial role in the account of epistemic representation I defend. If I do not say much about 
denotation here is rather because, unlike epistemic representation and faithful epistemic
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epistemic representation can be thought of as a representation that is used for 
epistemic purposes (so, beside scientific models, epistemic representations include 
maps and diagrams but also photographs and portraits). The fact that a user can 
draw conclusions about the target from an examination o f the vehicle is, therefore, 
a symptom that a vehicle is an epistemic representation of the target (for that user). 
The fact that some of those conclusions are true is a symptom that the vehicle is a 
faithful epistemic representation of the target. I will consequently identify two 
corresponding general questions that are often (but not always) conflated in the 
literature on scientific representation. The first one is ‘By virtue of what is a certain 
object, the vehicle, an epistemic representation of another object, the target?’ The 
second one is ‘By virtue of what is a certain epistemic representation of a certain 
target faithful (insofar as it is)?’
The so-called problem of scientific representation, thus turns out to be neither a 
special problem nor a single problem. Rather it is an instance of two general 
problems, which I will call the problem of epistemic representation and the 
problem of faithful epistemic representation. The main aim of this thesis is to 
provide general satisfactory solutions to these two problems, a solution which 
applies to the case of scientific models and real-world systems and, if possible, it 
also applies to other cases of epistemic representations.
The thesis is divided in three parts. In Part I ‘Disentangling Representation,’ I 
will distinguish three relevant uses of the term ‘representation.’ In Chapter 1.1, I 
will consider a challenge raised by Craig Callender and Jonathan Cohen. According 
to Callander and Cohen, there is no special problem about scientific 
representation. Whereas I agree with them about this I think that they think so for 
the wrong reasons. Callander and Cohen think that there is no special problem of
representation, denotation has already received a great deal of attention by philosophers in the 
analytic tradition and there are already some well-developed accounts of how entities (especially 
linguistic entities) come to denote other entities. Here I prefer not to commit myself to any specific 
account of denotation and try to develop accounts of epistemic representation and faithful epistemic 
representation that are compatible with any account of denotation one might want to embrace.
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scientific representation because representation amounts to what I have called 
denotation— a user just needs to stipulate that the vehicle stands for the target in 
order for the vehicle to represent the target. I argue that, if representation was 
purely a matter o f stipulation or convention, then any vehicle could represent any 
target equally well, but there are clearly circumstances in which this is not true. I 
adapt one of Callender and Cohen’s examples to illustrate my point. W hat 
Callander and Cohen seem to downplay is that in many cases we want to use the 
vehicle to learn something about the target— we want to use it as an epistemic 
representation of the target— and, in those cases, denotation is not a sufficient 
condition for epistemic representation. In Chapter 1.2, I introduce the notions of 
denotation, epistemic representation, and faithful epistemic representation and I
v
define the last two notions. Then, I discuss some ordinary examples o f epistemic 
representation and faithful epistemic representation and argue that models are 
epistemic representations o f the systems in the world.
In Part II ‘Epistemic Representation’, I try to formulate a satisfactory answer to 
the question ‘By virtue o f what is a certain model an epistemic representation o f a 
certain system?’ In Chapter II. 1, I consider Mauricio Suarez’s inferential 
conception of scientific representation, which is meant to be an answer to this 
question. I discuss some of the reasons why I think the inferential conception is 
unsatisfactory. The two main reasons are the following. First, the inferential 
conception unwarrantedly stops at what I have called the symptoms of epistemic 
representation (i.e. the fact that the user is able to perform inferences from the 
vehicle to the target) and therefore does not really answer the question ‘By virtue o f 
what is a certain model an epistemic representation o f a certain system?,’ which 
would be answered only by looking at the “causes” of epistemic representation. 
Second, the inferential conception makes the relation between epistemic 
representation and surrogative reasoning unnecessarily mysterious. In Chapter II.2, 
I develop an alternative conception o f epistemic representation— the 
interpretational conception. According to the interpretational concepiton, a vehicle 
is an epistemic representation of a certain target (for a certain user) only if the user
12
adopts an interpretation of the vehicle in terms o f the target. The notion of 
interpretation plays a crucial role and in determining which inferences from the 
vehicle to the target are valid and which are not.
In Part III ‘Faithful Epistemic Representation’, I then move on to develop an 
account of what makes an epistemic representation o f a certain target a faithful one. 
In Chapter III. 1, I argue that the so-called similarity and structural conceptions 
should be taken to be conceptions o f faithful epistemic representation rather than 
conceptions of epistemic representation. I then consider the similarity conception 
and argue that, even if the objections that are usually moved against the similarity 
conception are ineffective, the similarity conception can be effective only if  the 
similarity between the vehicle and the target is an abstract sort of similarity. In 
Chapter III.2, I develop a version of the structuralist conception o f faithful 
epistemic representation that captures this more abstract notion of similarity— I 
call this version of the structural conception the structural similarity conception o f  
faithful epistemic representation.
If scientific models play a crucial role in science and scientific models relate to the 
world by representing aspects or portions o f it, as most philosophers of science 
today seem to believe, then understanding how models represent aspects or 
portions of the world is paramount to understanding how science operates. This 
thesis lays the foundations to a better understanding of how models represent by 
accounting for two notions of representation which both play an important role 
but are too often conflated. Some of the ideas I develop in this thesis build on 
intuitions and suggestions that can be found elsewhere in the literature. Here, 
however, these ideas are developed into full-blown accounts of, respectively, 
epistemic representation and faithful epistemic representation.
For one, a number of authors have suggested that representation has something 
to do with some structural relation between the vehicle and the target. However, 
unless it is clearly specified what is the relation between the notion of 
representation and that of a morphism, how a morphism is supposed to hold
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between vehicles and targets that are not set-theroretic structure and which 
morphism needs to hold between a vehicle and a target in order for the vehicle to 
be a (faithful) epistemic representation of the target, this remains a stimulating 
idea, but one that can hardly be evaluated. In this thesis, I try to provide clear and 
definite answers to these in order to turn what can be seen as a stimulating insight 
about representation into a clear account of a specific notion of representation, 
whose adequacy can be evaluated.
The notion of (analytic) interpretation plays a central role in this thesis. Most of 
this thesis was devoted to laying the foundations for a solution for each of these 
problems. According to the account o f epistemic representation that I have 
defended, the interpretational account of epistemic representation, a vehicle is an 
epistemic representation of a certain target for a certain user if and only if the user 
takes the vehicle to denote the target and she adopts an interpretation o f the vehicle 
(in terms of the target). One of the main advantages o f the interpretational account 
that 1 defend is that it explains the intimate relation between epistemic 
representation and valid surrogative reasoning. The fact that a user adopts an 
interpretation of the vehicle in terms o f the target (and takes the vehicle to stand 
for the target) is both that in virtue of what the vehicle is an epistemic 
representation of the target for her and that in virtue o f what she can perform valid 
inferences from the vehicle to the target. W ithout the notion of an interpretation 
(or some analogous notion), the intimate relation between epistemic representation 
and valid surrogative reasoning would remain unnecessarily mysterious.
The notion of an analytic interpretation plays also a central role in the account 
of faithful epistemic representation that I develop as it directly contributes to the 
solution of three crucial problems that have haunted the structuralist conception of 
(faithful) epistemic representation so far. The first problem is that of applying the 
notion of a morphism to vehicles and targets that are not set-theoretic structures. 
As I will argue, the notion of an analytic interpretation provides us with a 
principled way to reconstruct the vehicle and the target as set-theoretic structures,
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which I called respectively the relevant structure of the vehicle and the relevant 
structure of the target.
The second problem is that of determining which morphisms need to obtain 
between the relevant structure of the vehicle and that of the target in order for the 
vehicle to be a faithful epistemic representation of the target (to a certain degree) 
because a morphism may obtain between the relevant structure o f the vehicle and 
that o f the target without the first being a faithful epistemic representation o f the 
target (on a certain interpretation o f it). The notion o f analytic interpretation 
provides us with a principled way to single out some of the morphisms that may 
obtain between the relevant structure of the vehicle and that of the target as the 
intended ones and it is only these morphisms that are relevant to the faithfulness of 
the epistemic representation in question.
The third problem is that the notion of the faithfulness of an epistemic 
representation comes in degrees while two structures are either X-morphic or they 
are not. However, the account of faithful epistemic representation that I will 
develop uses the notions o f relvant structure and intended morphism to develop a 
third crucial notion that o f the structural similarity between the vehicle and the 
target (under a certain interpretation o f the former in terms o f the latter). 
Intuitively, the stronger the strongest intended morphism between the relevant 
structure of the vehicle and that of the target is, the more structurally similar the 
vehicle and the target are. The central idea that underlies the structural similarity 
account is that the more structurally similar the vehicle and the target are under a 
certain interpretation of the former in terms of the latter, the more faithful an 
epistemic representation of the latter the former is under that interpretation. One 
of the main merits of the account of faithful epistemic representation that I 
develop, I think, vindicates the intuitions that underlie two of the main 
conceptions o f representation but avoids the pitfalls that characterize other possible 
versions of these views.
The account of epistemic representation and that o f faithful epistemic 
representation that I develop and defend in this thesis are more than just
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complementary— they are deeply interconnected. It is only when one attempts to 
develop some o f the intuitions and ideas that can be found in the literature into a 
coherent whole that one can see how everything falls into place in the overall 
picture. In this thesis, I hope to have provided a good initial sketch o f that picture.
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I. Disentangling Representation
1.1. Is Representation Merely Denotation?
1.1.1. Is T h e r e  A  Sp e c ia l  P r o b l e m  A b o u t  Sc ie n t if ic  Re p r e s e n t a t io n ?
One of the first questions that face us with regards to scientific representation is 
whether or not there is any special problem about scientific representation. In other 
words, do we need to develop a specific conception of how scientific models 
represent systems in the world? Craig Callender and Jonathan Cohen have recently 
argued that this question should be answered negatively (Callender and Cohen 
2006). Callender and Cohen give the right answer for the wrong reasons.
By arguing that there is no special problem of scientific representation, 
Callender and Cohen mean to show that the current interest in scientific 
representation is misplaced because, as they see it, the problem of scientific 
representation is only an instance of a more general problem of representation to 
which there is a general solution. In fact, I think, Callender and Cohen simply fail 
to engage with the sort of questions that those who are interested in the problem of 
scientific representation are trying to answer. Their failure, however, is instructive 
in that it will help me to bring into sharper focus what I take to be the two main 
questions that those who are interested in scientific representation are actually 
concerned with. In the next chapter, I will distinguish three notions of 
representation— denotation, epistemic representation, and faithful epistemic 
representation— and will argue that those interested in scientific representation are 
concerned with the last two notions of representation rather than the first. So, if 
there is no special problem about scientific representation, I think, it is because 
scientific representation is just a variety of what I will call epistemic representation 
and not because scientific representation is a variety of what I will call denotation 
as Callender and Cohen seem to think.
1.1.2. Representation  a n d  D e n o t a t io n
According to Callender and Cohen, there is a general strategy to reduce a variety of 
forms of representation to a single fundamental form of representation (most likely, 
mental representation, which is the representational relation between mental states 
and what they represent). If  successful, this strategy would reduce what would 
appear as a number of distinct, though interrelated, problems to a single 
fundamental problem, that o f providing an account o f mental representation:
[...] among the many sorts of representational entities (cars, cakes, 
equations, etc.), the representational status o f most of them is 
derivative from the representational status of a privileged core o f 
representations. The advertised benefit o f this [...] approach to 
representation is that we won’t need separate theories to account 
for artistic, linguistic, representation, and culinary representation; 
instead, [those who adopt this general approach propose] that all 
these types of representation can be explained (in a unified way) as 
deriving from some more fundamental sorts of representations, 
which are typically taken to be mental states. (Callender and Cohen
2006, p.70)
According to Callender and Cohen, something or other (what I shall call the 
vehicle of the representation) represents something else (what I shall call the target 
o f the representation) by virtue o f the fact that the speaker intends the vehicle to 
evoke the target in the mind o f an audience. Which mental state a vehicle evokes in 
an audience and, consequently, which target that vehicle represents for that 
audience is, according to Callender and Cohen, ultimately a matter o f convention 
or stipulation:
Can the salt shaker on the dinner table represent Madagascar? O f 
course it can, so long as you stipulate that the former represents the 
latter. Then, when your dinner partner asks you what is your
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favorite geographical land mass, you can make the salt shaker 
salient with the reasonable intention that your doing so will 
activate in your audience the belief that Madagascar is your favorite 
geographical land mass (obviously, this works better if your 
audience is aware o f your initial stipulation; otherwise your 
intentions with respect to your audience are likely to go 
unfulfilled). [...] On the story we are telling, then, virtually 
anything can be stipulated to be a representational vehicle for the 
representation o f virtually anything [...]. (Callender and Cohen 
2006, pp.73—74; emphasis added)
If the appropriate conventions are in place, (virtually) anything can be used to 
represent (virtually) anything else. To use Callender and Cohen’s examples, the 
saltshaker on the table can represent the state of Michigan, if we stipulate so. 
However, our stipulation is entirely conventional and, had we stipulated that my 
upturned right hand represented Michigan instead, my right hand would represent 
Michigan.
If we are to follow Callender and Cohen, thus the prototype o f (derivative) 
representation is the relation between referring expressions and their referents. In 
Italian, the word ‘gatto’ is used to refer to cats and ‘cane’ to refer to dogs, but this 
choice is entirely arbitrary: there seems to be no intrinsic reason why it should be so 
and not, say, the other way around. (By saying that there is no intrinsic reason, I 
mean that there is no intrinsic property of the word ‘gatto’ that makes it preferable 
to use it to designate cats rather than dogs).
If we were to follow Callender and Cohen’s strategy, then we would have to 
maintain that the Rutherford model o f the atom represents the atom by virtue of 
the fact that Rutherford intends it to stand for the atom and that, to fulfil his 
intentions, Rutherford has tacitly stipulated with his audience that it does so. On 
Callender and Cohen’s view, it would seem that Rutherford could as well have 
intended that the ideal pendulum, the Thompson model of the atom, or even the 
paper weight on his desk represented the atom.
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To avoid the most implausible consequences of their view, Callender and 
Cohen have to concede:
[...] it should be clear that the constraints ruling out these choices 
of would-be representational vehicles are pragmatic in character: 
they are driven by the needs o f the representation users, rather than 
by essential features of the artifacts themselves. (Callender and 
Cohen 2006, p. 76)
So, even if in principle it would have been possible for Rutherford to use anything 
to represent the atom, in practice some vehicles are more convenient than others. 
This, however, according to Callender and Cohen, does not mean that, in 
principle, a saltshaker could have not been used to represent the atom as well. 
Whether this line of defence is convincing crucially depends on what ‘more 
convenient’ means in this context.
Obviously, ‘more convenient’ does not mean that Rutherford found it easier to 
conceive of a new model of the atom rather than choosing any object from his desk 
and stipulating that that object represented the atom, or to pick any other model 
available at the time, say, the ideal pendulum, and stipulate that that represented 
the atom. Had any of these objects been able to serve Rutherford’s purposes equally 
well, it would have been certainly easier for Rutherford to use one of them rather 
than conceiving of a new model of the atom. Thus ‘more convenient’ does not 
mean easier.
The sense in which ‘more convenient’ has to be construed if it is to serve 
Callender and Cohen’s purposes clearly emerges from one of their examples. If we 
want to show someone where a place is in Michigan, they claim, it would be more 
convenient to represent Michigan by an upturned right hand than by a saltshaker. 
This, according to Callender and Cohen, is because:
[...] the geometric similarity between the upturned human right 
hands and the geography of Michigan make the former a 
particularly useful way o f representing relative locations in
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Michigan, and it normally would be foolish (but not impossible!) 
to use an upturned left hand for this purpose since a more easily 
interpreted representational vehicle is typically available. (Callender 
and Cohen 2006, p.76)
By conceding this much, however, Callender and Cohen reveal how 
unsatisfactory their strategy in fact is. In this case as in many others, our choice o f a 
vehicle is not completely conventional. As Dominic Lopes (1996 pp. 132-133), 
following David Lewis’ analysis of convention (Lewis 1969, p.76), notes against 
Nelson Goodman’s view of pictorial representation, a choice is conventional (with 
respect to a certain set of alternatives) only if those who make it have no intrinsic 
reason to prefer one of the available alternatives over the others. For example, the 
choice of the word ‘gatto’ to designate cats and ‘cane’ to designate dogs or that of 
driving on the right-hand side o f the road rather than on the left-hand side are 
conventional (with respect to a certain set o f alternatives) insofar as there is no 
reason to prefer any of the other alternatives to them. To the extent to which we 
have some intrinsic reasons for preferring one o f the options over the others, 
however, our choice is no longer entirely conventional.
If we want to show someone where a certain place in Michigan is, our 
preferences are clear: we would prefer a map over an upturned right hand and an 
upturned right hand over the saltshaker. Callender and Cohen not only 
acknowledge our preferences but go as far as suggesting that the reason why we 
prefer an upturned right hand to a saltshaker as a representation of the geography 
of Michigan is the “geometric similarity” between the hand and Michigan. To 
maintain that our choice of the map rather than the saltshaker as a representation 
of the geography of Michigan is conventional because, though foolish, it would not 
be impossible to choose the saltshaker, as Callender and Cohen suggest in the 
above passage, is analogous to maintaining that, if we are offered the choice 
between a gift o f £2 and a gift o f £200,000 with all else equal, our choice between
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the two options would be conventional because, though foolish, it would not be 
impossible to choose to win £2 rather than £200,000.
Although in the case of the map and the salt shaker our preferences are clear, the 
reasons that underlie them are difficult to articulate. Why is a saltshaker less 
preferable as a candidate for a representation of the state of Michigan than an 
upturned right hand and an upturned right hand less preferable than a map? Why 
did Rutherford go through the trouble of conceiving a new model of the atom 
rather than simply using one of the objects on his desk? Much work needs to be 
done to answer these questions adequately. In the next chapter, I will lay the 
foundations for this work by distinguishing three notions of representation—  
denotation, epistemic representation and faithful epistemic representation. It is 
only in Chapter II.2, where I develop and defend my account of epistemic 
representation, that I will be able to suggest what I take to be a satisfactory answer 
to this question.
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1.2. Denotation, Epistemic Representation, 
and Faithful Epistemic Representation
1.2.1. E p is t e m ic  Re p r e s e n t a t io n  a n d  Su r r o g a t iv e  R e a s o n in g
One of the main problems with the notion o f representation is that by 
‘representation’ people often mean different things. For the present purposes, it is 
important to distinguish two different senses o f ‘representation’. In a first sense, 
both the logo of the London Underground and a map of the London 
Underground can be taken to represent the London Underground network. In the 
terminology I adopt here, we can say that they both denote the network (I will say 
more about denotation in Section 1.2.2 below). The map of the London 
Underground, however, does more than just denoting the London Underground 
network; it represents the London Underground in a second, stronger sense— it is 
an epistemic representation of the network. It is in virtue of the fact that the map of 
the London Underground represents the London Underground network in this 
stronger sense that, to use the terminology introduced by Chris Swoyer (1991), 
someone can perform surrogative inferences from the map to the network— that is 
one can infer conclusions about the network from a consideration of the map. If A 
and B  are two distinct objects, an inference from A  to B  is surrogative if and only if 
the premise o f the inference is a proposition about A  and the conclusion o f  the 
inference is a proposition about B. In our example, the map and the network are 
clearly two distinct objects. One is a piece of glossy paper on which coloured lines, 
circles and names are printed; the other is an intricate system of, among other 
things, trains, tunnels, rails and platforms. Yet, the ordinary users of the map (and 
o f the network) frequently perform surrogative inferences from one object, the 
map, to the other, the network. For example, from ‘the circle labelled Holborn is
connected to the circle labelled Liverpool street by a red line’ (which expresses a 
proposition about the network) users infer ‘Central Line trains operate between 
Holborn and Liverpool street station’ (which expresses a proposition about the 
network). The same does not apply to the London Underground logo. Users o f the 
London Underground network do not usually use the London Underground logo 
to perform surrogative inferences from it to the network and there seems to be no 
obvious way to do so. The logo may denote the network but it is not an epistemic 
representation of it (I will say more about this in Section 1.2.3 below).2
On the conception of epistemic representation that I will defend here, the fact 
that some user performs a surrogative inference from a certain object, the vehicle, 
to another, the target, is a “symptom” of the fact that, for that user, that vehicle is 
an epistemic representation o f that target, a symptom that allows one to distinguish 
cases of epistemic representation (such as the London Underground map) from 
cases of mere denotation (such as the London Underground logo). However, there 
may be “asymptomatic” cases of epistemic representation. That is, a user does not 
necessarily need to perform any actual piece o f surrogative reasoning or other in 
order for the vehicle to be an epistemic representation o f the target. For example, 
even if someone has never performed and will never perform any actual inference 
from the London Underground map to the London Underground network, the 
map may still be an epistemic representation of the network for her provided that 
she would have been able to perform surrogative inferences if the occasion had 
arisen.
It is also important to note that it is not necessary that the conclusions the user 
draws (or would draw) about the target are true (or approximately true) in order for 
the vehicle to be an epistemic representation of the target. In other words, if a user 
is able to perform (valid) inferences from a certain vehicle to a certain target, the
2 Note that I am only claiming that the logo is not an epistemic representation of the network 
not that it could not become one if the appropriate conditions obtained. I take it that an account of 
epistemic representation is minimally one that specifies what conditions need to hold for something 
to be an epistemic representation of something else.
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vehicle is an epistemic representation of that target for that user, independently of 
whether or not the conclusions are true o f the target.
Even if I have not yet introduced the full conceptual apparatus that is needed to 
define precisely when a surrogative inference is valid (I will do so only in Section
II.2.6 below), it is useful at this point to distinguish between valid and sound 
surrogative inferences. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that, whereas a 
surrogative inference is sound if and only if it is valid and its conclusion is true (or 
approximately true),3 the conclusion of an inference does not need to be true in 
order for the inference to be valid. I trust that the distinction between valid and 
sound surrogative inferences is clear enough for the present purposes— a valid 
inference is sound only if its conclusion is true (or approximately true). However, 
since the notion of a valid surrogative inference will play a role in this chapter and 
the next, I will characterize it informally here.
The intuitive idea behind the notion of valid surrogative inference is that a 
surrogative inference is valid only if it is in accordance with a systematic set of 
rules. For example, according to the set of rules standardly associated with the 
London Underground map, it is valid to infer that Holborn and Bethnal Green 
stations are connected by Central Line train form the fact that the circles marked 
‘Holborn’ and ‘Bethnal Green’ are connected by a red line. According to the same 
set of rules, however, from the fact that the circles marked ‘Holborn’ and ‘Bethnal 
Green’ are 3.4 inches away it is not valid to infer that, say, the distance between 
Holborn and Bethnal Green station is 3.4 miles (or anything else about the 
London Underground network for what matters). That inference is simply not 
allowed by the standard rules associated with the map. However, it is in principle 
possible to devise a non-standard set of rules, according to which the latter 
inference is valid and the former is not.
3 Let me note that ‘sound’ here is not used in the same sense in which it is used in logic where 
an inference is sound if it is valid and its premises are true. I will say more about what I mean by 
approximately true in Section 1.2.5.
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By specifying that the set o f rules be systematic, I intend to stress that the result 
of applying a certain rule does not depend on who applies it or the circumstances 
in which she applies it but only on the way the vehicle is and what the rule says. A 
systematic set of rules, for example, cannot include rules such as: ‘If the circles 
marked ‘Holborn’ and ‘Bethnal Green’ are connected by a red line, conclude the 
first thing that goes through your mind’ because such a rule would give different 
results when different people apply it or when the same people apples at different 
times.
Unless otherwise specified, when talking about a valid inference from a certain 
vehicle to a certain target, I will do so by assuming that there is a set o f rules 
standardly associated with that vehicle and that the inference in question is one of 
those that are in accordance with that set o f rules. Whether there are any such 
rules, what there rules exactly are and where they come from are all crucial 
questions, which, however, I shall address only later on in Section II.2.6 below 
after having introduced my account of epistemic representation and the crucial 
notion of interpretation.
For the moment, however, it is possible to formulate the following definition:
(1) A vehicle is an epistemic representation of a certain target for a certain 
user if and only if:
[1.1] the user is able to perform valid (though not necessarily 
sound) surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the target.
I will call condition [1.1] valid surrogative reasoning. Definition (1) thus says that 
valid surrogative reasoning is a necessary and sufficient condition for epistemic 
representation.
Let me note an important feature of the notion of epistemic representation. 
According to (1), a vehicle is not an epistemic representation o f a certain target in 
and of itself—it is an epistemic representation for someone. Epistemic 
representation is not a dyadic relation between a vehicle and a target but a triadic
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relation between a vehicle, a target and a (set of) user(s).4 For the sake o f simplicity, 
I will often omit to mention the users o f an epistemic representation unless it is 
required by the context. However, this does not mean that a vehicle can be an 
epistemic representation o f a target for no one in particular or in its own right— a 
vehicle is an epistemic representation of a certain target only if there are some users 
for whom it is an epistemic representation of that target.5
The notion of epistemic representation is primarily a technical notion. As with 
many technical notions, however, the notion of epistemic representation is meant 
to capture what I take to be one of the senses of the ordinary notion of 
representation. According to this definition, numerous prototypical cases of what 
we would ordinarily consider representations turn out to be epistemic 
representations for us. Portraits, photographs, maps, graphs, and a large number of 
other representational devices usually seem to allow us to draw (valid) inferences to
4 That epistemic representation is not an intrinsic relation between a vehicle and a target but a 
triadic relation that involves a vehicle, a target and a set of users seems to be one of the few issues on 
which most contributors to the literature on scientific representation agree (see, e.g. Suarez 2002 
and 2003, Frigg 2002, Giere 2004). Suarez (2002) however does not seem to think that this is the 
case. He thinks that the supporters of the similarity and structural accounts of epistemic 
representation are trying to “naturalize” epistemic representation in the sense that they are trying to 
reduce representation to a dyadic relation between the vehicle and the target. Whereas, in the past, 
the likes of Giere and French may have given the impression that they conceived of representation 
as a dyadic relation, I do not think that this is their considered view. Giere has recently dispelled any 
doubt by declaring: ‘The focus on language as an object in itself carries with it the assumption that 
our focus should be on representation, understood as a two-place relationship between linguistic 
entities and the world. Shifting the focus to scientific practice suggests that we should begin with 
the activity of representing, which, if thought of as a relationship at all, should have several more 
places. One place, of course, goes to the agents, the scientists who do the representing’ (Giere 2004, 
p.743).
5 This is particularly important when the epistemic representation has a large set of users (such 
as the London Underground map). In those cases, we usually tend to disregard the fact that the 
vehicle is an (epistemic) representation for those users not in its own right. The fact that a vehicle is an 
epistemic representation for many people or even for everyone does not imply that it is an epistemic 
representation in and of itself.
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their targets and, if, as such, they are epistemic representations of their targets (for 
us) according to definition (1). For example, according to (1), if we are able to 
draw (valid) inferences from a portrait to its subject (as we usually seem able to do), 
then the portrait is an epistemic representation of its subject (for us).
However, there is also a sense in which the notion of epistemic representation 
seems to be broader than the ordinary notion of representation. This, I think, is 
due to an ambiguity of the ordinary notion o f representation. ‘Represent’ is 
sometimes used as a success verb and sometimes not. This is probably why we 
usually tend to conflate two distinct facts— the fact that a certain vehicle is an 
(epistemic) representation of a certain target and the fact that it can be more or less 
faithful (epistemic) representation of that target. Let me illustrate this point with an 
example. If we show a friend a portrait that depicts a 17th century nobleman and 
ask her to describe the person represented by it, she will probably be able to infer 
from the portrait a description of the person portrayed. In doing that, our friend 
performs a number of inferences from the portrait to the person it portrays. But 
why should we assume that the description inferred from the portrait is true? For 
all we know, the portrait could be a erroneous representation o f its subject (the 
painter may have never actually seen the person portrayed or may be mistaken 
about them), it could be a mendacious representation of its subject (the painter 
intended to mislead the viewers about the appearance of its subject), or it could be 
an ironic representation of its subject (who is in fact a contemporary whose 
manners resemble those of a 17th century gentleman).
Suppose, for example, that the painter meant to mislead the viewers about the 
appearance of the person portrayed, say, the Duke of Edinburgh. The portrait can 
deceive the viewers about the appearance of the Duke of Edinburgh only if, for 
them, it is an epistemic representation of Duke o f Edinburgh— i.e. only if, from it, 
the users are going to draw conclusions about the appearance o f the Duke of 
Edinburgh not someone else. However, if the viewers are deceived by the portrait, 
at least some of the valid inferences from the portrait to the Duke must not be 
sound. For this reason, besides notion o f epistemic representation we need to
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introduce the further notion o f faithful epistemic representation, which I will do in 
Section 1.2.6.
1.2.2. So m e  R em arks  A b o u t  D e n o t a t io n
Denotation is among the most widely discussed notions in philosophy and it is well 
beyond the scope of this thesis to give a full account of this notion. Nevertheless, 
since this notion plays an important role throughout this thesis, a few remarks 
about my use of the notion seems to be in order here.
The notion of denotation is usually discussed within the context o f philosophy 
of language. There denotation is (minimally) construed as a relation that holds 
between certain kinds of linguistic expression— I will call them denoting 
expressions—and objects (in the broadest sense o f the word).6 Proper names are the 
prototypical example of denoting expressions. For example, ‘Napoleon’ denotes 
Napoleon.
In the analytic philosophy of art, however, the notion of denotation has a 
broader use. O n this broader use, none of the relata of the denotation relation 
needs to be a linguistic expression. Any two objects (in the broadest sense of the 
term ‘object’) can be (among) the relata of the denotation relation. As far as I can 
see, this use o f the term ‘denotation’ in philosophy of art is consistent with the 
narrower use that seems to be prevalent in philosophy of language if we only 
assume that the objects that serve as linguistic expressions are only some of the 
objects that can be used to denote other objects. In this thesis, I use ‘denotation’ in 
the broader sense in which it is used in philosophy of art.
But what is denotation? W hat does it mean to say that something denotes 
something else? I will not try to answer these questions here. Rather I will take 
denotation to be a primitive notion This does not mean that philosophers or 
scientists cannot tell us anything deeper about denotation (e.g. what is it about the
6 I say ‘minimally’ because I take it that most philosophers of language do not conceive of the 
denotation relation as a dyadic relation.
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human mind or brain that allows us to use objects to denote other objects). It only 
means that, even if there is something deeper to be said about denotation, it is not 
likely to affect what I will say here.
Here, I will assume that a vehicle denotes a certain target for a certain user if 
and only if the user takes the vehicle to denote the target. As far as I can see, I do 
not need to commit myself to any specific account o f what it means for a user to 
take an object to denote another object. I take it that it is uncontroversial that, as 
human beings, we happen to be able to use some objects to denote (or stand for) 
other objects. If one were to deny that we have this ability, they would seem to 
have troubles to explain even our most basic linguistic and symbolic practices. If 
there is any controversy about denotation, it concerns how some things get to 
denote other things (for us) not about the fact that some things get to denote other 
things (for us). However, nothing in what I will say here depends on how some 
things get to denote other things for us. It only depends on the fact that some 
things do denote other things for us, which, as I said, I take to be a rather 
uncontroversial assumption.
1.2.3. D e n o t a t io n  a n d  E pist e m ic  Re p r e se n t a t io n
Once we distinguish between, denotation and epistemic representation, it is easier 
to see where exactly I disagree with Callender and Cohen. I think that Callender 
and Cohen are right in believing that there is no special problem of scientific 
representation— it is their reasons for believing so that are wrong. Callender and 
Cohen think that there is no special problem about scientific representation 
because scientific representation is a case of denotation. I believe that there is no 
special problem about scientific representation because it is a case of epistemic 
representation.
In particular, it may well be the case that in principle anything can denote 
anything else for a user if the right conditions are in place, but this does not mean 
that denotation is a sufficient condition for epistemic representation. The London 
Underground logo, the words ‘the Tube’, and the London Underground map may
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ail denote the London Underground network (for us), but only the last is an 
epistemic representation o f it for us— only the map is used by us to perform pieces 
of surrogative reasoning from it to the London Underground network.
It is important to note that, here, I am not denying that the London 
Underground logo and the words ‘the Tube’ could be epistemic representations of 
the London Underground network i f  the appropriate conditions obtained. W hat I 
am denying is that, even if they denote the London Underground network, they 
are epistemic representations of it. I take this to show that denotation is not a 
sufficient condition for epistemic representation.
1.2.4. R e p r e s e n t a t io n a l  C o n t e n t ,  S c o p e , a n d  B a c k g r o u n d  K n o w le d g e
I will now introduce some further notions that will be useful in what follows.
(2) Two epistemic representations of the same target offer conflicting 
representations of (an aspect of) the target if and only if:
[2.1] From the one it is valid to infer a certain proposition and 
from the other is valid to infer the negation o f that proposition.
So, for example, an old 1930s map of London Underground and the new map 
offer conflicting representations of (an aspect of) the London Underground 
network because, among other things, from the one it is valid to infer that there is 
no direct train service between Euston and Oxford Street stations, while, from the 
other, it is valid to infer that there is a direct train service between those stations.
(3) The representational content of an epistemic representation is the set 
of propositions that is valid to infer from the vehicle (in accordance 
with a given set of rules).
So, for example, since, according to the rules standardly associated with the 
London Underground map, it is valid to infer from it that Holborn and Bethnal 
Green stations are connected by Central Line trains, the proposition expressed by 
‘Holborn and Bethnal Green stations are connected by Central Line trains’ is part
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of the representational content o f the map (given the standard set o f rules 
ordinarily associated with it).
It is important to emphasize that a vehicle in and of itself does not have a 
representational content only epistemic representations do. It is only in relation to 
a set of rules according to which some surrogative inferences are valid and some are 
not that the epistemic representation has a representational scope. Since we 
ordinarily use the same term (e.g. ‘map’) to refer to an epistemic representation and 
its vehicle, it is easy to get confused about this. However, in any ambiguous cases, 
context should help the reader to determine whether terms such as ‘map’ refer to 
an epistemic representation or its vehicle. For example, whenever I talk of the 
representational content o f a map, I intend ‘map’ to refer to an epistemic 
representation not to the material object that is its vehicle.
(4) Two epistemic representations of the same target have the same scope 
if and only if:
[4.1] for every proposition p, p  is part of the representational 
content of the one if and only if p  or its negation is part of the 
representational content of the other.
(5) O f two epistemic representations o f the same target, A  and B, A  has 
wider scope than B if and only if:
[5.1] for every proposition />, if p  is part o f the representational 
content of B, p  or its negation is part o f the representational 
content of A
[5.2] for some proposition p, p  is part of the representational 
content of A and neither p  nor its negation is part of the 
representational content of B.
(6) O f two epistemic representations o f the same target, A  and B, B has 
narrower scope than A  if and only if:
[6.1] A  has wider scope than B.
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Ir follows from (2) and (4) that two epistemic representations can have the same 
scope even if  they offer conflicting representations of their target. So, for example, 
if two maps of Venice have exactly the same representational content except for the 
fact that from one it is valid to infer that there is a bridge over a certain canal while 
from the other it is possible to infer that there is no bridge over that canal the two 
maps have the same scope but they offer conflicting representations of (that aspect 
of) Venice.
It is important to note that definitions (4) and (5) imply that the relation 
‘having the same or broader scope than’ is a partial order. In other words, it is 
possible that neither of two epistemic representations of the same target has the 
same or broader scope than the other. This seems to be intuitively correct if one 
considers that there are epistemic representations of the same target whose scopes 
are largely different and therefore hardly comparable. For example, if a view of 
Venice and a map of Venice have largely different scopes, there seems to be no 
point in trying to determine which of them has wider scope.
1.2.5. A s id e : A ppr o x im a t e  T r u t h  a n d  C l o se n e ss  t o  t h e  T r u t h
In the previous section, I have defined a sound surrogative inference as one that is 
valid and whose conclusion is true or approximately true. In this section, I will 
clarify my use of this expression (on the understanding that a philosophical account 
o f the notion of approximate truth is well beyond the scope o f this thesis).
As I use it here, the expression ‘approximately true’ applies to sentences or 
propositions. A sentence or proposition is approximately true if it is “close enough” 
to the truth, where in most cases what counts as close enough depends on the user 
and the circumstances. For example, assume that (the proposition expressed by) 
‘The room is 6 feet wide’ is strictly speaking false because the room in question is 
actually 5’H ” wide. Though strictly speaking false, it is clear that there are 
circumstances in which we would not consider (the proposition expressed by) ‘The 
room is 6 feet wide’ false. For example, if we are describing someone’s house to a 
friend, it is unlikely that our friend would consider our description of the house
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false upon discovering that the room is actually 5’ 11” wide. For us and in those 
circumstances, the (proposition expressed by the) sentence ‘the room is 6 feet wide’ 
would be approximately true. In different circumstances, however, the same 
sentence would not be approximately true for us. For example, if our friend wants 
to know whether a 6-feet-wide bookshelf will fit in one of the rooms we have just 
described, the sentence would no longer be approximately true because our friend 
needs to know if the room is wider than 6 feet. (If the room was actually 6’1 \ ‘The 
room is 6 feet wide’ would probably still be approximately true for us in those 
circumstances.)
However, there is also a sense in which ‘The room is 6’ wide’ is closer to the truth 
(about the width of the 5’11” wide room) than ‘The room is 6’1” wide’. By this I 
only mean that, for all circumstances and all users, if the second sentence was 
approximately true, the first would be approximately true, but there are 
circumstances in which the first is approximately true but the second is not. (For 
example, if our friend’s bookshelf was exactly 6’1” wide the first sentence would 
still be approximately true for us while the second would be not. From the first we 
could find out that the bookshelf doesn’t fit on that wall, from the other we would 
not.)
1.2.6. F a i t h f u l  E p is te m ic  R e p r e s e n t a t io n
Consider again the old map of the London Underground and the new map of the 
London Underground I mentioned at the beginning of the previous section. Both 
represent the London Underground network in the sense that one can perform 
surrogative inferences from either map to the network. However, the two maps 
offer two conflicting representations o f  (some aspects of) the London Underground 
network— one can validly draw from one some conclusions that are the negation of 
conclusions that can be validly drawn from the other. As I have mentioned, for 
example, from the old map, one would infer that there is no direct train connection 
between Euston and Oxford Circus, while, from the new map, one would infer 
that Victoria Line trains operate between those two stations.
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Whereas the surrogative inferences from the new map are all sound (or at least 
so I assume here), some of the inferences from the old map to today’s network are 
not because, in the meantime, there have been significant changes to the London 
Underground network (I assume that the reverse would be true of the 1930’s 
London Underground network). In this sense, we could say that the old map 
misrepresents today’s network (to some degree). Prima facie, it could seem 
inconsistent to claim that the old map both represents today’s network and 
misrepresents it. However, the inconsistency disappears once we realize that the 
fact that the map misrepresents the network not only does not imply that the map 
does not represent the network but actually implies that it represents it.
To avoid this kind of confusion, it is wise to introduce the following set of 
definitions:
(7) A vehicle is a completely faithful epistemic representation of a certain 
target if and only if:
[7.1] it is an epistemic representation of the target and
[7.2] all of the valid inferences from it to the target are sound.7
(8) A vehicle is a partially faithful epistemic representation o f a certain 
target if and only if:
[8.1] it is an epistemic representation o f the target and
[8.2] some of the valid inferences from it to the target are sound.
7 It is important to note that, in order to be a completely faithful epistemic representation of its 
target, a representation does not need to be a perfect replica of its target. The new London 
Underground map, for example, is a completely faithful epistemic representation of today’s network 
because, from it, one can only draw true conclusions about today’s network (or, at least, so I assume 
here). This, however, does not mean that the map is a perfect replica of the London Underground 
network. There are innumerably many aspects of the London Underground network that are 
beyond the representational scope of the map (e.g. the internal structure of the stations or the spatial 
relations among them).
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(9) A vehicle is a completely unfaithful epistemic representation of a certain
target if and only if:
[9.1] the vehicle is an epistemic representation o f the target, and
[9.2] none of the valid inferences from the vehicle to the target are 
sound.
If only we assume that by ‘misrepresents’ we mean ‘is not a completely faithful 
epistemic representation o f  and by ‘represents’ we mean ‘is an epistemic 
representation o f the network,’ then it becomes apparent that not only the fact that 
the map misrepresents today’s network does not imply that the map does not 
represent the network it but it actually implies that it does represent it. In other 
words, a vehicle cannot be an unfaithful epistemic representation of a certain target 
unless it is an epistemic representation of that target.
The notions defined in (7), (8) and (9) concern what I will call the overall 
faithfulness of a certain epistemic representation. However, the overall faithfulness 
of an epistemic representation should be distinguished by its specific faithfulness. 
For example, if  we are only interested in finding out whether or not there is a direct 
train connection between Holborn station and Liverpool Street station, the old 
London Underground map is as faithful a representation of the London 
Underground network as the new London Underground map for this specific 
purpose, even if overall the latter is a more faithful epistemic representation of it 
than the former.
(10) A vehicle is a specifically faithful epistemic representation of a
certain target for a certain user and a certain purpose if and only if:
[10.1] it is an epistemic representation o f the target
[10.2] and
[10.3] the specific conclusion in which the user is interested is true.
Unlike epistemic representation, faithful epistemic representation is a matter of 
degree. An epistemic representation can be a more or less faithful epistemic 
representation o f its target. The same vehicle can be a faithful epistemic
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representation of some aspects o f the target and misrepresent other aspects. This 
seems to be the case with the old London Underground map. The map 
misrepresents today’s system in the sense that, from it, it is possible to draw many 
false conclusions about today’s network. However, from the old map, it is also 
possible to draw a number of true conclusions about today’s network. In general, 
an epistemic representation of a certain target is faithful only insofar as the 
inferences from the vehicle to the target are sound.8
Two faithful epistemic representations, A  and B, of the same target T  can be 
equally faithful epistemic representations of it or one can be a more faithful 
epistemic representation than the other. It is therefore important to introduce the 
following two definitions.
(11) Two epistemic representations, A  and B, are equally faithful 
epistemic representations o f T  if and only if:
[11.1] A and B  have the same scope
[11.2] the set of true conclusions validly drawn from A t o T  and the 
set o f true conclusions validly drawn from B  to T  coincide and
[11.3] None o f the false conclusions validly drawn from A  or B  to T  
is closer to the truth than the corresponding conclusion from B 
or A to T.
(12) O f two epistemic representations of T, A  and B, A  is a more 
faithful than B  if:
8 The distinction between epistemic representation and faithful epistemic representation is 
analogous to a distinction drawn by Mauricio Suarez (Suarez 2002 and Suarez 2004), who claims 
that we should distinguish between representation and ‘accurate, true and complete representation’ 
(Suarez 2004, p.767). The importance of such distinctions, I think, can hardly be overestimated. 
The fact that ‘representation’ is used to both refer to what I call epistemic representation and 
faithful epistemic representation is the source of many of the problems connected with the notion of 
representation. Much misunderstanding could be easily avoided by carefully distinguishing between 
different senses of representation.
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[12.1] A  and B  have the same scope and
[12.2] :
[12.2.1] the set of true conclusions about T  that it is valid to 
draw from B is a proper subset o f the set o f true conclusions 
that it is valid to draw from A  or
[12.2 .2] :
[12.2.2.1] some of the conclusions validly drawn from A to 
T  are closer to the truth than those from B to T  and
[12.2.2.2] none o f the conclusions validly drawn from B  to 
T  are closer to the truth than those from A to T.
It is important to note that the conditions provided by (12) are sufficient but 
not necessary conditions for A to be a more faithful epistemic representation o f T  
than B. There may well be other ways for A  to be a more faithful epistemic 
representation of T  than B  that are not covered by (12). For example, if from B  it is 
valid to infer only one true conclusion about (a certain aspect of) T  and from A  it is 
valid to infer a very large number of true conclusions about other aspects of T bu t a 
false conclusion about that particular aspect of T, I think that we would be likely to 
regard A  as a more faithful epistemic representation of T  than B  even if A  does not 
satisfy the conditions provided by (12). However, I do not think that these cases 
are as uncontroversial as the cases (12) covers. It seems to be at best unclear how 
the unfaithfulness of a representation relates to that o f the other. The virtue o f
(12), I think, is that it covers all cases that are uncontroversial while leaving open 
the possibility that some less uncontroversial cases may still be cases of one 
epistemic representation of a certain target being more faithful than another.
Even if it was possible to provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
an epistemic representation o f a target to be more faithful than another, the 
relation ‘being an equally or more faithful epistemic representation o f T  than’ 
would not be a partial order. That is, there are epistemic representations o f a 
certain target such that neither is an equally or more faithful epistemic
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representation of the target than the other. This follows from the fact that among 
the conditions for being an equally faithful epistemic representation o f a certain 
target than another is that both epistemic representations have the same scope and 
not all representations o f the same target have the same scope (in the 
abovementioned case of the view of Venice and the map of Venice for example we 
have reasons to believe that the two representations have largely different scopes).
Some may think that the requirement that A  and B  have the same scope in (11) 
is too stringent. However, I think that not including that requirement would give 
us some counterintuitive consequences. For example, we could have two epistemic 
representations of a certain target that are equally faithful even if one is completely 
faithful and the other is not (if the first has narrower scope than the second). I 
think that intuitively we would think that a completely faithful epistemic 
representation o f a certain target cannot be equally faithful to one that is not 
completely faithful as, by definition, an epistemic representation that is not 
completely faithful is partially unfaithful.
1.2.7. Sc ie n t if ic  M o d e l s  as E piste m ic  Re p r e se n t a t io n s
How does all this relate to scientific models? Scientific models, I claim, are 
epistemic representations of certain systems in the world (for their users) and, as 
such, they can be used to perform surrogative inferences from the model to the 
systems in question. In this section, I illustrate this claim by means of three 
emblematic examples of scientific models: the inclined plane model (1.2.7.1) and 
the Thomson and the Rutherford models o f the atom (1.2.7.2).
1.2.7.1 The Inclined Plane Model
Suppose that we want to ensure that a soap-box derby is safe. More specifically, we 
want to make sure that, when the cars reach the finish line at the foot of the hill, 
their velocity does not exceed a specific velocity that we deem safe. To perform this 
task, we may use a very simple model from classical mechanics: the frictionless
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inclined plane.9 In the model, a block lies at the top of a frictionless inclined plane. 
The only forces acting on the block are the gravitational force and the normal force 
acting perpendicular to the plane. At the top of the plane, the kinetic energy of the 
block is 0 (KEj=0) and its gravitational potential energy is U=mgh, where m is the 
mass of the block, g  is the gravitational acceleration and h is the height between the 
top and the bottom of the plane. The mechanical energy of the system, E, is thus 
given by E=KEj+U=0+mg =mgh. Since the energy in the system is conserved, when 
the block reaches the end of the slope, all the potential energy will be converted 
into kinetic energy. The kinetic energy of the block at the end o f the slope will be, 
therefore, KEf = 1/2 mvL=mgh. Solving for v> we can determine that the velocity of 
the block at the bottom of the slope will be vj={2ghy12. The final velocity o f the 
block, therefore, depends only on h and g.
By plugging in determinate values for g  and h, we obtain a determinate value for 
the velocity of the block at the bottom of the slope. From physics textbooks, we 
know that 9.8m/s2 is a very good approximation o f the gravitational acceleration 
experienced by a body near the surface of the earth, such as the cars in the soap-box 
derby, and we can set h so that it is the same as the difference in height between the 
start-line of the soap box-derby and the foot of the hill, say, 10 metres. Given these 
inputs, the velocity of the block at the bottom of the slope will be approximately 
14 m/s or 50.4 km/h.
From the inclined plane model, we can therefore infer that the velocity o f the 
cars at the bottom of the hill is going to be 50.4 km/h. A knowledgeable user 
however will take this conclusion with a pinch of salt, as she knows that the 
inclined plane model cannot possibly be a completely faithful epistemic 
representation of the soap-box derby. One of the reasons to think so is that some of 
the factors that affect the final velocity o f the cars have no counterpart in the 
model. The knowledgeable user would probably say that the final velocity of the 
cars will be approximately 50 km/h and, since the most relevant o f these factors
9 I owe this example to Bernard Nickel.
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contribute to the deceleration of the cars, she would probably say that the velocity 
o f the cars is likely to be less than 50 km/h.
Here it is important to distinguish what the user infers from the model from 
what her back-ground knowledge tells her about the conclusion drawn from the 
model. What she infers from the model about the velocity of the cars is not 
different from what any other competent user of the model would normally infer 
from it; however her background-knowledge suggests to her that the conclusion 
drawn from the model cannot be literally true and is, at best, “approximately 
true”— that is the value of the velocity o f the cars will be close enough to that of 
the velocity of the box in the model.
1.2.7.2 The Thomson and the Rutherford Models o f the Atom
Consider now a more complicated case. The Rutherford model of the atom was 
originally proposed by Ernest Rutherford (1911) in order to account for the 
phenomenon now known as Rutherford scattering. In a series of experiments in 
1909, Hans Geiger and Ernest Marsden found that, in passing through a foil of 
gold 0.00004 cm thick, one in 20,000 alpha-particles was scattered at an average 
angle of 90° (Geiger and Marsden 1909). The phenomenon could not be 
accounted for by what, at the time, was the main model of the atom— the 
Thomson model of the atom, also informally known as the “plum pudding” 
model. In the plum pudding model, the negatively charged electrons are embedded 
in a sphere of uniform positive charge that takes up the whole volume of the atom, 
like raisins in a plum pudding. The positive charge and mass are uniformly 
distributed over the volume of the atom.
If the golden foil in Rutherford’s experiment was made up of atoms like the 
ones in the Thomson model, even if all of the approximately 400 atoms in the foil 
fortuitously happened to deflect an alpha-particle in the same direction, the particle 
would still be scattered at a very small angle. Simple calculation shows that, for 
each atom an alpha particle crosses, an alpha-particle would pick up a total 
sideways velocity o f approximately 6750 metres per second— only a few ten-
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thousandths o f the particle’s forward velocity, which is approximately 1.6 x 107 
meters per second (see Fowlers 1997).
It is worth noting that here we are using a model, the Thomson model o f the 
atom, as a building block of a larger model, a model of Geiger and Masden’s 
experiments. In the latter model, alpha particles are represented as very heavy, 
positively charged particles and each o f the atoms in the golden foil is represented 
as the atom in the Thomson model. From this larger model, we can infer that 
Rutherford scattering would never occur. However, since Geiger and Masden’s 
1909 experiments show that the phenomenon actually occurs, the model of the 
experiment based on the Thomson model of the atom is not a completely faithful 
epistemic representation o f the experimental situation as it leads to a false 
conclusion about the experimental results. As Rutherford quickly realized, the 
experiments showed that the Thomson model was not a faithful epistemic 
representation of the atom.
The results of the Geiger and Marsden experiments suggested to Rutherford a 
different model of the atom. In the Rutherford model, all the positive charge o f the 
atom and almost all of its mass is concentrated in the nucleus, whose radius is one- 
hundredth of that of the atom, and the rest of the volume of the atom is empty 
except for the orbiting electrons. Since the total deflection of a positively charged 
particle by a sphere o f positive charge increases as the inverse of the radius o f the 
sphere, the encounter with one single nucleus can deflect an alpha-particle at an 
angle o f 90°. However, since most o f the volume of the atom is empty except for 
the electrons and the mass of electrons is too little to scatter high-momentum 
alpha-particles, most alpha-particles will not be deflected. Unlike the Thomson 
model of the atom, thus, from the Rutherford model we can soundly infer that 
Rutherford scattering will occur. From the model, we can also infer that the 
scattering of one in 20,000 alpha-particles at large angles is caused by the 
electromagnetic repulsion exerted by the atomic nuclei on those alpha particles that 
go close enough to one o f them. If this inference is sound, the Rutherford model
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faithfully represents this aspect of the behaviour o f the atom and explains 
Rutherford scattering.
When we say that the Thomson and the Rutherford models of the atom 
represents one o f the atoms in the golden foil in Geiger and Marsden’s 
experiments, we are not merely saying that they denote the gold atom, like the 
letters ‘Au’ on the periodic table do. Rather, we are saying that they are epistemic 
representations of the atom— in the sense, that both can be used to draw 
conclusions about certain aspects of atoms. As I have already mentioned, the two 
models are not equally faithful epistemic representations of the atom. One o f the 
conclusions about the atom that can be drawn from the Thomson model of the 
atom (according to its standard interpretation) has been proven false by Geiger and 
Marsden’s experiments.
Only a couple of years after Rutherford proposed his model of the atom, in 
1913, Niels Bohr published a pioneering paper in two parts titled ‘O n the 
Constitution of Atoms and Molecules’ (Bohr 1913). Among other things, in the 
paper, Bohr pointed out that the Rutherford model o f the atom is highly unstable. 
According to classical electrodynamics, any accelerated charge radiates energy. 
Therefore, the orbiting electrons in the Rutherford model would rapidly collapse 
into the nucleus. The Rutherford model was not a completely faithful epistemic 
representation either as from it one could draw the conclusions that atoms are 
much more unstable than they actually are.
It is difficult to assess to what extent this result was new to Rutherford. On the 
one hand, nothing in the Rutherford 1911 article suggests that Rutherford knew 
that the atom in his model was extremely unstable. This hypothesis is also 
supported by the fact that, in a later paper, Rutherford credits Bohr with drawing 
attention to this point (Rutherford 1914, p.498). On the other hand, in the 1911 
article, Rutherford claimed: ‘the question of the stability of the atom proposed 
need not be considered at this stage, for this will obviously depend upon the 
minute structure o f the atom, and on the motion o f the constituent charged parts’ 
(Rutherford 1911, p. 671).
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In proposing a model o f a certain system, scientists do not commit themselves 
to the model being a completely faithful epistemic representation of the target 
system. It is only through an investigative process that our competence in using a 
certain model as a faithful epistemic representation o f the system increases. This 
process consists in determining to what extent the valid inferences from the model 
to the system are sound. In some cases, some of the inferences that are valid 
according to the standard interpretation of the model may be found to be unsound 
when that aspect o f the system is empirically investigated (as in the case of the 
Thomson model o f the atom and Rutherford’s scattering). In other cases, 
inferences whose conclusions are known to be incorrect may be shown to be validly 
inferred from the model (as it is in the case of Bohr’s “discovery” of the instability 
o f the atom in the Rutherford model).
I take these examples to show that scientific models are often used to perform 
inferences about a certain target system and, as such, they can be considered 
epistemic representations of their target systems. The Bohr model o f the hydrogen 
atom and the ‘H ’ letter on the periodic table both denote the atom, but only Bohr 
model of the atom is an epistemic representation of it. As I have argued, denotation 
is not sufficient for epistemic representation. This seems to suggest that, if there is 
no special problem about scientific representation, it is not because scientific 
representation is simply an instance o f denotation as Callender and Cohen seem to 
think, but because scientific models are epistemic representations like the London 
Underground map.10
10 Some may feel that there are still important differences between scientific models rand other 
epistemic representations that make the problem of scientific representation a special problem. (I 
will discuss a few o f them in Section II. 1.2.4 below.) From a methodological point of view, 
however, it seems reasonable to assume that scientific models represent their target exactly like any 
other epistemic representation until proven otherwise— until we can specify an essential difference 
in how models and other epistemic representations are used as epistemic representations.
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. Epistemic Representation
II. 1. The Inferential Conception of Scientific 
Representation
II. 1.1. In t r o d u c t io n
In this chapter, I will examine one of the main conceptions o f scientific 
representation in the literature— Mauricio Suarez’s inferential conception of 
scientific representation— and argue that it does not provide us with a satisfactory 
account of “scientific” representation. According to Suarez, the primary aim of a 
substantial conception of scientific representation— i.e. a conception which 
specifies non-trivial necessary and sufficient conditions for scientific 
representation— is to answer the question: ‘By virtue of what is a certain vehicle a 
scientific representation of a certain target?’ and not the question: ‘By virtue of 
what is a certain vehicle an accurate or truthful scientific representation o f that 
target?’ In the terminology adopted here, the inferential conception of 
representation proposed by Suarez is, thus, meant to be a conception of “scientific” 
representation and not of what makes a “scientific” representation more or less 
faithful.
According to the inferential conception, ‘A  represents B only if (i) the 
representational force of A  points to B and (ii) A  allows competent and informed 
agents to perform inferences regarding E> (Suarez 2004, p.773). Condition (i) 
seems to amount to what so far I have called denotation. Suarez maintains that 
‘[...] this feature would be satisfied by a mere stipulation of a target for any source 
[which is Suarez’s term for what I call ‘vehicle’]’ (Suarez 2004, p.771). However, 
according to Suarez, in order for A  to be a scientific representation of B, it is not 
sufficient that A  denotes B: ‘[...] if a representation is to be objective in this sense 
(i.e., if it is to be a candidate for a scientific representation) it cannot be an 
arbitrary sign’ (Suarez 2004, p.772). Hence, the second necessary condition for 
scientific representation: A  is a scientific representation of B only if an informed
and competent user would be able to perform (valid though not necessarily sound) 
surrogative inferences from A  to B. Condition (ii) seems to amount to what I have 
called valid surrogative reasoning.
In the terminology that I have adopted here we can therefore reformulate the 
inferential conception as maintaining that
(A) A vehicle is a scientific representation of a target (for a user) 
only if:
(A.l) The user takes the vehicle to stand for the target and 
(A.2) The user is able to perform valid surrogative inferences 
from the vehicle to the target.
Conditions (A. l)and (A.2) amount to what I have called, respectively, denotation 
and valid surrogative reasoning. According to the inferential conception, thus, 
denotation and valid surrogative reasoning are individually necessary but not 
jointly sufficient conditions for scientific representation.
Denotation
Scientific
Representation
Valid
Surrogative Reasoning
Diagram 2. The Inferential Conception 
Suarez however does not think that this is a problem for the inferential 
conception o f scientific representation because the inferential conception is not 
meant to be a substantial conception of scientific representation. According to him, 
‘representation is not the kind of notion that requires, or admits, [universal 
necessary and sufficient] conditions’ (Suarez 2004, p.771). Thus, according to 
Suarez, a conception o f scientific representation cannot provide us with a set of 
non-trivial conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for 
scientific representation.
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Suarez offers two possible interpretations o f the non-substantiality of the 
inferential conception. On the one hand, Suarez claims that one should not look 
for further conditions because there are ‘[—] no deeper features to scientific 
representation other than its surface features’ (Suarez 2004, p.769). According to 
Suarez, these features are surface features in the sense that they are features o f the 
concept o f scientific representation (Suarez 2004, n. 4). On this interpretation, 
Suarez claims, the inferential conception would be a deflationary conception of 
scientific representation (Suarez 2004, pp.770-771).
On the other hand, Suarez seems to think that there are further, more concrete 
conditions by virtue of which the concept of scientific representation applies to 
cases of scientific representation, but that these further conditions differ from case 
to case. For example, Suarez claims that: ‘in every specific context of inquiry, given 
a putative target and source, some stronger conditions will typically be met; but 
which one specifically will vary from case to case. In some cases it will be 
isomorphism, in other cases it will be similarity, etc.’ (Suarez 2004, p.776).n 
According to this interpretation, Suarez would be claiming that a conception of 
representation can spell out a set of necessary conditions for the concept of 
scientific representation but it cannot spell out a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for its application. On this interpretation, the inferential conception 
would be, Suarez says, a minimalist conception o f scientific representation.
In this chapter, I will mainly focus on the points on which I disagree with 
Suarez. Before turning to those, it is worth briefly mentioning a few of the most 
crucial points on which I agree with him. The first point on which I agree with 
Suarez is that the question ‘By virtue o f what does a certain model represent a 
certain target?’ is to be clearly distinguished from the question ‘By virtue of what 
does a certain model represent its target faithfully?’. The second point is that 
denotation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for epistemic representation. 
The third point of agreement is that valid surrogative reasoning is a necessary 
condition for epistemic representation.
11 Similarly, see also (Suarez 2003, p.768 and p.776).
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Despite my agreement with Suarez on these three points, however, there are a 
number o f issues on which I disagree with him. The first point o f disagreement 
concerns the relation between the conditions that I have called ‘denotation’ and 
valid surrogative reasoning. Suarez seems to think o f them as two independent 
conditions, each o f which is individually necessary for epistemic or scientific 
representation and neither of which implies the other. I think that Suarez is 
mistaken on this point— denotation and (possible valid) surrogative reasoning are 
not distinct conditions because denotation itself is a necessary condition for 
surrogative reasoning. For the moment I will put aside this point of disagreement 
because my reasons for thinking that denotation and surrogative reasoning are not 
independent will become clear only in the next chapter in which I develop and 
defend my account o f epistemic representation.
The second point of disagreement concerns whether or not valid surrogative 
reasoning is a sufficient condition for epistemic or scientific representation. On the 
inferential conception, valid surrogative reasoning and denotation are necessary but 
not sufficient conditions for scientific representation. So, a fortiori, valid 
surrogative reasoning is not sufficient for scientific representation. On the 
definition of epistemic representation that I have proposed (definition (1) in 
Section 1.2.1) valid surrogative reasoning is both necessary and sufficient for 
epistemic representation. So, an advocate o f the inferential conception must deny 
that valid surrogative reasoning is sufficient for epistemic representation or that 
scientific representation is just a kind of epistemic representation. In Section II. 1.2, 
I will argue that there seem to be no good reason to deny either of those claims.
The third point o f disagreement concerns the relation between epistemic 
representation and the user’s ability to perform valid surrogative inferences. In 
Section II. 1.3, I will argue that, first, the fact that the user is able to perform 
surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the target is a consequence o f the fact 
that the vehicle is an epistemic representation o f the target (for that user), not the 
reverse and that, second, a satisfactory account of epistemic representation should 
explain by virtue o f what a user is able to perform valid surrogative inferences from
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the vehicle to the target if the vehicle is an epistemic representation o f the target. 
On the inferential conception, however, it would seem that the fact that the user is 
able to perform surrogative reasoning from the vehicle to the target is a brute fact 
that cannot be further explained or analysed. This, I think, makes the user’s ability 
to perform valid inferences form the vehicle to the target unnecessarily mysterious.
II. 1.2. Is S u r r o g a t i v e  R e a s o n in g  S u f f i c i e n t  f o r  “S c i e n t i f i c ” 
R e p r e s e n ta t io n ?
According to the inferential conception of scientific representation, surrogative 
reasoning is a necessary but not sufficient condition for scientific representation. 
This means that, according to the inferential conception, a user may able to 
perform inferences from a certain vehicle to a certain target without the vehicle 
being a scientific representation of that target. In this section I will consider a few 
reasons why one might think that this is the case and I will find them all wanting. 
My argument will be divided into two stages. First, I will argue that there seems to 
be no reason to think that surrogative reasoning is not sufficient for epistemic 
representation (II. 1 .2 .1—II. 1 .2 .3 ). Then, I will argue that there seems to be no 
reason to think that there are conditions that distinguish scientific representations 
from other epistemic representations (II. 1.2 .4).
II. 1.2. IM ust Every Epistemic Representation Be Partially Faithful?
If surrogative reasoning was not sufficient for representation, then it would be 
possible for a user to perform surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the target 
even if the vehicle was not an epistemic representation o f the target. Therefore, the 
best way to argue that (valid) surrogative reasoning is not sufficient for epistemic 
representation is to produce an example in which this is the case.12 Suppose that 
someone performs valid inferences from the Rutherford model of the atom to a 
certain physical system, say, a hockey-puck sliding on the surface of a frozen pond.
12 Again, although I have not defined what a valid inference from a model is, I shall take it to be 
sufficiently clear to proceed here, awaiting Section II.2.6 for further discussion of it.
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From the model, for example, the user infers that the puck is negatively charged 
and the ice is positively charged, or that the puck’s trajectory is circular. Since, on 
my characterization of epistemic representation, valid surrogative reasoning is 
sufficient for epistemic representation, this example seems to force me to accept the 
apparently problematic conclusion that the Rutherford model is an epistemic 
representation o f the puck-on-ice system (or more precisely that it is one for the 
user in question).
Now, it is very likely that, from the model, the user will only draw false 
conclusions about the system in question, or, in any case, we can assume so here. 
But this is beside the point. Unlike faithful epistemic representation, epistemic 
representation only requires that the user is able to perform valid inferences from 
the model to the system and not that any o f these inferences are sound. Those who 
want to deny that (valid) surrogative reasoning is sufficient for epistemic 
representation, however, might want to claim that, if all the valid inferences from a 
certain vehicle to a certain target are unsound, then the vehicle is not an epistemic 
representation o f the target. In other words, they might want to maintain that at 
least some of the valid inferences from the vehicle to the target need to be sound in 
order for the vehicle to be an epistemic representation of the target.13
If this were the case, however, a vehicle would be an epistemic representation of 
a certain target only if it was a partially faithful epistemic representation of the 
target. This, however, seems to be too strong a requirement, as it would rule out 
that completely unfaithful epistemic representations of a target are epistemic
13 Whereas Suarez never embraces this position, Daniela Bailer-Jones (2003) seems to do so. If 
my interpretation of her brief remarks on the topic is correct, Bailer-Jones thinks that a certain 
model represents a certain system only if some of the conclusions about the system one can draw 
form the model are true. A great deal of (Bailer-Jones 2003) is devoted to investigating which of the 
conclusions that can be drawn from a model have to be true of a system in order for the model to 
represent the system. Bailer-Jones tentatively concludes that this depends on what the intended 
function of the model is and on which aspects of the system the model is intended to be about. 
Ultimately, then, it is the users of the model who determine which of the conclusions drawn from 
the model have to be true of the system in order for the model to represent the system.
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representations of that target, which seems to be incoherent because an epistemic 
representation of a certain target, no matter how unfaithful, is still an epistemic 
representation of it.
To this, those who deny that valid surrogative reasoning is sufficient for 
epistemic representation are likely to object that the notion of epistemic 
representation is a technical notion and that, as such, there is no correct way of 
defining it. So there is nothing incoherent in defining it so that a vehicle is an 
epistemic representation of a certain target (for a certain user) if and only if that 
user is able to perform valid surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the target 
and some of the valid inferences from the vehicle to the target are sound.
Whereas there is nothing wrong with this definition in and of itself, this 
definition runs into trouble if one believes that epistemic representation should be 
distinguished from faithful epistemic representation, as Suarez and I do. Once we 
draw the distinction between epistemic representation and faithful epistemic 
representation, it becomes apparent that being an epistemic representation is a 
precondition for being a compeltely unfaithful epistemic representation o f a certain 
target no less than it is a precondition for being a completely faithful epistemic 
representation of it. As I have already argued, when we fail to acknowledge this 
distinction, we can be misled into believing that we are contradicting ourselves 
when we say that something both represents and misrepresents something else.
For example, suppose that a scientist proposes a bona fide  model of a certain 
system that, upon investigation, turns out to misrepresent every aspect of the 
system that is intended to represent. Even if, gradually, we might come to discover 
that all the valid inferences from the model to the system are unsound, the model 
does not thereby cease to be regarded as an (epistemic) representation of the 
system. At most it ceases to be regarded as a faithful epistemic representation of the 
system. Once we distinguish the question of epistemic representation from that of 
faithful epistemic representation (as Suarez himself does), we come to realize that 
misrepresentation seems to presuppose representation no less than completely 
faithful epistemic representation. As I have already argued in Chapter 1.2, a vehicle
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has to represent a certain target in order to wmrepresent it— or, in a less confusing 
terminology, a vehicle needs to be an epistemic representation of a certain target in 
order to be a completely unfaithful epistemic representation o f it.
II. 1.2.2Must Every Epistemic Representation Be Known to Be Partially Faithful?
A second possible suggestion is that the Rutherford model is not an epistemic 
representation o f the puck-on-ice system not because all the inferences from the 
model to the system are unsound but because the user knows them to be all 
unsound. If this is right, then a vehicle represents a target only if its user does not 
know that all the inferences from the vehicle to the target are unsound. If, in the 
above example, the user knew that all inferences from the model to the system were 
unsound, then the model would not be an epistemic representation of the system.
According to this suggestion, whether something is an epistemic representation 
of something else depends on the knowledge the user has of the system. However, 
in the above example, we have not made any mention of the knowledge that the 
user has of the system. As far as we know, the user could even mistakenly believe 
that some of the inferences from the model to the system are sound. If this were the 
case, then for that user, the model would be an epistemic representation of the 
target, whereas, for us, it would not be one. So, there would be nothing 
intrinsically wrong with claiming that, at least for that user, the Rutherford model 
is an epistemic representation of the puck-on-ice system.
Consider again the completely unfaithful model example that I have mentioned 
in the previous subsection. When the model was originally proposed, we did not 
know that none o f the valid inferences from the model to the system were sound. 
Thus, for us, the model was an epistemic representation o f the system. Then, we 
gradually discovered that all the inferences from the model to the system are, in 
fact, unsound. However, it seems absurd to suggest that we cease to regard the 
model as an epistemic representation of the system after we find out that all the 
inferences from the model to the system are unsound. Obviously, we cease to 
regard the model as a faithful epistemic representation of the system, but not as an 
epistemic representation of the system.
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II. 1.2.3Must Every Epistemic Representation Be Believed to Be Partially Faithful?
A third possible suggestion is that the Rutherford model is not an epistemic 
representation of the puck-on-ice system because no actual user of the model 
believes or has ever believed that they can draw sound inferences from the model to 
the system. This suggestion presupposes that a vehicle can be an epistemic 
representation of a target (for a certain user) only if at some point in time the user 
has believed that the vehicle is a partially faithful epistemic representation of the 
target, even if  the vehicle is in fact a completely unfaithful epistemic representation 
o f the system. The difference between this suggestion and the first is that, 
according to this suggestion, the vehicle may turn out to be a completely unfaithful 
epistemic representation o f the target but still be an epistemic representation o f it. 
The difference between this suggestion and the second is that, according to this 
suggestion, the vehicle can be known, at a later stage, to be an entirely unfaithful 
epistemic representation o f the target but it might still be an epistemic 
representation of it if at some point the user believed it to be a partially faithful 
epistemic representation of the system.
Consider again the entirely unfaithful model example, at some point we might 
have believed that some of the inferences from the model to the system were sound, 
but this does not need to be the case. The model might have been proposed in a 
purely hypothetical and conjectural manner, without anyone necessarily believing 
that any of the inferences from it to the system were going to be sound. In other 
words, the model can be put forward purely as a generator of hypotheses about the 
system whose truth and falsity need to be empirically investigated. This is often the 
case when we have little or no idea as to what the internal constitution of a certain 
system might be as in the case of atoms in the mid-eighteen century.
So far, I have argued that there is no reason to deny that valid surrogative 
reasoning is sufficient for epistemic representation. If one were still to deny that 
valid surrogative reasoning is sufficient for epistemic representation, they would 
have to postulate that there is some “secret ingredient” that is present in the 
entirely unfaithful model case but is missing in the case of Rutherford model of the
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atom and the puck-on-ice system. Unless some condition that is met in the first 
case and not in the second is specified, however, it is difficult to evaluate this claim.
In fact, the difference between the two cases is, I think, circumstantial not 
substantial. According to the stories I have told, none of the conclusions about the 
puck-on-ice system validly drawn from the Rutherford model are interesting 
hypotheses about that system, while many of the conclusions validly drawn from 
the entirely unfaithful model were initially stimulating hypotheses about the system 
of which the model was an epistemic representation. The difference between the 
epistemic representations provided by the two models is not that one is an 
epistemic representation of its target system while the other is not— they are both 
epistemic representations o f their target systems. Nor is the difference that one does 
so faithfully while the other does not— they are both completely unfaithful 
epistemic representations.
The difference is in the role the two models play in the context of the stories I 
have told about them. The investigation o f the conclusions validly drawn from the 
completely unfaithful model may lead to new discoveries about the system and be 
instrumental to the development o f more faithful models o f that system, while the 
same would not apply to the case of the Rutherford model as an epistemic 
representation o f the puck-on-ice system, if we already knew from the start that all 
o f the valid inferences from the Rutherford model are unsound.
II. 1.2.4 Can Scientific Representation be distinguishedfrom Epistemic Representation?
So far I have argued that there seem to be no reason to deny that valid surrogative 
reasoning is sufficient for epistemic representation. However, what Suarez seems to 
deny is that valid surrogative reasoning is sufficient for scientific representation. If 
there were further conditions that distinguished scientific representations from 
other forms of epistemic representations, then surrogative reasoning may be 
sufficient for epistemic representation without being sufficient for scientific 
representation.
Before considering this option, let me note that it is very unlikely that this what 
Suarez actually thinks. Suarez repeatedly uses examples of epistemic representations
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that are not scientific in order to make points about “scientific” representation and 
does not seem to consider this practice problematic in any way. For example, one 
o f Suarez’s arguments against the similarity conception o f representation is that the 
similarity between a portrait and a person is neither necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for the portrait to represent that person. If  scientific representation was 
essentially different from other forms of epistemic representation, then the fact that 
similarity is not a necessary condition for other forms of epistemic representation 
would not show that it cannot be necessary for scientific representation (for all we 
know, even if Suarez’s arguments are right with regards to the portrait case, 
similarity could still be a necessary condition for an epistemic representation to be a 
scientific one). In general, it would seem that, if one believes that cases of scientific 
representation were essentially different from cases o f epistemic representation, they 
would engage in the practice of drawing lessons about scientific representation 
from non-scientific examples much more cautiously than Suarez does.
At any rate, even if we assume that Suarez does believe that scientific 
representation is essentially different from other forms o f epistemic representation, 
it is at best unclear whether he has good reasons to think that there are any further 
conditions that distinguish scientific representations from other epistemic 
representations. Indeed it is not even clear which epistemic representations are 
scientific and which are not. For example, are geographic maps scientific 
representations or not? Many scientists,'' including geographers and geologists, use 
maps as part of their scientific investigations and the way they use these maps as 
epistemic representations does not seem essentially different from the way maps are 
ordinarily used as epistemic representations for non-scientific purposes. 
Analogously, electric circuit diagrams are used by physicists, engineers and 
hobbyists alike. Are the electric circuit diagrams that physicists use scientific 
representations and the ones that hobbyists use non-scientific epistemic 
representation?
Even if we were able to draw such distinctions, there seems to be no good reason 
to assume that the sense in which “scientific” representations represent their targets
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is different from the sense in which other epistemic representations represent their 
targets. The fact that we are not able to find sufficient conditions to demarcate 
scientific representations from other epistemic representations might, therefore, 
simply be due to the fact that there are no such further conditions— scientific 
representations are nothing but epistemic representations that scientists use in the 
pursuit o f their research. In fact, I think that we should simply refrain from talking 
o f “scientific” representation altogether unless we are able to identify any essential 
difference between “scientific” representation and other epistemic representation.
Some might object that further conditions that distinguish scientific 
representations from other epistemic representation must be there even if we are 
currently unable to identify them. Someone may be able to draw (valid) inferences 
about a certain swing from a photo of that swing but that does not make the photo 
a model o f the swing. This objection however is based on a misunderstanding of 
what one should expect from an account o f epistemic or “scientific” representation. 
The fact that a user is able to draw inferences from a map to the city o f Venice 
makes of the map an epistemic representation o f Venice (for that user) and the fact 
that a user is able to draw inferences from a view of Venice to the city of Venice 
makes o f the painting an epistemic representation o f Venice (for that user). 
However, what makes of the map a map and what makes of painting a painting is 
not the fact that users can perform inferences from them to the city of Venice. In 
other words, an account of epistemic representation can account for what makes of 
a certain map a map of Venice and what makes o f a certain painting a view of 
Venice but should not be required to account for what makes them, respectively, a 
map and a painting in the first place. It may be the case that something can be a 
map, a painting or a model only if that something is an epistemic representation of 
something else (for some user), but an account o f epistemic representation does not 
need to explain what makes of a certain representation a map, a model or a 
painting.
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The arguments in this section obviously do not prove that the condition I have 
called valid surrogative reasoning is sufficient for epistemic representation or that 
there are no further conditions that distinguish “scientific” representations form 
other epistemic representations. However, I think the burden of the proof is now 
on those who want to deny either o f those two claims.
II. 1.3. O n  t h e  R e l a t io n  B e t w e e n  E pist e m ic  Re p r e se n t a t io n  a n d  
Su r r o g a t iv e  R e a s o n in g
In the previous section, I have argued that there seems to be no reason to deny that 
(the possibility of) surrogative reasoning is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
epistemic representation or that scientific representations are nothing but epistemic 
representations. So, a substantial conception of epistemic representation seems 
viable. Since surrogative reasoning seems to be not only necessary but also 
sufficient for epistemic representation, then the inferential conception may be, in 
fact, providing us with necessary and sufficient conditions for epistemic 
representation. In fact, in a recent paper with Albert Sole, Suarez goes as far as 
suggesting that denotation and surrogative reasoning may well be both necessary 
and sufficient for the definition of the concept of scientific representation, but that 
this does not exclude that some further condition (such as similarity or 
isomorphism) are met in each concrete application o f  that concept. Even if this 
were the case, argue Suarez and Sole, the inferential conception would not be a 
substantial conception o f scientific representation because, even if they were both 
necessary and sufficient, denotation and surrogative reasoning would only be 
surface features of scientific representation and a substantial conception of scientific 
representation is one that identifies non-trivial necessary and sufficient conditions 
for scientific representation.
In this section, I will argue that even if this was the case, the inferential 
conception would still not be a satisfactory conception o f epistemic representation. 
I think that the situation is best illustrated by using medical terminology. Consider 
the following (fictional) medical example. Suppose that everyone comes in contact
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with the measles virus develops measles and everyone who develops measles has 
come into contact with the measles virus and that whoever has measles develops 
Koplik spots and everyone who develops Koplik spots has measels. In other words, 
having come into contact with the measles virus and having Koplik spots are each 
necessary and sufficient conditions for having measles. However, they are not on 
the same level from an explanatory point o f view. Koplik spots are only a symptom 
o f  measles. The cause o f  measles is having been in contact with the virus. A 
satisfactory account of someone contracting measles is one that mentions the fact 
that they contracted the disease by coming into contact with the virus not one that 
mentions the appearance o f Koplik spots.
Valid surrogative reasoning, I think, may well be a necessary and sufficient 
condition for epistemic representation, but it is only a symptom of epistemic 
representation. While the possibility o f surrogative reasoning always accompanies 
epistemic representation, epistemic representation has conceptual precedence over 
actual surrogative reasoning. One is able to perform inferences from the London 
Underground map to the London Underground network by virtue o f  the fact that 
the map represents (i.e. is an epistemic representation of) the network for them, 
not the reverse— the map does not represent the network by virtue o f  the fact that 
one can use it to perform valid inferences about the network. In fact, we would not 
even attempt to use a piece o f glossy paper with coloured lines printed on it to find 
our way around the London Underground network if we did not already regard the 
former as an epistemic representation o f the latter. Surrogative reasoning, thus, 
presupposes epistemic representation. Hence, if  the map represents the network, it 
cannot do so in virtue of its allowing surrogative reasoning (on pain of circularity) 
but, it has to do so in virtue of something else.
The actual performance o f surrogative inferences is just a “symptom” that allows 
us to tell apart cases of epistemic representation from cases of mere denotation. The 
actual performance of a surrogative inference from the model to the system reveals 
that the vehicle is being used as an epistemic representation o f the target. In this 
sense the relation between representation and surrogative reasoning is analogous to
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that between measles and Koplick spots in the above example. Whereas the spots 
may be a necessary and sufficient condition for having measles, this does not mean 
that one has measles because they have Koplick spots.
Suarez would probably agree with the claim that valid surrogative reasoning is 
only a symptom of scientific representation. This I think is the most profound 
reason why he takes the inferential conception not to be a substantial conception of 
“scientific” representation—valid surrogative reasoning is just a surface feature of 
epistemic representation (one which minimally distinguishes it from mere 
denotation). The main point of departure between Suarez and me is therefore that, 
unlike Suarez, I believe that a satisfactory conception o f epistemic representation 
can and should do more than listing a number o f necessary symptoms or surface 
features of scientific representation.
The main reason why the inferential conception is unsatisfactory is that it does 
not explain by virtue o f what a certain vehicle is an epistemic representation of a 
certain target (for certain users) and how, as such, it can be used by those users to 
perform (valid) surrogative inferences about the target. On the inferential 
conception, the user’s ability to perform valid surrogative inferences from a vehicle 
to a target would seem to be a primitive feature that cannot be further explained. 
This makes the connection between epistemic representation and valid surrogative 
reasoning needlessly obscure and the performance of valid surrogative inferences an 
activity as mysterious and unfathomable as soothsaying or divination. Moreover, 
the inferential conception does not provide us with any principled way to 
distinguish between valid and non-valid surrogative inferences.
A satisfactory account of epistemic representation, I think, should address these 
questions— i.e. it should be able to explain:
• by virtue of what a vehicle is an epistemic representation o f the target 
(for certain users),
•  how the fact that the vehicle is an epistemic representation o f the target 
for those users enables them to perform valid surrogative inferences from 
the vehicle to the target, and
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•  what makes some of these inferences valid and others not valid.
In the next chapter, I intend to offer an account that provides us with answers to 
these questions, which I will call the interpretational conception of epistemic 
representation.
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II.2. The Interpretational Conception of 
Epistemic Representation
II.2 .1 . In t r o d u c t i o n
So far, I have maintained that it is a necessary and sufficient condition for a vehicle 
to be an epistemic representation o f a certain target (for a certain user) that the user 
is able to perform (valid) surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the target. I 
have called this necessary and sufficient condition for epistemic representation 
(valid) surrogative reasoning. I have also argued that a conception of epistemic 
representation which stops at this level is unsatisfactory. Surrogative reasoning, I 
have argued, is only a symptom of epistemic representation and a substantial 
conception o f epistemic representation should do more than listing the symptoms 
of epistemic representation— it should identify those conditions by virtue o f which 
the vehicle is an epistemic representation of the target.
In this chapter, I will defend such a substantial conception of epistemic 
representation, which I call the interpretational conception o f epistemic representation. 
The interpretational conception maintains that:
(B) A vehicle is an epistemic representation of a certain target (for a 
certain user) if and only if:
(B. 1) the user takes the vehicle to denote the target, and 
(B.2) the user adopts an interpretation o f the vehicle.
Condition (B.l) is what, so far, I have called denotation, while condition (B.2) is 
what I will call interpretation.
Denotation
Interpretation
Epistemic
Representation
Surrogative
Reasoning
According to the interpretational conception o f epistemic representation, therefore 
interpretation is a necessary and sufficient condition for epistemic representation. 
The next two sections are devoted to clarifying what these two conditions amount 
to. I will first explain informally how when the two conditions that I have called 
denotation and interpretation hold, the vehicle is an epistemic representation o f the 
target. In the following section, I will give a more formal definition o f what it takes 
for a user to adopt a specific but very common kind of interpretation of a vehicle in 
terms of a target.
II.2 .2 . D e n o t a t io n  a n d  In t e r p r e t a t io n : A n  Exam ple
Suppose that you are commissioned to design a map of a subway system, a map 
which represents which train lines connect which stations on the network. One 
way to go about this is the following. First, before even knowing what the network 
looks like, you identify what types o f objects on the network and what types o f 
properties of and relations among those types o f objects are relevant based on what 
aspects of the subway system the map is supposed to represent. I will call these 
types of objects, properties and relations T-relevant (i.e. relevant in the target). 
Given that, in our example, the map is supposed to represent which stations are 
connected by the train lines, T-relevant types o f objects must include the stations 
on the network, the T-relevant properties o f those objects will include the names o f 
those stations and the T-relevant relations among them will include the train 
services operating between those stations. However, not all objects, properties, 
functions, and relations are T-relevant. For example, if your map is not supposed
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to represent the relative positions of the stations, the positions of the stations will 
not be T-relevant properties of the type of object station.
The second step consists in selecting which types of objects on the map and 
which types of properties and relations among them will denote the T-relevant 
objects, properties and relations. For example, you can decide that, on your map, 
stations will be denoted by, say, small black circles, that a circle with a name 
printed on the side will denote the station with that name, and that direct train 
services operating between two stations will be denoted by coloured lines 
connecting the corresponding circles (each train line being denoted by a different 
colour). I will call V-relevant (relevant in the vehicle) the types of objects, 
properties, functions, and relations on the map that denote T-relevant types of 
objects, properties and relations.
After completing these two steps, you will have developed what I will call an 
interpretation. An interpretation has two interesting features. First, which types of 
objects properties and relations are T-relevant depends on what aspects o f the 
target the epistemic representation is supposed to represent (depends on what I 
have called the scope o f the representation). Were you interested in representing 
different aspects of the subway system you would have selected different types of 
objects, properties and relation from the one you actually chose as T-relevant. For 
example, if you were interested in designing a map of the subway system useful to 
the train drivers, the T-relevant objects would have probably included tracks, 
interchanges and platforms, rather than stations and train services.
Second, it is to a certain extent arbitrary what objects, properties, functions, and 
relations among objects on the map are V-relevant. Within the limits posed by 
pragmatic constraints, it would have been possible for you to use different types of 
objects, properties and relations on the map to denote the T-relevant types of 
objects, properties and relations. For example, nothing would have prevented you 
from using small red squares instead of small black circles to denote stations on the 
map. The pragmatic constraints, however, seem to set quite clear limits to the 
arbitrariness of your choices in this matters. For example, it seems to be highly
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impractical to use elephants to denote stations and extremely expensive to use 
precious stones. If we put aside the sheer impracticality (and animal rights), 
however, nothing would prevent you from producing an epistemic representation 
of a subway network in which stations are denoted by elephants and a direct trains 
service operating between two stations is denoted by the corresponding elephants 
being tied together by a coloured ribbon.
A third interesting feature of the interpretation discussed here is that it is, what I 
will call, a general interpretation— i.e. on the basis o f it, one can construct a 
completely faithful epistemic representation of virtually any subway system. As I 
will argue later, not all interpretations have this feature.
Once you have developed a general interpretation, you can turn to designing the 
actual map of the specific subway system you are interested in based on the general 
interpretation. You will first turn to the actual subway system and make note o f all 
and only those objects that are tokens of the T-relevant types of objects and of their 
properties and relations that are tokens of the T-relevant types of properties and 
relations. In our case, you compile a list o f stations and make note o f their names 
and of the train lines that connect them directly to other stations.
Then, you draw on your map one and only one small black circle for each 
station on your list and draw coloured lines between any two stations that are 
connected by a direct train service (using a different colour for each line). As a 
result of this process, you will have designed a map of the subway system in 
question. Here, I will call the interpretation on the basis o f which you designed the 
map the standard interpretation o f the map.
Consider now the map you have just designed from the perspective of one o f its 
users. In and o f itself, the map is not an epistemic representation of anything— it is 
just a piece of paper with small circles and coloured lines drawn on it. If the map is 
to become an epistemic representation for our user, the user must take some of the 
objects, properties and relations on that piece of paper to denote something else—  
i.e. the user has to adopt some interpretation or other o f the map.
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If the user is familiar with interpreting other maps of subway systems, it would 
probably be easy for her to realize that that piece of paper is meant to be a map of 
some subway system or other and that small black circles on the map denote the 
stations on that system and coloured lines between circles denotes direct train 
connections between the corresponding stations. In other words, a user who is 
familiar with similar interpretations of other subway maps is likely to work out 
what the standard interpretation of the map is.
However, the user does not need to adopt the standard interpretation o f the 
map in order for that map to be an epistemic representation for her. For example, 
the user can take the circles to denote cities and towns, the coloured lines to denote 
highways, and the relative positions o f the circles to denote the relative positions of 
the corresponding cities. Under such non-standard interpretations, the map would 
still be an epistemic representation for the user although it would not be an 
epistemic representation of a subway system but one o f a highway system.
Assume that the user in question adopts the standard interpretation of your 
map. According to the interpretational conception, the map is now an epistemic 
representation o f some subway system for that user— circles stand for stations and 
coloured lines stand for direct train connections. So it could seem that the 
condition I have called interpretation is not only necessary but also sufficient for 
epistemic representation. So, why does a second condition, denotation, enter the 
picture?
If the user only adopts an interpretation o f the map without taking the map to 
denote any specific subway system, the map will only be a representation of some 
subway system or other not o f any specific subway system. It is only when the user 
takes the map to stand for a specific subway system that the map becomes an 
epistemic representation of that subway system for that user. So for example, a user 
who adopts the standard interpretation of the map but does not take the map to 
stand for any specific subway system may infer that one o f the stations on the 
subway network represented by the map is called Spadina, but she will not be able
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to infer that there is a station by that name on Toronto subway system unless they 
take that map to stand for Toronto subway network.
Somehow schematically, we could say that, when a user adopts an interpretation 
o f a certain vehicle in terms of a certain type o f target, the vehicle becomes an 
epistemic representation o f a target o f that type for that user, but it is only when 
the user takes that epistemic representation to stand for a specific target, that the 
epistemic representation becomes an epistemic representation o f that target for that 
user. In our example, this piece of paper becomes a subway map for a user only 
when they interpret it in terms o f some subway system or other; and the subway 
map becomes a map ^ T o ro n to  subway system only when the user take the map 
{qua epistemic representation) to stand for the Toronto subway system.
I I .2 .3 . A n a l y t ic  In t e r p r e t a t io n s
According to a general, though somewhat loose, characterisation of the notion of 
interpretation, a user interprets a vehicle in terms of some target or other only if she 
takes facts about the vehicle to stand for (putative) facts about some target or other. 
One specific way to interpret a vehicle (though possibly not the only way) is to 
adopt what I will call an analytic interpretation of the vehicle. An analytic 
interpretation o f a vehicle presupposes that the user identifies a (non-empty) set of 
V-relevant objects in the vehicle (flv={oiv, <?*v}), a set of V-relevant properties 
o f and relations among the V-relevant objects in the vehicle (Pv={"/?iv, ..., 
where nR  denotes an «-ary relation and properties are construed as 1-ary relations) 
and, a set of V-relevant functions from (f2v)”— i.e. the Cartesian product of £2V by 
itself n times— to Q v (<J>V={"Ajv, ..., ”F,„y}, where nF  denotes an w-ary function). 
The user assumes that there is a set o f T-relevant objects in the target (OF), a set of 
T-relevant properties and relations among objects in the target (P7), and a set o f T- 
relevant functions from (ft7)" to £2T (O7). (Here functions will be mainly used to 
stand for certain kinds o f properties and relations such as being 5.2 miles from , 
which will be represented as a binary function that associates two objects with the
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real number 5.2, or being 1.82m tall, which will be represented as a unary function 
that associates an object with the real number 1.82)
(13) A user adopts an analytic interpretation of the vehicle in
terms of the target if and only if:
[13.1] The user takes14 every object in Q v to denote one and only 
one object in £2T and every object in £2T to be denoted by one 
and only one object in Qv,
[13.2] The user takes every »-ary relation in Pv to denote one and 
only one «-ary relation in PT and every «-ary relation in PT to be 
denoted by one and only one »-ary relation in Pv,
[13.3] The user takes every »-ary function in <J>V to denote one and 
only one »-ary function in <I>T and every »-ary function in <1>T to 
be denoted by one and only one w-ary function in <I>V.
W hat is peculiar about analytic interpretations is that relevant objects are 
denoted by objects, properties by properties, binary relations by binary relations, and 
so on. Note, however, that not all prima facie objects, properties, functions, and 
relations are relevant according to the interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the 
target. The only V-relevant objects, properties and relations are those that denote 
objects, properties and relations in the target and the only T-relevant objects, 
properties, functions and relations in the target are those that are denoted by, 
respectively, objects, properties, functions, and relations in the vehicle. For 
example, the relation being connected by a light blue line in the London 
Underground map is relevant (according to the standard interpretation of the map 
in terms o f the network) because, on the standard interpretation o f the map, it 
denotes a relation between stations on the network, but the relation being two
14 Let me note that ‘takes’ here does not mean ‘believes.’ A user can take one object to denote 
another even if they do not believe there is anything the object denotes. I will say more about this 
below.
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inches left o f is not relevant because, on the standard interpretation of the map, it 
does not denote any relation among stations in the network.
II.2.4. A n a l y t ic  v s .  N o n -An a l y t ic  In t e r p r e t a t io n s
Most interpretations o f vehicles in terms o f targets that we ordinarily adopt 
seem to be analytic. The standard interpretation o f the London Underground map 
in terms o f the London Underground network, for example, is an analytic 
interpretation. First, we take some objects on the map (i.e. small black circles and 
small coloured tabs) to denote objects on the network (i.e. stations). Third, we take 
some of the properties o f and relations among those objects on the map to stand 
for properties of and relations among stations on the network. For example, we 
take the relation being connected by a light blue line on the map to stand for the 
relation being connected by Victoria Line trains on the network. In what follows, I 
will call any epistemic representation whose interpretation is analytic an analytically 
interpreted epistemic representation.
In this thesis, I will focus exclusively on what I have called analytic 
interpretations. Unless otherwise specified, by saying that a user adopts an 
interpretation of the target, I will always mean that the interpretation in question is 
analytic. However, I do not mean to imply that all interpretations of vehicles in 
terms of the target are analytic. Epistemic representations whose standard 
interpretations are not analytic are at least conceivable. For example, at a chess 
tournament with eight players, we may use a chessboard to keep track o f which 
players are playing against each other at any given time. One letter from A to H 
and one number from 1 to 8 is assigned to each player so that every player is 
denoted by both a letter and a number and no two players are denoted by the same 
letter or the same number and if a piece on, say, the square D4 of the chessboard, 
denotes the fact that the player denoted by D is playing against the player denoted 
by 4. This is an example o f an interpretation that is not analytic because a property 
of an object (i.e. the position o f a piece on the chessboard) denotes a relation 
between two objects (i.e. the relation playing against).
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Epistemic representations whose standard interpretations are non-analytic, 
however, seem to be the exception rather than the rule. In the overwhelming 
majority o f prototypical cases o f epistemic representation (which include maps, 
diagrams, drawings, photographs and, o f course, models), it seems possible to 
reconstruct the standard interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target as an 
analytic one.15 If this is true, then, restricting our attention to analytic 
interpretations will extremely simplify the discussion without any comparable loss 
o f generality.
Moreover, if one is willing to adopt a more liberal conception of what can count 
as relevant objects, properties and relations, it may be possible that any non- 
analytic interpretation can be reconstructed as an analytic one. In the example 
above, for example, we have considered a piece to be a V-relevant object and the 
position of a piece on the chessboard as a V-relevant property. However, if one was 
willing to consider columns and rows o f squares on the chessboard to be V-relevant 
objects so that a chessboard is composed of 16 objects (8 rows and 8 columns of 
squares) and the relation having the same piece on a relation between a row and a 
column such that the relation holds between column X  and row Y when and only 
when a piece is on one square XY, then the above interpretation becomes an 
analytic one because T-relevant objects (players) are denoted by V-relevant objects 
(rows and columns of squares) and a T-relevant binary relations {playing against) is 
denoted by a relation between rows and columns of squares.
The above is obviously not meant to be a general argument to the effect that any 
non-analytic interpretation can be reconstructed as an analytic one, but just to 
suggest that it is not implausible to think that such reconstruction may be possible 
in a wide variety o f cases. At the moment, I do not have any general proof that any 
non-analytic interpretation can be reconstructed as an analytic one (in fact, I am 
not even sure what such a proof would look like). Whether the account I develop
15 I talk of ‘reconstruction’ because, as I will mention later, users are often unable to spell out 
how they interpret the vehicle in terms of the target and sometimes are not even aware that they do 
interpret the vehicle in terms o f the target.
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in this thesis is a general account of epistemic representation and faithful epistemic 
representation crucially hinges on this question. If it was possible to reconstruct any 
interpretation as an analytic interpretation, then the account offered here would be 
a general account of epistemic representation. If this reconstruction was not always 
possible, I think that there are reasons to hope that, as it is, the account can deal 
with most prototypical cases o f epistemic representation and that extending it to 
cases in which the interpretation adopted is irreducibly not analytic will only turn 
out to be technically challenging but not conceptually so.
II.2 .5 . In t e r p r e t a t io n  a n d  E pist e m ic  Re p r e se n t a t io n
In ordinary language, we often use the same word to refer both to an epistemic 
representation and to the object that serves as a vehicle for that epistemic 
representation. For example, the word ‘map’ is sometimes used to refer to the 
material object that serves as a vehicle of a certain epistemic representation (‘The 
map is on the table’) and other times used to refer to the epistemic representation 
itself (‘The map is very accurate’). However, the fact that we use the same word to 
refer to both should not mislead us into believing that the material object, in and of 
itself is an epistemic representation of something else. An epistemic representation 
is an object plus an interpretation o f it.
According to the interpretational conception, it is only when a user, more or less 
consciously, adopts some interpretation or other of a vehicle that the vehicle 
becomes an epistemic representation for that user. This means a vehicle— by which 
I mean the object (material or not) that serves as a vehicle of a certain 
representation such as the piece o f paper that serves as a map— in and of itself does 
not represent anything. It is only when some user adopts an interpretation of the 
vehicle that the object— the piece o f paper— becomes an epistemic representation. 
According to this view, an epistemic representation can be schematically seen as an 
ordered pair <V, I(VJ^7)>  whose first element is the vehicle {V, i.e. the object that 
serves as a vehicle o f the epistemic representation) and whose second element is an 
interpretation of the vehicle in terms o f the target (I(V~^ 7)).
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Users are often unaware that they are adopting an interpretation of the vehicle 
in terms of the target. Even when they are aware o f that, they would rarely be able 
to spell out exactly how they interpret the vehicle in terms of the target. For 
example, people are not usually aware that they adopt an interpretation to draw 
inferences from, say, a photograph to what the photograph represents. They feel 
that they can just see things in the photograph. This however does not mean that 
they do not in fact adopt an interpretation of the photograph but only that they are 
so used to interpreting photographs in a certain way that the interpretation process 
becomes transparent to them. It is only because we are so used to interpreting 
photographs that we can believe that we can directly “see” things in a photograph. 
It is only when we are less familiar with the standard interpretation of a certain 
form of epistemic representation (such as in the case of infrared photographs or 
ultrasound scans), that the need for an interpretation becomes apparent.
One of the reasons why interpretations often become transparent to us is that, 
in many cases, the same interpretation (or a family of closely related 
interpretations) can be used to interpret different vehicles as epistemic 
representations of different targets when these epistemic representations are 
representations of the same kind. So, we do not need to learn a new interpretation 
every time we come across a new epistemic representation if we are already familiar 
with the standard interpretation associated with the form of epistemic 
representation. For example, after learning how to interpret a geographic map, we 
are usually able to use the same (or a very closely related) interpretation for other 
geographic maps as well. I will call such interpretations that are used as the 
standard interpretation of many representations of the same form general 
interpretations.
This feature of interpretation finally puts us in the position to provide an answer 
to the question raised in Chapter 1.1 concerning our preferences of the map of 
Michigan over the upturned right-hand and the upturned right-hand over the salt 
shaker as vehicles o f an epistemic representation o f the geography of Michigan. In 
the case of the map, we do not need to come up with an ad hoc interpretation of
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the vehicle in terms of the target because we are already familiar with a number of 
ready-made, general interpretations that allow us to interpret maps in terms of their 
target and these are likely to include one that will allow us to interpret the map of 
Michigan in terms of the state of Michigan (for example, we know that, usually, a 
blue area on the map denotes an expanse of water). In the case of the upturned 
right-hand, it is quite intuitive for those who are familiar with the geography of 
Michigan to come up with an interpretation of the upturned right-hand in terms 
of the geography of Michigan (one according to which a point on the palm of the 
hand denotes a certain location in Michigan and the contour of the hand denotes 
the borders and coasts o f Michigan). However, there is no intuitive interpretation 
o f the salt-shaker in terms o f the geography of Michigan, let alone a ready-made 
one. According to the interpretational conception of epistemic representation, our 
preferences can thus be explained in terms of how easily we can interpret the 
different vehicles in terms o f the targets.
II.2.6. How D o e s  In t e r p r e t a t io n  R el a t e  t o  Su r r o g a t iv e  R e a s o n in g ?
I will now argue that the interpretational conception of epistemic representation 
allows us to explain why, if a vehicle is an epistemic representation of a certain 
target, users are able to perform valid surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the 
target and allows us to tell which inferences from a vehicle to a target are valid. I 
take it that the fact that the interpretational conception of epistemic representation 
can explain how users are able to draw valid inferences from a vehicle to a target 
and what makes some inferences valid and others not are two of the greatest 
advantages o f the interpretational conception. As we have seen, for example, on the 
inferential conception, the user’s ability to perform inferences from a vehicle to a 
target seems to be a brute fact, which has no deeper explanation. On the 
interpretational conception, on the other hand, the user’s ability to perform pieces 
o f surrogative reasoning not only is not a mysterious skill but it is an activity that is 
deeply connected to the fact that vehicle is an epistemic representation o f the target 
for that user.
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According to the interpretational conception of epistemic representation, a 
certain vehicle is an epistemic representation of a certain target (for a certain user) 
if and only if the user adopts an interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target. 
An analytic interpretation underlies the following set of inference rules:
(Rule 1) If oyt denotes oT, according to the interpretation adopted by the user, it
is valid for the user to infer that oT, is in the target if and only if 0V, is in 
the vehicle,
(Rule 2) If <?vt denotes or  1, ..., <?v„ denotes oy„, and "R^k denotes nRR  according
to the interpretation adopted by the user, it is valid for the user to infer 
that the relation nRR  holds among oT 1, ..., oT„if and only if ”/?v* holds 
among oy i, ..., 0V„,
(Rule 3) If, according to the interpretation adopted by the user, ov, denotes oTh
oy] denotes or i, ..., ov„ denotes ov„, and "P'k denotes "T1*, it is valid for 
the user to infer that the value o f the function "Pk for the arguments 
or i, . . . ,  or„ is oTi if  and only if the value of the function "P't is ow, for 
the arguments ovi, ..., ow„.
To illustrate how these rules apply in a concrete situation suppose that a user 
adopts the standard interpretation o f the London Underground map in terms of 
the network and that she takes the map to stand for the network. According to 
(Rule 2), from the fact that there is a circle labelled ‘Holborn’ on the map, it is 
valid for her to infer that there is a station called Holborn on the London 
Underground network and, from the fact that there is no circle or tab labelled 
‘Louvre Rivoli’ on the London Underground map, it is valid for her infer that there 
is no station called Louvre Rivoli on the London Underground network. According 
to (Rule 2), from the fact that the circle labelled ‘Holborn’ is connected to the tab 
labelled ‘Bethnal Green’ by a coloured line, one can infer that a direct train service 
operates between Holborn and Bethnal Green station and from the fact that the 
circle labelled ‘Holborn’ is not connected to the tab labelled ‘Highbury & 
Islington’ by any coloured line, one can infer that no direct train service operates 
between Holborn and Highbury & Islington stations
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We are now finally in a position to give a definition of validity for epistemic 
representation whose interpretations are analytic.
(14) If a user adopts an analytic interpretation o f the vehicle, then
an inference from the vehicle to the target is valid (for that user 
according to that interpretation) if and only if:
[14.1] it is in accordance with (Rule J), or
[14.2] it is in accordance with (Rule 2), or
[14.3] it is in accordance with (Rule 3)
So, if a user is able to perform inferences from a vehicle to a target when the 
former is an analytically interpreted epistemic representation of the latter, it is 
because (a) an analytic interpretation o f a vehicle in terms of a target underlies a set 
o f rules to draw valid surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the target (b) a 
vehicle is an analytically interpreted epistemic representation of the target only 
when a user adopts an analytic interpretation of it in terms of the target.
Before concluding this section, let me note that an analytic interpretation 
underlies a set of rules in the sense that the adoption of a certain set of rules is part 
and parcel of the adoption of the underlying analytic interpretation. So, for
example, from the fact that there is a circle labelled ‘Holborn’ on the London
Underground map one can validly infer that there is a station called Holborn if  and 
only if one adopts an interpretation of the map according to which the map 
denotes the London Underground network and small circles with a name printed 
on the side denote interchange stations with that name.
II.2.7. D e n o t a t io n  a n d  E p is t e m ic  R e p r e s e n t a t io n
The condition that so far I have called denotation is, therefore, a necessary 
condition for both epistemic representation and surrogative reasoning. In this 
section, I will clarify how my view of the relation between denotation and 
epistemic representation differs from the views of Suarez and Callender and Cohen 
on this issue.
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Let us consider Suarez’s view first. According to Suarez denotation and 
surrogative reasoning are both necessary conditions for epistemic representation. 
This would seem to suggest that Suarez considers these two conditions 
independent from each other. I think Suarez is wrong on this point. On the 
interpretive conception, denotation and surrogative reasoning are also necessary 
conditions for epistemic representation but they are not on the same level because 
they are not independent from each other— one, denotation, is a necessary 
condition for the other, surrogative reasoning. To see why the condition I have 
called surrogative reasoning cannot hold unless the condition I have called 
denotation holds, consider again the example o f the user who takes this piece of 
paper to be a map of a subway system but has no idea o f what subway system in 
particular the map is a map of. According to the interpretational conception, this is 
because, while the interpretation condition holds, the denotation condition does 
not hold— that is the user adopts an interpretation of the map in terms of some 
subway system or other but does not take it to be a representation o f any target 
system in particular. If that user is to be able to perform inferences from the map to 
some specific target such as the London Underground network (i.e. if the 
condition that I have called valid surrogative reasoning is to hold), the user has to 
take the map to stand for the London Underground system and not, say, Toronto’s 
subway system. So, .the valid surrogative reasoning condition cannot hold unless 
the denotation condition also holds. The two conditions, therefore, are not 
independent as the denotation condition is a necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition for surrogative reasoning.
Consider Callender and Cohen’s view of the relation between denotation and 
epistemic representation. According to the interpretational account, denotation is a 
necessary condition for epistemic representation and it also plays a crucial role in 
the condition that I have called interpretation. This, however, is a very far cry from 
claiming that epistemic representation amounts to denotation as the advocate of the 
denotational conception o f epistemic representation, which I have discussed in 
Chapter 1.1, do. The set of ink marks ‘the Tube’, for example, may denote the
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London Underground network but, in and of itself, this does not make o f them an 
epistemic representation o f the network (for us). I f ‘the Tube’ is not an epistemic 
representation of the London Underground network (for us), it is not because it 
fails to denote the London Underground network but because we do not adopt any 
interpretation o f those marks in terms of the network— for example, we do not 
take the letter ‘T ’ (or any other mark) to stand for an object on the London 
Underground network and we do not take the fact that the letter ‘T ’ is taller than 
the letter ‘u’ to stand for a relation between the objects in the network denoted by 
those marks.
Let me note, however, that I am not denying that ‘the Tube’ could be an 
epistemic representation o f the London Underground network. I am only denying 
that it is one. Nothing would prevent us from doing so, in which case, according to 
the interpretational conception of epistemic representation, the set of marks ‘the 
London Underground network’ would qualify as an epistemic representation of the 
network. In that case, however, ‘the London Underground network’ would be an 
epistemic representation o f the network by virtue of the fact that we have adopted 
an interpretation of those marks in terms of the London Underground network.
Before concluding this section, let me note that a user does not need to believe 
that a certain object in the target exists in order to take an object in the vehicle to 
denote it according to the interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target. For 
example, on the old London Underground map, there is a tab labelled ‘Dover 
Street’. According to the standard interpretation of the map in terms of the 
network, that tab denotes a station whose name is ‘Dover Street’. However, since 
there is no longer a Dover Street station on today’s London Underground network, 
at present that tab on the old map fails to denote any station. Even if I know that 
that is the case, however, I can still take the tab labelled ‘Dover Street’ to denote 
the Dover Street station according to the standard interpretation o f the network that I 
am adopting. In other words, if I adopt the standard interpretation o f the map in 
terms o f the network, I can take every circle and every tab on the map to denote a 
station according to the standard interpretation o f the map even if I know that some
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circles and tabs fail to denote a station. (This is vaguely similar to the case in which 
I take the name ‘Santa Claus’ to  denote Santa Claus according to a child who 
believes in the existence o f Santa Claus even if I know that the name ‘Santa Claus’ 
fails to denote any real person).
A better way to put this is probably to distinguish between what I  believe about 
the London Underground network and what the map (under its standard 
interpretation) “tells” me about the network—we can call this the informational 
content o f the map (under its standard interpretation). If what I believe about the 
London Underground network conflicts with what the map “tells” me about the 
network, I will not conclude that my interpretation of the map is wrong, rather I 
will conclude that the map is an unfaithful epistemic representation o f the network.
II.2.8. T h e  In t e r p r e t a t io n a l  C o n c e p t io n  a n d  Sc ie n t if ic  M o d e l s
According to the interpretational conception of epistemic representation, a model 
is an epistemic representation o f a target system (for a user) if and only if the user 
adopts an interpretation o f the model in terms o f the system. We often go through 
the process of interpreting a model in terms of a certain system so effortlessly that 
we do not even realise that we are interpreting the model in terms o f the system. 
For example, in the case of the inclined plane model and the soap-box derby which 
I have first considered in Section 1.2.7.1, we take a simple model from classical 
mechanics and turn it into an epistemic representation o f a certain system by 
interpreting it in terms of that system. As I believe it is usually the case with 
models, the interpretation is an analytic one— i.e. we take the inclined plane model 
to denote the soap-box derby system, we take the box in the model to denote one 
o f the racers in the system, and we take some relevant properties of the box such as 
its position or its velocity to denote the position and velocity o f the racer denoted 
by it.16
16 Here I talk of the position of the box at a certain time and that of the racer as a property to 
keep in line with the language ordinarily used by philosophers. However, it is more convenient to
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A more problematic case may seem that of models some of whose components 
fail to denote anything in the system represented by it. f o r  example, according to 
the Ptolemaic model o f the cosmos, the universe is a system of concentric crystal 
spheres. The Earth lies at the centre o f the sublunary region, which is the 
innermost sphere. Outside the sublunary region are the heavens: eight tightly fit 
spherical shells, the outermost of which, the sphere of the fixed stars, hosts the 
stars. Each of the other spherical shells hosts one of the seven “planets,” which, in 
the Ptolemaic model, include the Moon and the Sun. Each spherical shell rotates 
around its centre with uniform velocity. According to the standard interpretation 
of the model, the crystal spheres in the model denote the crystal spheres that 
supposedly host the planet in the system. However, one does not need to believe 
that there actually are crystal spheres that host the planets and stars in order to 
adopt an interpretation of the model according to which crystal spheres host the 
planets. Here it is useful to use again the distinction between the user’s beliefs 
about the target and the informational content of a certain epistemic 
representation. The users of the model may believe that planets are not hosted by 
crystal spheres and nevertheless believe that what the model “says” is that the 
planets are hosted by crystal spheres.
To sum up, the interpretational conception o f epistemic representation 
maintains that a vehicle is an epistemic representation of a certain target (for a 
certain user) by virtue of the fact (and if and only if) the user adopts an 
interpretation of the vehicle in terms o f the target. An interpretation of the vehicle 
in terms of the target underlies a set of rules to draw inferences from the vehicle to 
the target. So, whenever a user adopts an interpretation of the vehicle in terms of 
the target they will be able to perform surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the 
target. At the same time, the fact that a user performs a (valid) surrogative inference
regard certain properties such as the position and the velocity of the box at a certain time as 
functions rather than properties. So the velocity function is a function that associates with a certain 
object its velocity at a certain time.
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from the vehicle to the target presupposes that she adopts an interpretation o f the 
vehicle in terms o f the target, which underlies a set of rules to draw inferences from 
the vehicle to the target and therefore the fact that the user performs inferences 
from a certain vehicle to a certain target is a symptom of the fact that the vehicle is 
an epistemic representation of the target.
The adoption of an interpretation provides the user with a set of rules to 
perform inferences from the vehicle to the target. However, as I have argued, the 
fact that a certain inference is valid—i.e. that it is in accordance with the set of 
rules that the interpretation adopted by the user underlies— does not imply that the 
inference is sound—i.e. that its conclusion is true. Therefore, if the user adopts an 
interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target, the vehicle is an epistemic 
representation of the target. However, this does not imply that the vehicle is a 
completely faithful epistemic representation o f the target. Nor does it imply that it 
is a faithful epistemic representation at all. In fact, as I suggested in Section 1.2.5, 
the vehicle may be an epistemic representation of the target and yet be a completely 
unfaithful epistemic representation o f the target.
If the vehicle is to be to some degree a faithful epistemic representation o f the 
target some further conditions need to hold. An account that identifies these 
further conditions is an account o f faithful epistemic representation. Part III of this 
thesis is devoted to developing such an account.
81
III. Faithful Epistemic Representation
III. 1. Similarity and Faithful Epistemic 
Representation
III. l . l .  T h e  Q u e s t io n  o f  Fa it h f u l  Episte m ic  Re p r e se n t a t io n
In Chapter 1.2, I have distinguished two main questions that are usually conflated:
1) By virtue of what is a vehicle an epistemic representation o f a certain target?
2) By virtue of what is a vehicle a faithful epistemic representation of a certain 
target?
Both the inferential conception of scientific representation that I have discussed in 
Chapter II. 1, and the interpretational conception o f epistemic representation that I 
have developed in Chapter II.2 were meant to answer question (1). In the third 
part of this thesis, I will turn to question (2) and I intend to develop an account of 
what I have called faithful epistemic representation.
As I have already mentioned when introducing the notion o f faithful epistemic 
representation in Section 1.2.5, the faithfulness o f an epistemic representation is a 
matter of degree. Overall an epistemic representation can be completely faithful, 
partially faithful or completely unfaithful. Moreover, an epistemic representation 
can be a more or less faithful epistemic representation of a certain target and, of 
two epistemic representations o f a certain target, one may be more faithful than the 
other.
I take it that, in order to have a satisfactory answer to question 2), we need to 
have an answer to each of the following questions:
(i) In virtue of what is a completely faithful epistemic representation of a certain 
target completely faithful?
(ii) In virtue o f what is a partially faithful epistemic representation of a certain 
target partially faithful?
(iii) In virtue of what is one o f two epistemic representations o f a certain target 
more faithful than the other (if it is)?
(iv) In virtue of what are two equally faithful epistemic representations of a certain 
target equally faithful?
In this third part of the thesis, I will formulate an account o f faithful epistemic 
representation that not only answers the questions (i)—(iv), but also, in doing so, it 
reveals the systematic relations among these notions o f epistemic representation.
Before turning to these questions let me note that there are a number o f closely 
related questions that I will not address here. These questions include the following 
questions:
(v) In virtue of what is a specifically faithful epistemic representation of a certain 
target a specifically faithful epistemic representation of that target?
(vi) W hat justifies a user in believing that a certain epistemic representation is a 
faithful epistemic representation o f that target?
(vii) What justifies a user in believing that a certain valid inference from the vehicle 
to the target is sound?
If I do not address any o f these questions here, it is not because I do not think they 
are interesting or worthy question. To the contrary I think that they are very 
important questions. However I believe that questions (i)-(iv) have conceptual 
priority over questions (v)-(vii)— i.e. we need to have an answer to that set of 
questions in order to answer those in the second set of questions. Here, I will be 
solely concerned with what makes an epistemic representation o f a certain target a 
faithful one, independently of what the user is justified to believe and o f the 
circumstances in which the epistemic representation is used.
III. 1.2. Re in t e r p r e t in g  t h e  S im ilarity  C o n c e p t io n  a n d  t h e  St r u c t u r a l  
C o n c e p t io n  as C o n c e p t io n s  o f  Fa it h f u l  E piste m ic  R e p r e se n t a t io n
Beside the inferential conception o f scientific representation, the two main 
accounts of representation discussed in the literature on scientific representation are 
the similarity conception and the structural conception of representation. 
Unfortunately, the sympathizers of the similarity conception, which include 
Ronald Giere and Paul Teller, and those of the structural conception, which
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include Patrick Suppes, Bas van Fraassen, Steven French, and James Ladyman, 
have never formulated explicit and detailed accounts of scientific representation—  
i.e. accounts that provides us with a set of conditions for a vehicle to be a scientific 
(or epistemic) representation of its target or a faithful scientific (or epistemic) 
representation of it. This, however, should not particularly concern us here, where 
we are mainly interested in developing an account of faithful epistemic 
representation and not in determining what the above-mentioned authors actually 
say about scientific representation.
Somewhat ironically, the most clear formulation o f the so-called similarity and 
structural conceptions of representation available in the literature is due not to 
someone who sympathizes with these views but to one of their critics— Mauricio 
Suarez (see in particular Suarez 2003). On Suarez’s interpretation, the similarity 
conception and the structural conception would be conceptions of epistemic 
representation and, as such, they would be incompatible with the inferential and 
epistemic conception that I have considered in Part II. (Evidence of this is the fact 
that one of Suarez’s main arguments in favour o f the adoption of a deflationary or 
minimalist conception of representation is the failure o f what he calls [iso] and 
[sim] in accounting for epistemic representation.).
According to Suarez’s interpretation, the similarity conception of representation 
maintains that:
(C) A vehicle is an epistemic representation of a certain target if 
and only if:
(C. 1) the vehicle is similar to the target
The structural conception maintains that:
(D) A vehicle represents a target if and only if:
(D .l) (The structure instantiated by) the vehicle is isomorphic 
to (the structure instantiated by) the target.
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(C) and (D), I think, are misrepresentations of, respectively, the similarity 
conception and the structural conception o f representation. I believe that, unlike 
the inferential conception, the similarity conception and the structural conception 
are conceptions of faithful epistemic representation rather than conceptions of 
epistemic representation— i.e. they aim at identifying which conditions need to 
hold for an epistemic representation of a certain target to be a faithful epistemic 
representation o f that target.
On this interpretation, for example, the similarity conception, on which I will 
focus in this chapter, maintains that:
(E) A vehicle is a faithful epistemic representation of a certain 
target for a certain user if and only if:
(E. 1) The vehicle is an epistemic representation of that target 
for that user and
(E.2) The vehicle is similar to the target in some respects and 
to some degree (where different versions of the similarity 
conception specify different respects and degrees of 
similarity).17
In saying this, I do not mean to claim that the sympathizers of the similarity 
conception and the structural conception intend or mean to account for faithful 
epistemic representation. In fact, they do not even distinguish between epistemic 
representation and faithful epistemic representation. Rather, I claim that, once we 
draw the distinction between epistemic representation and faithful epistemic 
representation, the best way to make sense of the similarity conception and the 
structural conception is to consider them as conceptions of faithful epistemic 
representation rather than epistemic representation simpliciter.
On this interpretation, the similarity conception and the structural conception, 
unlike the inferential and the interpretational conceptions, would be attempts to
17 I refer the reader to III.2.1 for the general formulation of the structural conception of faithful 
epistemic representation.
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answer question (2)— By virtue o f what is an epistemic representation o f a certain 
target an overall faithful one (insofar as it is)?— not question (1)— By virtue of 
what is a vehicle an epistemic representation o f a certain target? As such, both of 
them presuppose that those who hold them adopt a conception o f epistemic
representation such as the interpretational conception that I have proposed in
Chapter II.2 or the inferential conception proposed by Suarez. So, far from being 
incompatible with the inferential conception and the interpretational conception, 
they actually complement them.
In other words, the fact that a vehicle is an epistemic representation o f a certain 
target is a necessary but not sufficient condition for it to be a faithful epistemic 
representation o f that target. As I have argued in Section II. 1.2, once we
distinguish between epistemic representation and faithful epistemic representation, 
it becomes apparent that there may be epistemic representations that are
completely unfaithful. As I interpret them, the similarity conception and the 
structural conception therefore attempt to identify which further conditions— i.e. 
which conditions beside the ones that make the vehicle an epistemic representation 
o f the target— need to hold in order for the vehicle to be (to a certain degree) a 
faithful epistemic representation o f the target.
On this interpretation of these two conceptions, it is neither necessary nor 
sufficient conditions for a vehicle to be an epistemic representation of a target that 
the vehicle is similar to the target or that the vehicle is isomorphic to the target. 
Rather, what the two conceptions claim is that, i f  a certain vehicle is an epistemic 
representation o f a certain target, then it is a faithful epistemic representation o f it in 
virtue of the fact that some further condition holds (such as the fact that the vehicle 
is similar to the target or the fact that a morphism holds between the structure of 
the vehicle and that of the target).
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III. 1.3. H o w  t h e  St a n d a r d  A r g u m e n t s  A g a in s t  t h e  Sim ilarity  
C o n c e p t io n  Ca n  B e A v o id e d
As I mentioned, my argument in favour of this interpretation of the similarity 
conception and the structural conception is not exegetical. I am not saying that this 
is the correct interpretation of what the sympathizers o f the similarity conception 
or those of the structural conception actually say or think. As far as I am 
concerned, the sympathizers of the similarity conception and those of the structural 
conception could well have in mind what Suarez seems to think they have in mind. 
Rather, my argument in favour of the interpretation of structural conception and 
the similarity conception that I am proposing here is that, interpreted as 
conceptions of faithful epistemic representation rather than epistemic 
representation, the similarity conception and the structural conception avoid most 
of the objections that are usually levelled against them and indeed they can be 
turned into viable conceptions of epistemic representation. Here, I will only 
consider Suarez’s arguments against (C) and argue that these arguments are 
ineffective when directed against (E). However, since the Suarez’s arguments 
against (C) and (D) are analogous, the same considerations will apply mutatis 
mutandis to Suarez’s arguments against (D) when directed against the structural 
conception o f epistemic representation.
The first argument against (C), the logical argument, states that, while similarity 
is a reflexive and symmetric relation, representation is usually a non-reflexive, non- 
symmetric and non-transitive relation. A map is most similar to itself but it does 
not represent itself, it represents the city of which it is a map. If  the map is similar 
to the city, then the city is similar to the map; however, the city does not represent 
the map. (E) does not claim that the map represents the city by virtue o f their 
similarity but that, i f  the map is a representation o f  the city, it is a faithful one by 
virtue of the fact that the map and the city are similar (in certain respects and to a 
certain degree).
Indeed, according to (E), similarity is neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
map to be an epistemic representation of the city. The fact that the similarity
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relation is reflexive and symmetric and the representation relation is usually neither 
reflexive nor symmetric does not have any bearing on the plausibility of (E), 
because according to (E), there is no connection between similarity and epistemic 
representation.
The second argument, the argument form mistargeting, states that the similarity 
conception does not allow for mistargeting. By ‘mistargeting,’ Suarez means those 
cases in which a user mistakenly believes one object to be the target of a 
representation, while another object is its actual target. In Suarez’s own example, a 
friend of his disguises himself as Pope Innocent X and this misleads Suarez into 
believing that Velasquez’s portrait o f Pope Innocent X represents his friend. 
However, despite the similarity between the portrait and the friend, the portrait 
does not represent the friend.
According to (E), however the similarity between Suarez’s friend and the 
portrait of Pope Innocent X is neither necessary nor sufficient for the portrait to be 
an (epistemic) representation of Suarez’s friend. Rather, (E) claims that, i f  the 
portrait represented Suarez’s friend, it would be a faithful epistemic representation of 
him if and only if it was similar to him in certain respects and to a certain degree. 
However, since the portrait does not represent Suarez’s friend, according to (E), no 
amount o f similarity between the two in and of itself can turn the portrait into an 
(epistemic) representation of Suarez’s friend.
The third and the fourth arguments, the non-necessity and non-sufficiency 
arguments, state that similarity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
representation— i.e. something can be a representation of something else even if it 
is not similar to it and something can be similar to something without being a 
representation of it. However, (E) does not claim that similarity is either necessary 
or sufficient for epistemic representation. According to (E), similarity is a further 
condition that needs to obtain in addition to the conditions that make a vehicle an 
epistemic representation o f the target if the vehicle is to be a fa ithful epistemic 
representation o f it.
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III. 1.4. T h e  S im i la r i ty  C o n c e p t i o n  o f  F a i t h f u l  E p is te m ic  R e p r e s e n t a t io n
Once we are clearer about the interpretation of the similarity conception and the 
structural conception, however, we have to determine whether some version of 
them can be developed into a satisfactory account of faithful epistemic 
representation. This is what I will do in this and the next two chapters. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I will briefly consider the similarity conception of 
faithful epistemic representation and will argue that, even if there is no conclusive 
reason to reject the similarity conception as inadequate, such a conception does not 
provide us with a satisfactory framework for a general account of faithful epistemic 
representation. In the next chapter, I will then turn to the structural conception 
and develop what I take to be a satisfactory general account o f faithful epistemic 
representation, which I will call the structural similarity account. The structural 
similarity account not only will avoid the problems that other structural accounts 
o f faithful epistemic representation run into, but it also vindicates the main 
intuition, which underlies the similarity conception— i.e. that similarity (although 
a very abstract sort o f similarity) is somehow involved in faithful epistemic 
representation.
In other words, I do not think that the similarity conception o f faithful 
epistemic representation is mistaken. To the contrary, I believe that there is more 
than a grain of truth to the similarity conception of epistemic representation. If I 
favour a version of the structuralist conception of faithful epistemic representation, 
it is because I believe that not only does it provide us with a much more solid and 
well-defined general framework for understanding faithful epistemic representation 
but also because it allows us to understand how similarity is related to faithful 
epistemic representation to the extent that it is.
III. l .5. T h e  R e l e v a n t  Sim ilarities  A c c o u n t
In the context of the literature on models and representation, the similarity 
conception has been mainly supported by Ronald Giere. According to Ronald
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Giere, the relationship between scientific models and real-world systems is 
mediated by what Giere calls theoretical hypotheses (cf. Giere 1985, 1988). 
Theoretical hypotheses are part of the theory to which a certain model belongs and 
have the following general form:
The designated real system is similar to the proposed model in 
specified respects and to a specified degree (Giere 1985, p .80).
As an example o f a specific theoretical hypothesis, Giere mentions the following 
hypothesis:
The position and velocities of the earth and moon in the earth-
moon system are very close to those o f a two-particle Newtonian
model with an inverse square central force (Giere 1988, p.81).
In this specific theoretical hypothesis, the earth-moon system is a real world system, 
the two-particle Newtonian model is the model that represents that system, the 
respects of similarity are the positions and velocities of the relevant objects in the 
model and the systems and the degree o f similarity is said to be very close.
According to the conception of representation that seems to be implicit in
Giere’s earlier works a certain model is a faithful epistemic representation o f a
certain system only if the theoretical hypothesis that mediates between the model 
and the system in question is true, or, in other words, only if the model is actually 
similar to the system in the respects and to the degree specified by the theoretical 
hypothesis. So, for example, the inclined plane model represents the soap-box 
derby faithfully only if there is a true theoretical hypothesis according to which the 
model is similar to the system in certain respects and to a certain degree.
But in which respects and to what degree does a model have to be similar to a 
certain system in order to represent the system faithfully? In what respects and to 
what degree, for example, has the inclined plane model to be similar to the soap­
box derby in order for it to be a faithful epistemic representation of it? The 
advocates of what I will call the relevant similarities account seem to think that the
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answer to this question crucially depends on the purposes the users want to use the 
model for.
Giere, for example, claims:
The focus on language as an object in itself carries with it the 
assumption that our focus should be on representation, understood 
as a two-place relationship between linguistic entities and the 
world. Shifting the focus to scientific practice suggests that we 
should begin with the activity of representing, which, if thought of 
as a relationship at all, should have several more places. One place, 
of course, goes to the agents, the scientists who do the representing.
Since scientists are intentional agents with goals and purposes, I 
propose explicitly to provide a space for purposes in my 
understanding of representational practices in science. So we are 
looking at a relationship with roughly the following form: S  uses X  
to represent W for purposes P. (Giere 2004, p .743)
Paul Teller (2001, pp.401-402) claims:
[...] once the relevant context has been specified, for example by 
saying what is to be explained or predicted and how much damage 
will result from what kinds of error, the needs of the case will 
provide the required basis for determining what kind of similarity 
is correctly demanded for the case at hand. More specifically, 
similarity involves both agreement and difference o f properties, and 
only the needs o f the case at hand will determine whether the 
agreement is sufficient and the differences tolerable in view of those 
needs. There can be no general account o f similarity, but there is 
also no need for a general account because the details of any case 
will provide the information which will establish just what should 
count as relevant similarity in that case. There is no general 
problem of similarity, just many specific problems, and no general
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reason why any o f the specific problems need be intractable. (Teller 
2001, p.402)
The relevant similarities account maintains that:
(F) A vehicle is a specifically faithful epistemic representation of a 
certain system for a certain user (for certain purposes) if and 
only if:
(F.l) The model is an epistemic representation of that system 
for that user and
(F.2) The model and the system are similar in the relevant 
respects and to the relevant degree (where the relevant respects 
and degrees o f similarity are determined by the purposes o f the 
user).
A first thing to note about (F) is that, as I have formulated it, the relevant 
similarity account seems to be a general account of faithful epistemic 
representation. That is, it seems to be an account o f what makes any epistemic 
representation (not only scientific models) into a faithful epistemic representation 
of a certain system. In fact, Giere does not seem to think that scientific models are 
a special case of representational devices and he often talks of epistemic 
representations that are not scientific models (such as maps or diagrams) in a way 
that suggests that they constitute a continuum with scientific models.
A second thing to note is that the relevant similarities account is primarily an 
account of specifically faithful epistemic representation. That is, it is trying to 
answer what makes a vehicle a faithful epistemic representation o f the system for a 
certain specific purpose the user has. It is not clear whether the advocates o f the 
relevant similarity account think that the notion o f the overall faithfulness o f a 
representation makes no sense or if they merely think that the notion of the overall 
faithfulness o f a representation is a derivative notion.
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I will now proceed to consider some of the alleged problems of the similarity 
conception. I will argue that whereas most o f them may be overcome some of them 
seem to be inherent to the use o f the notion o f similarity.
III. 1.6. T h e  V a g u e n e s s  o f  S im il a r it y
Philosophers are usually wary o f using the notion of similarity because similarity is 
an inherently vague notion. In the case of the similarity conception, this problem 
has been raised by many of its detractors who think that the appeal to similarity is 
trivial (because anything is similar to anything else) (e.g. Suarez 2003) or it is no 
more than a blank to be filled in on a case-by-case basis (e.g. Frigg 2002). One of 
the main tasks facing the advocates of the similarity conception is thus that of 
dispelling the impression that their use o f the notion of similarity renders their 
account vacuous or uninformative.
The first step in performing this task is to note that the similarity conception of 
epistemic representation does not make use of the notion o f overall similarity. 
According to the similarity conception (as formulated in (E)), the vehicle and the 
target do not need to be similar overall (whatever that means); they need to be 
similar in certain specific respects and to a certain degree. So, first of all, even if it is 
the case that virtually anything is similar to anything in some respect and to some 
degree, it is clearly not true that anything is similar to anything else in some respect 
and to some degree. Even if there is a sense in which my red notebook is similar to 
my silver laptop in some respects (say, they are both mid-sized material objects 
with a (roughly) flat parallelepipedal shape which usually are on my desk), they are 
clearly not very similar with respect to their colour (in fact one could say that they 
are dissimilar with respect to their colour).
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More generally, whereas genuine overall similarity judgements18 seem to be 
hopelessly vague, people seem to be fairly good at making restricted similarity 
judgements such as ‘the two sweaters are very similar in colour’ or ‘the two players 
are similar in height’ (by a ‘restricted similarity judgement’, I mean a judgement 
about the similarity of two objects to a certain degree in a certain context). This is 
not to deny that, in those contexts, the term ‘similar’ is to some degree vague and 
context-dependent, but that the vagueness and context-dependence that 
characterizes ‘similar’ is not more serious than the vagueness that characterizes 
terms such as ‘tall.’ Given a certain context, there are some clear cases o f objects 
that are similar and objects that are dissimilar in certain respects and to a certain 
degree as, given a certain context, there are clear cases of people who are tall and 
people who are not.
III. 1.7. T h e  Lin k  b e t w e e n  Pu r p o se s  a n d  Respe c t s  o f  S im ilarity
The second step in dispelling the impression that the use o f similarity renders the 
similarity conception vague or uninformative consists in formulating a general 
account o f what respects and degrees o f similarity are required given that the user 
wants to use the epistemic representation for a certain purpose. For example, 
according to the relevant similarities account, it would seem that in which respects 
and to which degree the inclined plane model needs to be similar to the soap-box 
derby system in order for it to be a specifically faithful epistemic representation of 
the system for the purpose of predicting the final velocity of the racer depends on
18 Personally, I am inclined ro doubt that we ever even rry to perform genuine overall similarity 
judgments. I believe that when people seem to be talking about the overall similarity of two or more 
objects, they are actually saying that the objects are similar in the respects and to the degree 
implicitly specified by the context. If I tell you ‘Don’t buy that sweater—you already have a lot of 
similar sweaters’, the respects and degrees of similarity are implicitly suggested by the context— that 
is, in this case, I probably mean that the sweaters in question are similar in colour, material or cut 
not that they are similar in being all on the planet Earth, being self-identical, or being not good 
conductors of electricity.
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the purpose. In this case, for example, it would seem that the final velocity of the 
box should be similar to the velocity o f the racer in order for the model to be a 
specifically faithful epistemic representation of that system. However, it is not clear 
whether this specific respect of similarity is sufficient to make the model a 
specifically faithful epistemic representation o f the system. (It would seem that if all 
that matters is the similarity between the final velocity o f the box and that of the 
car, then a model that says that the final velocity of the box is proportional to the 
length o f the box is a specifically faithful epistemic representation of the soap-box 
derby if the final velocity o f the racer happens to be similar to the final velocity of 
the box as determined by the model) Moreover, since what we want to ascertain is 
that the racer will not exceed a velocity we deem to be safe, we are more interested 
in the final velocity of the box not being lower than that of the racer rather than in 
it not being higher. This is because, for our purposes, a model that grossly 
underestimated the final velocity of the racers would be a less faithful epistemic 
representation than a model that overestimated it.
As this example seems to show, the relation between purposes and degrees and 
respects of similarity is a complex one. It is at best unclear whether any general 
account o f how certain kinds o f purposes (say prediction or explanation) relate to 
specific respects o f similarity is possible. I am not claiming that such an account is 
impossible. W hat I am saying is that, in lack of it, however, the relevant similarity 
account can hardly be acquitted from the charge of vagueness. Its critics are likely 
to claim that the account remains hopelessly vague if what the relevant respects and 
degrees of similarity are is a question that can only be answered on a case-by-case 
basis.
III. 1.8. C a n  T h e o r e t ic a l  M o d e l s  B e  S im il a r  t o  C o n c r e t e  Sy s t e m s?
Another fundamental problem for the similarity account o f scientific representation 
is explaining in what sense a theoretical model, which is arguably not a concrete 
object, can be similar to a concrete system in the world. R.I.G. Hughes, for 
example, claims:
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[...] we may model an actual pendulum, a weight hanging by a 
cord, as an ideal pendulum. We may be even tempted to say that in 
both cases the relation between the pendulum’s length and its 
periodic time is approximately the same, and that they are in that 
respect similar to each other. But the ideal pendulum has no length, 
and there is no time in which it completes an oscillation (Hughes 
1999, p.S330; my emphasis).
I take it that, according to Hughes, only material objects— i.e. objects that are both 
actual and concrete— can have concrete properties such as having a certain length 
and completing an oscillation in a certain time; and, since, whatever the ideal 
pendulum is, it is not a material object, it cannot have a length and cannot 
oscillate. So, it would not be clear in what sense the ideal pendulum could be 
similar to the actual pendulum, which oscillates and has a certain length.'9
The advocates of the similarity conception, however, do not need to maintain 
that the ideal pendulum literally has the concrete properties it is ordinarily said to 
have in order to claim that it is similar to a certain real-world pendulum. Consider 
what seems to be an analogous case. Whatever fictional entities, such as Sherlock 
Holmes, are, they are not concrete actual objects. Yet they are often said to have 
properties that only concrete objects have, such as smoking a pipe and living on 
Baker Street. Obviously, when people say things like ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes a 
pipe’ in a meta-fictional context (i.e. when talking about fiction), they do not mean 
that Sherlock Holmes literally smokes a pipe. Rather, they mean that “he” does so 
in some non-literal sense.
The fact that fictional characters do not literally have some of the properties 
they are ordinarily said to have does not seem to prevent us from comparing them 
to concrete actual objects. When discussing literary works, for example, people 
often compare fictional entities to actual concrete ones. Readers, for example, may 
discuss how closely the London o f Dickens novels resembles the actual Victorian
19 Analogous objections can also be found in (Suarez 2002) and (Callender and Cohen 2006).
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London, or whether the historical Richard III was as ruthless as the homonymous 
character in the Shakespearian play, or how closely Sherlock Holmes resembles Dr. 
Joseph Bell, one of Conan Doyle’s professors who allegedly inspired the Sherlock 
Holmes character. Readers can even note how a character in a novel reminds them 
of someone they know.
These similarity comparisons seem perfectly legitimate and do not seem to 
presuppose that the fictional entities whose characteristics are being compared with 
those of actual concrete ones are themselves actual concrete objects that literally 
have the concrete characteristics attributed to them. To object to those that 
compare the personality of Sherlock Holmes with that o f Joseph Bell that they 
cannot do so because Sherlock Holmes is not an actual concrete person and as such 
does not have a personality would simply be to miss the point of that exercise. At 
no point do those who draw the comparison assume or need to assume that 
Sherlock Holmes literally has a personality in order to draw that comparison.
Let me note that here I do not mean to deny that accounting for how objects 
that are neither concrete nor actual can, in some sense, said to have concrete 
properties is a genuine philosophical problem. The ontological status of fictional 
entities is at the centre of a long philosophical debate. The available conceptions 
can be roughly grouped in three: those according to which there are no fictional 
entities, those according to which fictional entities are possible (concrete) objects 
and those according to which fictional characters are (actual) abstract objects. None 
of these conceptions o f fictional entities is entirely uncontroversial but it is well 
beyond the scope of this section to discuss these options and their problems. Here 
it is sufficient to note that any empirically adequate account of what fictional 
entities are should be able to account for the fact that fictional entities are not 
actual concrete objects and yet are said to have concrete properties. In fact, this is 
all we need to account for the practice of assessing the similarities of fictional 
entities with real ones.
In saying this, I do not mean to belittle the task of explaining how an object 
that is not actual or concrete can have concrete properties in some sense. I only
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mean to show that, not only is the claim that non-concrete models are similar to 
concrete systems far from being self-refuting, but, in fact, it does not even raise a 
new philosophical problem to which there is no suggested solution. Theoretical 
models, such as the ideal pendulum or our inclined plane, can be therefore 
construed as fictional entities, which, in some sense, have the properties that are 
said to have, such as having a certain length and having a certain period of 
oscillation. As in the case of fictional entities, this seems to be sufficient to ground 
judgements of similarity between a theoretical model and a concrete system. To 
avoid the above problem, the advocate of the similarity account can, therefore, 
claim that theoretical models are fictional entities and adopt any of the available 
accounts of the ontology of fictional entities insofar as the account in question can 
account for the fact that fictional entities, in some sense, have the properties they 
are attributed.
The critics of the similarity account, however, may think that this is not 
sufficient to solve the problem. Whereas real-world pendulums have definite 
oscillation times and real strings have a definite length, the pendulum in the ideal 
pendulum has no definite oscillation time but only an indefinite oscillation time T  
and its string has no definite length but only an indefinite length L. So, how can the 
length of the string in a real-world pendulum be similar to the length of the string 
of an ideal pendulum, if the string of the ideal pendulum has no definite length?
Against this second objection, it should be noted, first of all, that, even if the 
ideal pendulum has no definite length and no definite oscillation time, it has a 
length and an oscillation time and the relation between them is a definite relation. 
Secondly, nothing prevents us from setting the values of any of the parameters of 
the ideal pendulum that have an indefinite value. This is what someone would do 
when they want to use the ideal pendulum model to represent a specific pendulum. 
She can, for example, set the parameter L so the string in the ideal pendulum so 
that its string is exactly 30 centimetres long. In the specified ideal pendulum, the 
string would thus have a definite length exactly like any real string. It is important 
to note that, usually, by setting some of the parameters of a model, one also thereby
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fixes other parameters. In the case o f the ideal pendulum, for example, by setting 
the values of the length o f the string, Z, and the gravitational acceleration on the 
bob, g, one also indirectly fixes the period of the pendulum, which is equal to 
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III. 1.9. T h e  Sim ilarity  C o n c e p t io n  o f  Fa it h f u l  E pist e m ic  Re p r e se n t a t io n
One of the most deep-seated intuitions people ordinarily have about representation 
is that representation is closely related to similarity. For example, most non­
philosophers would be happy to claim that a portrait is similar to its subject (in the 
sense that it resembles its subject) and that this similarity is somehow connected to 
the fact that the portrait represents its subject. Once this intuition is subjected to 
scrutiny, however, it becomes apparent that the relation is not as close as one might 
be tempted to think at first. Following Nelson Goodman’s scathing criticism of 
this common intuition, most philosophers in the analytic tradition today are wary 
o f drawing a direct connection between similarity and representation.
Once we distinguish between epistemic representation and faithful epistemic 
representation, however, one does not need to think that there is any relation 
whatsoever between similarity and epistemic representation in order for similarity 
to play an important role in representation. According to the similarity conception 
o f faithful epistemic representation, similarity between the vehicle and the target 
(in certain respects and to certain degree) is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for the vehicle to be a faithful epistemic representation of the target. So, for 
example, the similarity conception of faithful epistemic representation does not 
maintain that the portrait is an epistemic representation o f its subject by virtue of 
their similarity. It claims that, if the portrait is an epistemic representation o f the 
subject, it represents her faithfully if and only if the portrait and the subject are 
similar in specified respects and to a specified degree.
This conception of faithful epistemic representation may seem very tempting 
when applied to some prototypical cases o f epistemic representation. One such 
case, for example, is that o f (conventional) portraits. First, in that case, our
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intuitions about the similarity between the portrait and the subject seem to be 
reasonably clear. If  we show someone a portrait o f one o f their friends, they will 
usually be able to tell us whether or not it “resembles” like their friend. Second, in 
those cases, the advocate of the similarity conception would seem able to tell a 
plausible story about why, if the portrait is a faithful epistemic representation o f its 
subject, then its users will be able to perform sound inferences from the portrait to 
the subject. The story would go somewhat as follows. A portrait is a faithful 
epistemic representation of a certain only if it is similar to the subject (in certain 
respects and to a certain degree). For example, the portrait represents its target 
faithfully only if the colour o f the patches o f paint that stand for the irises o f the 
subject are similar to a certain degree to the colour of the irises of the subject. 
Then, the user can infer (in accordance with the standard interpretation of 
conventional portraits) that the irises o f the subject are of the same colour as the 
patches o f paint that denote them. If  the colour o f the patch o f paint is similar to 
the colour of the subject’s eyes, the user’s conclusion would be true (or at least 
approximately true).
The similarity conception, however, does not seem to do equally well in other 
cases. For example, it is far from obvious in which respects and to which degree, if 
any, the London Underground map is similar to the London Underground 
network. This is not to say that there is no sense in which they are similar. (In the 
next chapter I will specify in which sense they are similar insofar as they are). 
Rather it is to say that the two objects do not seem to be similar in the intuitive 
sense of the word. One is a piece of glossy paper with names, small circles, and 
coloured lines printed on it; the other is a system of trains, tracks, platforms, 
escalators, and so on. The two objects do not seem to be similar in any intuitive 
sense o f the word. This seems to be a serious problem. As I have argued in III. 1.6, 
the best strategy available to avoid the charge o f vacuousness directed against the 
similarity conception is to appeal to our ordinary intuitions about the similarity of 
some objects in some respect and to some degree. However, in this case, the
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similarity between the two objects, if any, seems to be so abstract that our ordinary 
intuitions about similarity simply seem to fail us.
The advocate of the similarity account could claim that the map is similar to the 
network in that the circles and tabs on the map are connected by a coloured line 
and the stations denoted by those circles and tabs are connected by a direct train 
service, but this line o f defence trades on the fact that we happen to use the same 
abstract verb (‘connect’) can be used to refer to two relations that do not seem to be 
similar at all. When we say that two stations are connected by a certain train line, 
we mean that certain trains travel back and forth between those stations. This is 
clearly not what we mean when we say that a line connects to points. In that case, 
nothing travels back and for the between those points.
Let me emphasize again that this is not to deny that the map and the network 
may be similar at some level. In fact, I do think that they are similar. Rather, I am 
claiming that, if the map and the network are similar, they are similar at a very 
abstract level— they are similar in a sense that, though somehow close to the 
intuitive sense o f ‘similar’, needs to be carefully specified if the account is to clearly 
apply to cases such as this.
The notion of similarity, I think, does not afford us the technical resources to 
capture this abstract sense of similarity. In the next chapter, I will develop a version 
of the structuralist conception of representation that clearly specifies the abstract 
sense in which the map and the network are similar— in the terminology that I will 
introduce there the map and the network are structurally similar.
III. 1 .10. C o n c l u s io n
In this chapter, I have tried to defend the similarity conception of representation 
from some of the objections that are usually directed against it. As far as I can see, 
there are no conclusive objections against the similarity conception of faithful 
epistemic representation. There is no reason to believe that most o f the difficulties 
considered here cannot be overcome from within the similarity conception. The 
last difficulty, on the other hand, can be avoided by claiming that the similarity
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conception is only meant to account for faithful scientific representation not for 
faithful epistemic representation tout court.
If I do not attempt to go down this route here, it is not because I believe that it 
is impossible to develop a defensible version of the similarity account that avoids 
completely the difficulties that I have discussed here. Rather it is because I think 
that it is possible to develop and defend an account o f faithful epistemic that not 
only is more general but also vindicates some of the intuitions that seem to underlie 
the similarity account. In the next chapter, I will develop and defend this account.
As I have mentioned, I do not think that the similarity conception o f faithful 
epistemic representation is mistaken. To the contrary, I believe that there is more 
than a grain of truth to the similarity conception of epistemic representation. If I 
favour a version of the structuralist conception of faithful epistemic representation, 
it is because I believe that not only it provides us with a much more solid and well- 
defined general framework for understanding faithful epistemic representation but 
also because it allows us to understand how similarity is related to faithful epistemic 
representation to the extent that it is.
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III.2. Structure and Faithful Epistemic 
Representation
III.2 .1 . In t r o d u c t io n
In this chapter, I will defend a version of the structural conception o f faithful 
epistemic representation that I will call the structural similarity account of faithful 
epistemic representation. Sympathizers of the structural conception of 
representation seemingly include the likes of Patrick Suppes, Bas van Fraassen, and 
Steven French. From the literature, one could gather the impression that the 
structural conception is a fully-formed view. Despite many insightful remarks and 
some systematic work, however, none o f the sympathizers of the structural 
conception has developed a detailed account of epistemic representation or faithful 
epistemic representation— i.e. a set o f conditions for a vehicle to be an epistemic 
representation or a faithful epistemic representation of a target— or provided us 
with any example of how this conception would apply to some concrete case.
In most cases, their views are confined to rather episodic and informal remarks. 
Even when they provide us with something closer to an account of faithful 
epistemic representation (as, for example, in (French and Ladyman 1999)), their 
views on representation remain largely unclear as they fail to provide us with 
worked-out example of how their account applies to some concrete instance of 
epistemic representation.
My most immediate goal in this chapter is therefore that of clarifying what the 
structural conception o f representation could possibly be. Rather than trying to 
interpret what the sympathizers o f the structural conception might mean when 
talking about representation, I will try to develop what I take to be the strongest 
version of the structuralist conception of faithful epistemic representation and
illustrate how this applies to concrete cases of epistemic representation. My most 
ambitious goal is that o f developing a successful version of the structuralist 
conception of epistemic representation.
The structural conception aims at accounting for epistemic representation in 
terms of a formal relation, a morphism, between set-theoretic structures. A set- 
theoretic structure is a «-tuple S = <AS, nR\s, ..., °Rf, PF\S, ..., rFkS>, where As is a 
non-empty set o f objects (which we will call the universe of S); mR\s, ..., °Rf are 
relations on As (where the superscript before the R  indicates the number of places of 
the relation and properties are construed as unary relations), PF\S, ..., TFkS are 
functions from subsets of tuples of As (where the superscript before the F  indicates 
the number of arguments of the function) to elements of As. (For the sake of 
simplicity, I will drop all subscripts and superscripts whenever they are not 
necessary)
Isomorphism and homomorphism are two common morphisms.
(15) A function,^  from the universe o f A to the universe of B if.
AA—>AB) is a homomorphism if and only if:
[15.1] if <aA, ..., airA>eR,A, then < f a A), ..., yU*A)> e/?B for all R A 
and /?,-B and
[15.2] f i F f i a f ,  ..., apA)) -Ff{ fa \A), . . . , f l a A)) for all F f  and F f
(16) A function ,^  from the universe of A to the universe of B ( f
A A —> AB) is an isomorphism if and only if:
[16.1] For every oBe  AB, there is an oA& AA such that fo ,A)=o*.
[16.2] For every o,Be A B, \ f f o A)=o* and f o A)=of  then o A- o A.
[16.3] For all R A and /?B, <oA, ..., oA> e R A if and only if < f o A), ..., 
J{okA)>e R f
[16.4] For all F f  and F?,flF f(a> \ ..., a A))=F?(J{aiA), . . . , f a A)).
Two structures, A and B, are homomorphic if and only if there is a homomorphism 
from the universe of A to the universe of B; they are isomorphic if there is an
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isomorphism from the universe of A to the universe of B. Homomorphism and 
isomorphism are the two most common morphisms. However, there can be other 
morphisms. For the sake of simplicity, I will call two structures x-morphic if and 
only if they are homomorphic, or isomorphic, or some other morphism holds 
between them.
In Section III. 1.2, I have argued that the structural conception should be 
considered a conception of faithful epistemic representation. On this 
interpretation, the different versions o f the structural conception will have the 
following general form:
(G) A vehicle is a faithful (analytically interpreted) epistemic 
representation o f a certain target for a certain user if and only 
if:
(G .l) the vehicle is an (analytically interpreted) epistemic
representation of that target for that user and
(G.2) an x-morphism holds between the vehicle and the target.
It is important to note that, as it is, (G) is not an account o f faithful epistemic 
representation but a general template from which specific versions of the structural 
conception of faithful epistemic representation can be generated. First, (G) does 
not specify what kind of faithful epistemic representation (G .l) and (G.2) are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for. (Is it completely faithful, partially faithful, 
or specifically faithful epistemic representation?). Second, according to (G .l), a 
vehicle is a faithful epistemic representation of a certain target for a certain user 
only if it is an epistemic representation of that target for that user. Therefore, any 
version o f the structuralist conception of faithful epistemic representation needs to 
adopt an account of epistemic representation. For example, the advocates o f the 
structuralist conception could adopt Suarez’s inferential conception of epistemic 
representation. However, as it will become apparent, the interpretational 
conception of epistemic representation that I have developed is much better suited 
to the purposes o f the structuralist conception than the inferential conception.
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Third, (G.2) leaves unspecified two crucial details. The first is how a morphism 
which is defined as a relation between set-theoretic structures can hold between 
most vehicles and targets which, on the face o f it, are not set-theoretic structures. 
The second is what specific morphism needs to hold between the vehicle and the 
target in order for the vehicle to be a faithful epistemic representation of the target.
In this chapter, I will develop what I take to be a successful version o f the 
structural conception of faithful epistemic representation. In Section III.2.2, I will 
address the question of how vehicles and target that are not set-theoretic structures 
themselves can nonetheless be said to instantiate set-theoretic structures. This 
seems to be a crucial problem for the structural conception, which has been raised 
by some of its critics (see, for example, Frigg 2006) but has never been addressed 
by the supporters o f the structuralist conception. In Section III.2.2, I will argue 
that the notion of interpretation provides us with a very natural way to reconstruct 
both the vehicle and the target as set-theoretic structures. I will call those structures 
the relevant structure of the vehicle and the relevant structure of the target (relative 
to a certain interpretation) and I will say that the vehicle and the target instantiate 
those structure (on a certain interpretation o f them).
In Section III.2.3, I will address another crucial problem for the structuralist 
conception, which has never been adequately addressed. The relevant structure of 
the vehicle and that o f the target may well be x-morphic, but many of the x- 
morphisms that hold between them are not sufficient for the vehicle to be a faithful 
epistemic representation of the target. To avoid this problem some supporters of 
the structuralist conception have claimed that the only x-morphisms that count are 
the intended ones (see, for example, van Fraassen 1997). Unfortunately, not much 
has been done in order to make the notion o f an intended x-morphism anything 
more than an intuitive notion. In Section III.2.3, I suggest that, roughly, the 
intended x-morphims are those that associate an element of the relevant structure 
of the vehicle with one of the relevant structure of the target only if that element 
denotes the other element according to the interpretation o f the vehicle in terms of 
the target adopted by the user.
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In Section III.2.4, I will develop what I call the intended isomorphism account of 
completely faithful epistemic representation. The account is very useful to illustrate 
how the structuralist conception applies to the simplest cases of faithful epistemic 
representation— those in which the vehicle is a completely faithful epistemic 
representation of the target. Unfortunately, though, most cases o f faithful epistemic 
representation are not cases o f completely faithful epistemic representation. If the 
structuralist account is to be taken seriously, it has to account for partially faithful 
epistemic representation as well and, in those cases, an intended isomorphism fails 
to hold between the relevant structure of the vehicle and that of the target. Since 
our main concerns here are scientific models, this seems to be particularly crucial as 
I illustrate in detail in Section III.2.7. Given that most scientific models are to 
some extent idealized and approximated, they are rarely completely faithful 
epistemic representations of the system they represent. Nevertheless, most models 
are to some extent faithful epistemic representations of their target system. For 
example, even if geocentric models are largely unfaithful epistemic representations 
of the solar system, they are nonetheless often used as epistemic representations of 
it because many of the inferences that can be drawn from them about the apparent 
positions of the stars and the moon are sound. A conception of epistemic 
representation that was unable to account for epistemic representations that are 
only partially faithful would hardly apply to the case of scientific models.
This is a well-known problem among the supporters o f the structural 
conception. The commonly-accepted solution to this problem is to opt for a 
morphism weaker than isomorphism as the morphism that holds between the 
relevant structure of the vehicle and the relevant structure of the target. Much of 
the disagreement concerns which morphism is adequate. In Section III.2.6, I 
distinguish three kinds o f unfaithfulness— which I call incorrectness,
incompleteness and inexactness— and I argue that any combination of them can 
characterize a partially faithful epistemic representation. In Sections III.2.9 and
III.2.10, I consider some candidates for the role o f the weaker morphism that holds 
between the relevant structure o f the vehicle and that of the target and I argue that
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are inadequate as general accounts of partially faithful epistemic representation, for 
none of them can adequately account for epistemic representations that are both 
incorrect and incomplete.
In Section III.2.11, I then develop what I call the intended partial isomorphism 
account of partially faithful epistemic representation. This account is a refinement 
of the account proposed and defended by Steven French and his collaborators. 
There I show how the account, as developed here, is successful in dealing with 
epistemic representations that are both incorrect and incomplete. In Section
III.2.11, I argue that the intended partial isomorphism account is also able to 
explain the success o f the other accounts (including the intended isomorphism 
account) by showing how those morphisms are limit cases of intended partial 
isomorphism. In Section III.2.13, however, I will argue that the account is not 
equally successful in dealing with partially faithful epistemic representations that 
are inexact.
Finally, in Section III.2.14, I develop what I will call the structural similarity 
account of faithful epistemic representation and I will argue that this account can 
account for partially faithful epistemic representations that are incorrect, 
incomplete, and inexact. The notion o f structural similarity which plays a central 
role in the account is introduced in III.2.15, where the faithfulness of an epistemic 
representation is explained in terms o f the structural similarity of the relevant 
structure of the vehicle and that o f the target (relative to a certain interpretation of 
the vehicle in terms of the target.)
III.2.2. St r u c t u r a l  R e c o n s t r u c t io n
One of the most fundamental problem that faces a structural conception of faithful 
epistemic representation is that morphisms are defined as relations between set- 
theoretic structures and, on the face of it, most vehicles and targets are not set-
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theoretic structures.20 For example, neither the London Underground map nor the 
London Underground network is a set-theoretic structure. So, how would a 
conception of representation that relies on the formal notion o f a morphism apply 
to objects such as the London Underground map and the London Underground 
network, which are not structures?
The most promising answer to this question, I think, is to maintain that, even if 
they are not set-theoretic structures, concrete objects or systems can instantiate set- 
theoretic structures. Two concrete objects or systems, then, could be said to be x- 
morphic if and only if they instantiate x-morphic structures. Roman Frigg (2006) 
has suggested that to say that a concrete object (or system of objects) instantiates a 
certain structure amounts to giving an abstract description of it that applies if  and 
only if some suitable, more concrete description o f it applies. Following Nancy 
Cartwright (1999, Ch. 2), Frigg suggests a necessary condition for one description 
to be more abstract than another. A description such as ‘John is playing a game’ is 
more abstract than a set of descriptions— such as one that includes ‘John is playing 
chess’, ‘John is playing football’, ‘John is playing poker’— only if (a) ‘John is 
playing a game’ does not apply unless one or other o f the concrete descriptions in 
that set applies and (b) the fact that the more concrete description is satisfied is 
what the fact that the more abstract description is satisfied consists in on that 
instance. Frigg then claims:
[...] for it to be the case that possessing a structure applies to a 
system, being an individual must apply to some of its parts and 
standing in a relation to some of these. The crucial thing to realise 
at this point is that being an individual and being in a relation are 
abstract on the model ofplaying a game. (Frigg 2006, p.55)
20 Some advocates of the semantic conception of theories seem to believe that scientific models 
are set-theoretic structures (see e.g. van Fraassen 1997). However, this would solve only half of the 
problem because the systems that models represent are not set-theoretic structures but concrete 
systems.
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For example, the London Underground network instantiates a structure 
N=<{Acton Town, Aldgate, ..., Woodside Park, Woolwich Arsenal}, 
. . . ,1i?yN{<Blackhorse Road>, <Brixton>, <Euston>, <Finsbury Park>, <Green 
Park>, <Highbury & Islington>, <Oxford Circus>, <Pimlico>, <Seven Sisters>, 
<Stockwell>, <Tottenham Hale>, <Vauxhall>, <Victoria>, <Walthamstow 
Central>, <Warren Street>},...> only if an abstract description that includes among 
other things ‘there is a property that Blackhorse Road, Brixton, ..., Walthamstow 
Central, and Warren Street stations have and no other station has’ is true of the 
London Underground network. I will call this description a structural description of 
the London Underground network. This structural description is true only if a 
suitable, more concrete description— such as the one that includes ‘Blackhorse 
Road, Brixton, ..., Walthamstow Central, and Warren Street stations are on the 
Victoria Line and no other station is on the Victoria Line’ or the one that includes 
‘Blackhorse Road, Brixton, ..., Walthamstow Central, and Warren Street stations 
have four escalators and no other station has four escalators’— is true o f the 
network.
The structural description is more abstract because it is purely extensional and, 
as such, it does not tell us anything about the nature of the properties and relations 
among the objects in the universe of the structure, it only tells us that such and 
such objects in the universe o f the structure have some property or other that no 
other object in .the universe of the structure has or that such and such »-tuples of 
objects in the universe o f the structure are in some relation or other and that no 
other n-tuple o f objects in the universe o f the structure is in that relation. In this 
example, the property could be that of being on the Victoria Line, but any other 
more concrete property (e.g.: having four escalators) would do if it is shared by the 
abovementioned stations and by no other stations on the network.
It is crucial to note that, on this account, the same object or system can 
instantiate a number o f different structures depending on which more concrete 
description of the system we are basing the structural description on— i.e. 
depending on how we identify which o f its parts are the objects in the universe of
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the structure and which of the concrete properties of and relations among those 
parts have their abstract counterpart included in the structure. The same vehicle 
and the same target thus are likely to instantiate not one but many structures.
This however is not a problem for the structural conception if one adopts the 
interpretational conception o f epistemic representation that I have defended in 
Chapter II.2. There, I have argued that a vehicle is an epistemic representation of a 
certain target if and only if a user interprets the vehicle in terms o f the target and 
that one way for a user to interpret a vehicle in terms o f the target is to identify 
some objects, properties and relations in the vehicle that stand for objects, 
properties and relations in the target. In Section II.2.2, I have called these objects, 
properties and relations in the vehicle and the target, respectively, V-relevant and 
T-relevant (according to a certain analytic interpretation of the vehicle in terms of 
the target).
For example, I have claimed that the relation being connected by a light blue line 
in the map is V-relevant (according to the standard interpretation of the map in 
terms o f the London Underground network) because, on the standard 
interpretation, that relation stands for a relation between stations on the network; 
the relation being two inches left o f  on the other hand, is not V-relevant because, on 
the standard interpretation of the map, that does not stand for any relation among 
stations in the network. Analogously, the relation being connected by Victoria Line 
trains in the network is T-relevant because there is a relation in the map that stands 
for that relation, while the relation being three miles away from  is not T-relevant 
because, on the standard interpretation, no relation on the map stands for that 
relation.
Now, suppose that there is a true description of the vehicle that includes all and 
only the objects and their properties and relations that are V-relevant (according to 
the interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target) and that there is a true 
description of the target that includes all and only the objects and their properties 
and relations that are T-relevant (according to the interpretation o f the vehicle in 
terms o f the target). Under those ideal descriptions both the vehicle and the target
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instantiate a structure, which I will call, respectively, the relevant structure o f  the 
vehicle, V, and the relevant structure o f the target, T, according to interpretation I.
In general, the notion of relevant structure of the vehicle and relevant structure 
o f the target can be defined as follows:
(17) If V  is a vehicle, T  is a target, and I(V~^T) is an analytic
interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target, V is the relevant 
structure of V  (relative to I) if and only if:
[17.1] Av={0 iv, ..., of]  is the universe o f the structure V if and only 
if Av is the set of V-relevant objects according to /.
[17.2] nRf={<of,  ..., of>, ..., <of, ..., of>} if and only if some n- 
ary V-relevant relation holds among o f ,  ..., o f ,  among, ..., 
among o f  ..., of, but does not hold among any other «-tuple of 
objects in Av.
[17.3] "Ff{f{of ,  ..., of)=of ,  ..., of)=of] if and only if 
some «-ary V-relevant function takes o f  as its value if its
arguments are oiv, ..., o f ,  __ , and takes o f  as its value if its
arguments are oiv, ..., o f .
(18) If  V  is a vehicle and T  is a target and I{V-^T)  is an analytic
interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target, T  is the relevant 
structure of T  (relative to the interpretation I) if and only if:
[18.1] AT={0 iT, ..., o„T} is the universe of the structure T  if  and only
if AT is the set o f T-relevant objects according to the
interpretation I.
[18.2] "Rf={<of,  ..., o„T>, ..., <of, ..., of>} if and only if  some n- 
ary T-relevant relation holds among o f ,  ..., o f ,  among, ..., 
among of,  ..., of,  but does not hold among any other «-tuple of 
objects in AT.
[18.3] "Ff{f{of ,  ..., o„T)=of, . . . , f o f ,  ..., of)=of} if and only if 
some »-ary T-relevant function takes o f  as its value for the
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arguments oiT, o„T, ...., takes o? as a value for the arguments
T T
O f 1 ,  0n.
So, on this account, an interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target 
provides us with a principled and natural way to reconstruct the vehicle and the 
target as set-theoretic structures. An analytic interpretation of a vehicle in terms of 
the target singles out some objects, properties, functions, and relations in the 
vehicle and in the target as respectively V-relevant and T-relevant. It is natural to 
assume that, according to that interpretation, the relevant structure o f the vehicle 
and of the target will therefore be the structures that include all and only those V- 
relevant and T-relevant objects and their V-relevant and T-relevant properties and 
relations.
The interpretational conception of epistemic representation and the notion of 
interpretation in particular turns out to be particularly well-suited to the purposes 
o f the structural conception o f epistemic representation as it provides a principled, 
natural way to turn a seeming weakness of the structural conception into a 
strength. Even when a vehicle and a target are not set-theoretic structure, if the user 
adopts an analytic interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target, the vehicle 
and the target can be easily reconstructed as set-theoretic structures on the basis o f 
that interpretation.
I I I .2 .3 . In t e n d e d  M o r p h is m s
In the previous section, I have introduced the notions o f the relevant structure o f 
the vehicle, V, and the relevant structure of the target, T, according to a given 
analytic interpretation. Now, a number of different morphisms may hold between 
the relevant structure of the vehicle and the relevant structure of the target. It is 
therefore crucial to identify a special class of morphisms, which I will call intended 
morphisms.
(19) A m orphism ,^ between the relevant structure o f the vehicle
and that o f the target is intended (relative to a certain analytic 
interpretation of the vehicle in terms o f the target I) if and only if:
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[19.1] For all 0V,€ Av and all oT,e AT, j{oyl)=oT, only if, according to 
7, 0 ;V denotes o,T;
[19.2] For all nRyk and ”RkT, <oyi, ..., oy„>E”R /h and <j(oyi), ..., 
J{oy„)>e ”R J  only if, according to 7, nRyk denotes "Rj?.
[19.3] For all ”F<k and ”F kiJ{”F k{o,y, ..., ^ v))=”f r*(/(^1), . . . , / * v*)) 
only if, according to 7, denotes ”P k.
According to the standard interpretation of the London Underground map in 
terms o f the network, for example, a small circle or tab with a name printed on the 
side stands for the station with that name and the relation being connected by a red 
line stands for the relation being connected by Central Line trains. A morphism 
between the relevant structures of the map and the network is, therefore, intended 
only if it associates a circle or a tab with a certain name with the station with that 
name and it associates circles and tabs that stand in the relation being connected by a 
red line with stations that are in the relation being connected by Central Line trains.
It is important to note that not all morphisms are intended. Suppose, for
example, that, by mistake, the printers have printed a map of the London
Underground network that is completely identical to the regular map except for 
the fact that the names o f the circle labelled ‘Holborn’ and the tab labelled 
‘Highbury and Islington’ on the standard map have been inverted. If the standard 
map is isomorphic to the network, so is the defective map, for the regular map and 
the defective one are themselves isomorphic to each other. The isomorphism 
between the relevant structure o f the defective map and that o f the network is not 
intended though because it associates the tab labelled ‘Holborn’ with Highbury 
and Islington station and the circle labelled ‘Highbury and Islington’ with Holborn 
station, while, according to the standard interpretation of the map, a circle or a tab 
with a name printed on the side stands for the station with that name.
Consider another example. This time the printers have mistakenly inverted the 
colours o f the red line and dark blue line on the map. If the regular map is
isomorphic to the network, then the defective map will be isomorphic to the
113
network as well. However, the isomorphism is not intended. According to the 
standard interpretation of the map, the relation being connected by a red line stands 
for the relation being connected by Central Line trains and the relation being 
connected by a dark blue line stands for the relation being connected by Piccadilly Line 
trains.
I think that no version of the structural conception o f faithful epistemic 
representation can be successful unless it employs the notion o f an intended 
morphism (or an analogous notion). If the morphisms between the relevant 
structure of the vehicle and that o f the target is not intended, it may well be the 
case that all of the inferences from the vehicle to the target are wrong. To see why 
just think of a map of London Underground that is exactly like the actual map 
except for the fact that the colours o f all the lines are randomly assigned and each 
tab or circle is randomly assigned the name of a station. Suppose that the defective 
map is such that the map is a completely unfaithful epistemic representation o f the 
network— i.e. so none o f the inferences from the map to the network that are valid 
according to the standard interpretation associated with the standard map is sound. 
(This seems to be possible if an appropriate combination o f colours and labels is 
chosen). Since the standard map is isomorphic to the defective map, if the former is 
x-morphic to the network, the latter will also be x-morphic to the network.21 
However, whereas some of the x-morphisms that hold between the standard map 
and the network will be intended, none of the x-morphism between the defective 
map and the network will be. So, if we do not specify that the x-morphism 
between the relevant structure vehicle and that of the target is an intended 
morphism, two epistemic representations of the same objects may well be both x- 
morphic to the target without being both partially faithful epistemic 
representations o f it.
Supporters o f the structural conception have sometimes expressed the need to 
focus only on the intended morphisms between vehicle and target (see, for
21 This follows from the fact that if A and B are isomorphic structures and A is x-morphic to a 
third structure C, then also B is x-morphic to C.
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example, van Fraassen 1997). No account of what conditions a morphism needs to 
meet in order to be an intended one, however, is available in the literature. The 
notion o f an analytic interpretation interpretation, however, allows us to clearly 
define what conditions a morphism needs to meet in order to be an intended one.
III.2.4. T h e  In t e n d e d  Is o m o r p h is m  A c c o u n t  o f  C o m p l e t e l y  Fa it h f u l  
E p is t e m ic  R e p r e s e n t a t io n
In the previous two section, I have introduced two crucial notions— that of 
relevant structure and that o f intended morphism. We now have the resources to 
formulate an account of completely faithful epistemic representation— the 
intended isomorphism account. This will mainly serve as an illustration o f the kind 
o f intuition that underlies the structural conception that a certain x-morphism 
needs to hold between the vehicle and the target if the vehicle is to be a faithful 
epistemic representation o f the target.
According to the intended isomorphism account:
(H) A vehicle is a completely faithful (analytically interpreted) 
epistemic representation of a target for a user if and only if:
(H .l) the vehicle is an (analytically interpreted) epistemic 
representation o f that target for that user and 
(H.2) there is an intended isomorphism between the relevant 
structure o f the vehicle and that o f the target.
In order to show that the intended isomorphism account of completely faithful 
epistemic representation is successful (in all cases in which the epistemic 
representation is analytically interpreted), I need to show that:
(i) if the vehicle is an analytically interpreted epistemic representation o f the
target for a certain user and an intended isomorphism holds between the
relevant structure o f the vehicle and that of the target, then all valid 
surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the target are sound and
(ii) if the vehicle is an analytically interpreted epistemic representation o f the
vehicle in terms o f the target and all valid surrogative inferences from the
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vehicle to the target are sound, then an intended isomorphism holds 
between the relevant structure o f the vehicle and that of the target.
Consider (i) first. If a user adopts an analytic interpretation of the vehicle in 
terms o f the target, an inference from the vehicle to the target will be valid if  and 
only if it is in accordance with the rules outlined in Section II.2.6. I will now show 
that, if an intended isomorphism holds between the relevant structure o f the 
vehicle and that of the target, then all valid inferences— i.e. all inferences that are in 
accordance with (Rule 1), (Rule 2), or (Rule 3)— are sound.
(Rule 1). Assume that there is an object o7 in the vehicle and that o? denotes o7  
according to the interpretation adopted by the user. According to (Rule 1), it is 
then valid to infer that there is an object <?T> in the target. Now, if an isom orphism / 
holds between the relevant structure o f the vehicle and the relevant structure o f the 
target, then there must be an object, o j,  in the universe of the relevant structure of 
the target, AT, such that/<7/v)=<?/. I f / i s  an intended isomorphism however, it must 
be the case that oJ=oT;, because oT, is the object that is denoted by ov, according to 
the interpretation adopted by the user.
Now, assume that there is no object 0V, in the vehicle and that ov, denotes oT, 
according to the interpretation adopted by the user. According to (Rule 1), it is 
then valid to infer that there is no object <?T, in the target. If an isomorphism/holds 
between the relevant structure o f the vehicle and the relevant structure of the target 
then every object in the universe o f the relevant structure of the target must be in 
one-to-one correspondence with some object different from <?v, and, if this 
isomorphism is intended, then orf cannot be among the objects in the universe of 
the structure of the target because an intended isomorphism would associate 0 T, 
only with <?v„ which is the object that denotes it according to the interpretation 
adopted by the user. Therefore, it is sound to infer that the object oT, is not in the 
target. So, if an intended isomorphism holds between the relevant structure o f the 
vehicle and that of the target, any inference that is in accordance with (Rule 1) will 
be a sound inference.
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(Rule 2). Assume that certain V-relevant objects in the vehicle, 01v, ..., o„v, are 
in a certain V-relevant w-ary relation, "/&v and that, according to the interpretation 
adopted by the user, o\v denotes 0 ]T, ..., o y denotes o„v, and "Rj? denotes nRkT. 
According to (Rule 2), it is therefore valid to infer that a relation nR*T holds among 
0 1T, ..., o„T. If an isomorphism /h o ld s  between the relevant structure of the vehicle 
and the relevant structure of the target, then a relation ”R J  will hold among the 
ob jec ts/oV]), . . . , / o v„). If the isomorphism is intended, then, since o y denotes o\T, 
..., and o„v denotes o„y, it must be the case th a t /o iv)=oiT, . . . iJ(p„y)=oTl, and, since 
"Rky denotes ”RkT, the relation nRTx must be the relation nRvit.
Assume now that certain relevant objects in the vehicle, ov 1, ..., 0V„, are not in a 
certain relevant «-ary relation, ”/?v* and that, according to the interpretation 
adopted by the user, ov\ denotes oT 1, ..., ov„ denotes 0V„, and "RFt denotes "RkT. 
According to (Rule 2)-, it is therefore sound to infer that the relation "RtT does not 
hold among or 1, ..., oT„. Here there are two cases to consider. Either a different 
relevant »-ary relation holds between oy 1, ..., oy„ or no «-ary relation holds among 
them. If a different w-ary relation holds among ov 1, ..., oy„ and an isomorphism 
holds between the relevant structure of the vehicle and the relevant structure o f the 
target, then there will be a relation "RJ that holds among the objects j{o \r), ..., 
f io*) .  If the isomorphism is intended, then, since o y denotes oiT, ..., and o y 
denotes o„v, it must be the case t h a t /o iv)=OiT, . . . , / o„v)=oT„ but ”RXT cannot be 
nRkV because, if the isomorphism is intended, «?vi, ..., 0v„>e/?*v, and <J{ow 1), ..., 
fioy„)>eRkT only if, according to the interpretation adopted by the user, Rj? 
denotes RkT. If no n-ary relation holds among o\v, ..., o y and an isomorphism 
holds between the relevant structure o f the vehicle and the relevant structure o f the 
target, then no relation holds am ong/o i'O , ..., /o»v). If the isomorphism is 
intended, , since o y denotes o\T, ..., and o y denotes o„v, it must be the case that 
/ o , v)=o,T, . . . , / o „ v)=oT„ and therefore no relation holds among those objects. So, 
if an intended isomorphism holds between the relevant structure o f the vehicle and 
that of the target, any inference that is in accordance with (Rule 2) is sound.
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(Rule 3). Assume that the function "P'k has <?v, as its value when its arguments 
are oy 1, oy„, and, according to the interpretation adopted by the user, ov,
denotes oT„ oy\ denotes 0 Ti, ..., oy„ denotes oy„, and "F'k denotes nFTk. According to 
(Rule 3), it is therefore valid to infer that the value of the function for the 
arguments oTi, ..., oT„ is oTj. If  an isomorphism f  holds between V and T, then 
flCFk{oyi, ..., oy„))=fioy,)=nF Tk (f{oyi), ..., ftoy„)). However, since, if the
isomorphism is intended, then j(oy)=oTj and "f^k (f{oy i), ..., J{oy„))=nFTk (oTi, ..., 
oT„), it must be the case that nF*k (oT i, ..., oT„)= oTj. So, if an intended isomorphism 
holds between the relevant structure of the vehicle and that of the target, any 
inference that is in accordance with (Rule 3) is sound.
Since, if the user adopts an analytic interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the 
target, only inferences that are in accordance with (Rule 1), (Rule 2), or (Rule 3) are 
valid and all inferences that are in accordance with (Rule 1), (Rule 2), or (Rule 3) 
are sound if an intended isomorphism holds between the relevant structure of the 
vehicle and that o f the target, we can conclude that, in all cases in which the user 
adopts an analytic interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target, if an intended 
isomorphism holds between the relevant structure of the vehicle and that o f the 
target, all valid inferences are sound.
Consider now (ii)— if the user adopts an analytic interpretation and all valid 
surrogative inferences from the vehicle to the target are sound, then an intended 
isomorphism holds between the relevant structure of the vehicle and that o f the 
target. If a user adopts an analytic interpretation of the vehicle in terms o f the 
target, then only surrogative inferences that are in accordance with (Rule 1), (Rule 
2), or (Rule 3) are valid. I will therefore need to show that if all inferences that are 
in accordance with (Rule 1), (Rule 2), or (Rule 3) are sound then it must be the case 
that an intended isomorphism holds between the relevant structure of the vehicle 
and that o f the target.
If all inferences that are in accordance with (Rule 1) are sound, then, it must be 
the case that, for every object ov, that is in the vehicle, the object denoted by oyh 0 T„
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is in the target and that, for every object 0V, that is not in the vehicle, the object 
denoted by 0V„ 0T„ is not in the target.
If all inferences that are in accordance with (Rule 2) are sound, then it must be 
the case that, for every w-tuple of objects, oy 1, ..., oy„, that are in a »-ary relation 
”R Vk, the objects denoted by o 'i, ..., oy„, or i, ..., or„, are in the relation denoted by 
”RkT and that, for every »-tuple o f objects, oy\, ..., 0V„, that are not in a «-ary 
relation "F'k, the objects denoted by ovi, ..., oy„, oTi, ..., or„, are not in the relation 
denoted by "RF. So, an w-tuple of objects oy 1, ..., oy„ is in a certain relation ”R /k if 
and only if the objects denoted by 0vi, ..., oy„ are in the relation "RF denoted by
" R \
Finally, if all inferences in accordance with (Rule 3) are sound, then it must be 
the case that for every «-ary function "F'k whose value for the arguments oy 1, ..., 
oy„ is ov„ the value of function denoted by "F'k, "Fk, is the object denoted by oy, 
when the arguments are the objects denoted by oy\, ..., oy„.
From this, it follows that, if all inferences in accordance with (Rule 1), (Rule 2), 
or (Rule 3) are sound, then it is possible to construct a function, f ,  from the 
relevant structure o f the vehicle Av to the relevant structure o f the target o f the 
target AT such that:
a) For every oy, and 0 T„ J{oy,)=oTj if and only if 0V, denotes 0 T, according 
to the interpretation adopted by the user.
b) For all and "Rj?, <oyi, ..., 0v*>e if and only if <J{oy i), ..., 
J{oy„)>E ”RkT and ”Ryk denotes "RF according to the interpretation 
adopted by the user.
c) For all "F'k and "A1*, J[nF /k{oy\, ..., oy„))=”F Ykifi.oy i), ..., J{(F„)) and 
"F'k denotes nFTk according to the interpretation adopted by the user.
Since a function that meets these conditions is an intended isomorphism, it 
follows that, if all inferences in accordance with (Rule 1), (Rule 2) and (Rule 3) are 
sound, then an intended isomorphism holds between the relevant structure of the 
vehicle and that of the target.
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III.2.5. A n  E x a m p le  o f  C o m p le t e ly  F a i t h f u l  E p is te m ic  R e p r e s e n t a t io n
I will now illustrate how the intended isomorphism account works with a concrete 
example. Suppose that an intended isomorphism holds between the relevant 
structure of the London Underground map and that of the London Underground 
network relative to the standard interpretation. This means that there is a bijective 
function that associates circles and tabs on the map with the stations they denote 
according to the standard interpretation of the map and that some circles or tabs 
have a certain property or are in a certain relation only if the stations they denote 
are in the property or relation denoted by that property. For example, if an 
intended isomorphism holds between the relevant structure of the London 
Underground map and that o f the London Underground network, then the circle 
labelled ‘Holborn’ and the tab labelled ‘Bethnal Green’ are connected by a red line 
if and only if Holborn and Bethnal Green stations are connected by Central Line 
trains because, according to the standard interpretation of the map, the circle 
labelled ‘Holborn’ and the tab labelled ‘Bethnal Green’ denote respectively 
Holborn and Bethnal Green stations and the relation being connected by a red line 
denotes the relation being connected by Central Line trains. Therefore, it follows 
that, if the user were to infer from the map that Holborn and Bethnal Green 
stations are connected by Central Line trains in accordance with (Rule 2% her 
inference would be sound and so for all other inferences that are valid according to 
the standard interpretation of the map.
It is important to note that all this holds only if the isomorphism between the 
relevant structure of the map and that of the network is an intended isomorphism. 
If no intended isomorphism held between the relevant structure of the map and 
that of the network, then some valid inferences would not be sound. Consider the 
examples discussed in Section III.2.3. The first is the map which is identical with 
the standard map except for the fact that on it the printers have mistakenly 
inverted the names of the circle labelled ‘Holborn’ and the tab ‘Highbury and 
Islington’. If the standard map is isomorphic to the network, so is the defective 
map, for the regular map and the defective one are themselves isomorphic to each
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other. The defective map, however, is not a completely faithful epistemic 
representation of the network, as some of the inferences that one could perform 
from the map to the network are unsound. For example, from the defective map, it 
is valid to infer that Highbury and Islington station is on the Circle Line, when in 
fact Holborn is on that line but Highbury and Islington station is not. So, even if 
the defective map and the network are isomorphic, the defective map is not a 
completely faithful epistemic representation of the network because none of the 
isomorphisms between the relevant structure of the map and that o f the network is 
an intended one.
Consider the case in which the printers have mistakenly inverted the colours o f 
the red and dark blue line. The relevant structure o f the defective map and that of 
the network are still isomorphic, but the isomorphism is not an intended one. As a 
consequence, the defective map is not a completely faithful epistemic 
representation o f the network. According to the standard interpretation of the map, 
a user would validly infer that Piccadilly line trains operates between Holborn 
station and Liverpool Street station, while actually only Central Line trains do so. 
Despite the isomorphism between the relevant structure of the map and the 
network, the defective map is not a completely faithful epistemic representation of 
the network, as the isomorphism between the relevant structure o f the defective 
map and the relevant structure of the network is not the intended one.
III.2.6. Pa r t ia l l y  Fa it h f u l  E p is t e m ic  R e p r e s e n t a t io n s  a n d  T h r e e  K in d s  o f
U n f a it h f u l n e s s
So far, I have argued that the intended isomorphism account o f completely faithful 
epistemic representation is successful in all those cases of completely successful 
representation in which the user adopts an analytic interpretation of a vehicle in 
terms of a target, as in the case of the London Underground map. However, not all 
epistemic representations are completely faithful. In fact, scientific models, which 
are our main concern here, are usually far from being completely faithful epistemic 
representations o f the systems they represent. In this section, I will distinguish
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three kinds of unfaithfulness that characterise partially faithful epistemic 
representations— incompleteness, incorrectness, and inexactness— and argue that 
the intended isomorphism conception cannot account for partially faithful 
epistemic representation.
(20) A vehicle V  is an incorrect (analytically interpreted) epistemic 
representation o f a certain target T  for a certain user if and only if:
[20.1] Kis an analytically interpreted epistemic representation of T  
for that user, and
[20.2] V is the relevant structure of V  (relative to the analytic 
interpretation /  adopted by the user), and
[20.3] T  is the relevant structure of T  (relative to the analytic 
interpretation I(V~$ T) adopted by the user), and
[20.4] :
[20.4.1] for some o?E Av, oyv denotes o7 and 0 T, does not exist, 
or
[20.4.2] for some ow\ denotes oTi, ..., oy„ denotes oT„,nR /k 
denotes "RtT and «?vi, ..., 0v*>e"/?v* but <oTi, ..., 
o„J>£ nRkT.
(21) A vehicle V  is an incomplete (analytically interpreted) 
epistemic representation of a certain target T  for a certain user if and 
only if:
[21.1] Kis an analytically interpreted epistemic representation of T  
for that user, and
[21.2] V is the relevant structure o f V  (relative to the analytic 
interpretation /  adopted by the user), and
[21.3] T  is the relevant structure o f T  (relative to the analytic 
interpretation I{V->T) adopted by the user), and
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[21.4] :
[21.4.1] for some oT,e AT, oVj denotes 0T, and <?v, does not exist 
or,
[21.4.2] for some nRkT, ov i denotes oTi, ..., ov„ denotes 0 T„, 
denotes "RkT according to /, and <oT\, ..., 0 *T> e nRF  but 
<0vi, ..., onv><£"RF.
(22) A vehicle V  is an inexact (analytically interpreted) epistemic
representation of a certain target T  for a certain user if and only if:
[22.1] Uis an analytically interpreted epistemic representation of T  
for that user, and
[22.2] V is the relevant structure of V  (relative to the analytic 
interpretation /  adopted by the user), and
[22.3] T  is the relevant structure o f T  (relative to the analytic 
interpretation I{V~$  T) adopted by the user), and
[22.4] For some for some "Ft , ov\ denotes or i, ..., ov„ denotes oT„,
"F^kdenotes "Fk and nF k{ow\, ..., <?vd^"/*T(oTi, ..., <?„T).
(Incidentally, it is worth noting how each kind of unfaithfulness is defined in terms 
of the failure of one of one of the conditions that need to hold in order for an 
intended isomorphism to hold between the relevant structure of the vehicle and 
that of the target).
In Chapter 1.2, I have illustrated the difference between completely faithful and 
partially faithful epistemic representation by means of two maps of the London 
Underground network— a contemporary map of the London Underground and an 
old, 1930s map of it. As 1 noted, whereas, under its standard interpretation, the 
new London Underground map is a completely faithful epistemic representation of 
today’s network, the old London Underground map is only a partially faithful 
epistemic representation of it under its standard interpretation, as only some of the 
inferences from the map to today’s network that are valid according to that
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interpretation are sound. I will now use that example to illustrate the difference 
between the first two kinds o f unfaithfulness— incorrectness and incompleteness. (I 
will illustrate the third kind of unfaithfulness, inexactness, in Section III.2.7 
below).
According to the intended isomorphism conception o f completely successful 
representation, the old London Underground map is no longer a completely 
faithful epistemic representation of the London Underground network because no 
intended isomorphism holds between the relevant structure of the map and that of 
today’s network. There are at least two ways in which the intended isomorphism 
between the relevant structure of the old map and that of the network fails to hold 
and as a consequence the old map is both an incorrect and an incomplete epistemic 
representation of today’s network. The old map is an incomplete epistemic 
representation of today’s network because, among other things, some of the 
stations and train lines on today’s network have no counterpart on the map. For 
example, on today’s network, Victoria Line trains operate between Highbury and 
Islington and Victoria station. In the relevant structure instantiated by today’s 
network, the ordered pair <Highbury and Islington, Victoria> is an element o f the 
set o f all pair of stations connected by Victoria Line trains. However, the circles on 
the old map that denote those stations (according to the standard interpretation of 
the old map) are not connected by any coloured line. Therefore, the ordered pair 
<tab labelled ‘Highbury and Islington’, circle labelled ‘Victoria’> is not an element 
o f any set of pairs of circles or tabs connected by a coloured line. As a consequence, 
an intended isomorphism fails to hold between the structure of the old map and 
the structure of the network.
The old map is an incorrect epistemic representation of today’s network because 
among other things, some of the circles, tabs, and coloured lines on the map have 
no counterpart in today’s network. For example, on the old map there is a tab 
labelled ‘Dover Street’ connected by a dark blue line to the circles labelled 
‘Piccadilly Circus’ and ‘Green Park’. In the structure instantiated by the old map, 
the tab labelled ‘Dover Street’ is an element of the set o f circles connected by a blue
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line. Since there is no station called Dover Street on today’s network, however, the 
tab labelled ‘Dover Street’ fails to denote any station on today’s network. 
Therefore, there is no intended isomorphism between the map and the network as 
an intended isomorphism is one that associates every circle on the map with the 
station with the name printed by the circle.
Despite the old map being an incomplete and incorrect epistemic 
representation, a large number of inferences from the map to today’s network that 
are valid according to the standard interpretation of the map in terms o f the 
network are sound. Users would therefore be able to draw a number o f sound 
inferences from the map to the network without adopting a non-standard 
interpretation of the map in terms of the network. This is far from being an 
exceptional case. For example, the pre-modern users of the Ptolemaic model (with 
epicycles and deferents), who were unaware that the model (on its standard 
interpretation) was an incorrect epistemic representation of its target, were able to 
perform a number o f sound inferences from it such as those concerning the 
apparent position of the Sun, the Moon, the planets and the stars in the sky. I take 
it that a satisfactory account of faithful epistemic representation should be able to 
explain by virtue o f what partially faithful epistemic representations, such as the old 
map and the Ptolemaic model of the universe, are faithful insofar as they are.
An alternative approach would be to assume that, for every epistemic 
representation that is partially faithful under its standard interpretation, there is 
some ad hoc interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target under which the 
vehicle is a completely faithful epistemic representation o f the target. I take this 
alternative to be unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. The main reason is that 
this alleged ad hoc interpretation is not the one users actually adopt. For example, 
someone who is unaware that the old London Underground map is obsolete from 
it to the target adopting their standard interpretation and not an ad hoc 
interpretation such that all inferences that are valid according to that interpretation 
are sound. If  we are to be able to explain why those users of those epistemic 
representations can draw both true and false conclusions about the target from
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them we have to explain by virtue of what the map is a faithful epistemic 
representation o f the network on its standard interpretation.
I I I .2 .7 . A n  E x a m p l e  o f  In e x a c t  E p is t e m ic  R e p r e s e n t a t io n
It is widely acknowledged that scientific models are usually far from being 
completely faithful epistemic representations o f their target systems. Consider 
again, for example, the inclined plane and the soap-box derby. In the example, the 
users intend to use the model to estimate the velocity of the racers at the foot of the 
hill to determine whether the racers will exceed the velocity that they deem safe. 
Suppose that, once we have plugged in acceptable approximations of the values of 
the height of the start line and of the gravitational acceleration in the model, the 
final velocity of the box turns out to be lower than the velocity we deem to be safe. 
By virtue o f what is this conclusion true, if true? The structural conception of 
faithful epistemic representation would maintain that it is true in virtue of the fact 
that a certain morphism holds between the structure instantiated by the model and 
that instantiated by the system under the description o f them that underlies the 
interpretation of the model in terms of the target. In this section, I will argue that 
this intended morphism, however, cannot be isomorphism.
This is not a new or surprising result. It is well-known that, since most (if not 
all) scientific models are idealized and approximated epistemic representations of 
their target systems, isomorphism cannot be the morphism that holds between the 
relevant structure of a model and that of its target system. In fact, to my 
knowledge, not one of the sympathizers of the structuralist account thinks that 
isomorphism can be the morphism that holds between idealized models and the 
systems they are used to represent. However, I think it is instructive to see exactly 
how isomorphism fails to obtain, because it will help us to identify the 
characteristics that a morphism should have in order to play this role and it will 
illustrate the third kind o f unfaithfulness mentioned above— inexactness.
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7/7.2.7.1 The Relevant Structure o f the Inclined Plane Model
Following the work o f Patrick Suppes and his collaborators (see, e.g., Suppes 2002) 
and o f Wolfgang Balzer, Ulises Moulines and Joseph Sneed (Balzer, Moulines and 
Sneed 1987) on the set-theoretic structure of the models of classical particle 
mechanics, it is plausible to maintain that, on its standard interpretation, the 
inclined plane model instantiates a structure of the general form M =«AM, 7™, V, 
R, I*> P ,  mM, P ,  gM>, where AM is a non-empty set of objects, which in our case 
contains the box, 7™ is an interval o f real numbers, V is a three-dimensional vector 
space over real numbers, R  is the set of real numbers, I* is the set of positive 
integers. The domain of P  is the Cartesian product of AM and 7™, AMx7M, and its 
co-domain is V. For every a,-E AM and every tjE 7™, P  is twice differentiable at 
For the sake o f clarity, I will call P (tf„  tj) and aM(tf„ tj) the first and the second 
derivative of P(tf„ tj) with respect to t {dPA{aii tj)ldt= P (tf„  tj) and S P A{an 
t])ld?=2l A{aj, tj)). Informally, the functions P , P  and aM associate each object and a 
time-value with, respectively, the magnitude of the position, velocity and 
acceleration of that object at that time. The domain of the function mu is AM and 
its co-domain is the set of positive real numbers, R*. Informally, m associates every 
object in AM with the magnitude of its mass. The domain of P  is the product of 
(AMxAM)x7Mx7+ and its co-domain is V. Informally, P  associates ordered pairs of 
objects in the domain, a time-value and a positive integer with one of the forces 
that the first object exerts on the second one at that time (the positive integer is just 
a way to label different forces that one object may exert on the other). These forces 
can be construed as “internal” forces— forces exerted by objects that are within the 
system in question). The domain o f g*1 is AMx7Mx7+ and its co-domain is V. The 
function g*1 associates an object, a time-value and an integer with one of the 
“external” forces acting on it at that time (where external forces can be informally 
construed o f as forces that are exerted by objects outside of the system in question 
or by source-less force fields).
There are different sort of constraints on the values these functions can have 
given a certain set of arguments. The most general set of constraints, which I will
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call the general constraints, stem from the fact that the inclined plane model is a 
model of classical mechanics and, as such, the objects in it are subject to the general 
laws of classical mechanics such as the Newtonian laws o f motions, which constrain 
the values of the functions. For example, according to Newton’s Second Law, for 
every a& AM and every tjE 7™, P  (ah a\, t)+ ...+ P  (a„ at-\, /)+P  (ah a ,-\, r)+ ...+P
(ah a i-\, t)+'y'i g^O*,, t, k)=mM{a)^A{ai, t). According to Newton’s third law, for
*=i
every couple of objects, a, and a* eA M and every tjE 71*1, in P, P  {a„ at,, *>)=—P  (at,
&i, tj) •
A more specific set o f constraints, which I will call specific constraints, derives 
from the specific features of the inclined plane model. In this particular case, the 
specific constraints concern the values o f the function g ^  In the model, two forces 
act on the box at all times. The first one is an external gravitational force, g™(b, th 
1), whose magnitude is constant and equal to mM{b)g (where g  is the gravitational 
acceleration). The second is the normal force gM{b, tj, 2) that the plane exerts on 
the box whose direction is perpendicular to the plane and whose magnitude is 
constant and equal to rrPifyg sin# (where 6  is the angle of inclination of the 
plane).22 Since there are no other forces acting on the box, gM(b, tj, k)=0 for all k>2.
The general and specific constraints are all the constraints on the values of the 
functions in the structure of the inclined plane model as such. Despite these 
constraints, however, the functions in the structure of the model still do not have 
definite values for all arguments unless some additional constraints are put on the 
model. I will call this further set o f constraints the inputs o f  the model. In the case of 
the inclined plane model, one such set o f constraints consists in specifying the mass
22 Note that here I consider the box the only object in the universe of the structure of the 
inclined plane model AM and the normal force of the plane on the box an external force. This is 
because considering the plane an object itself would give rise to certain unintuitive consequences. 
For example, if the plane was one of the objects in the universe of the structure of the model, the 
function rrt* would associate a certain mass with it and there is no obvious sense in which the plane 
in the model has a mass or a position.
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of the box (mM(&)), its initial position and velocity (r1^ ,  fo) and to)), the
gravitational acceleration (the values o f g)} and the angle of inclination of the plane 
(the value of 0). By specifying g  and 6, the function g^1 will have a definite value for 
all arguments. Once we specify (m M(b)), aM(by t,) will have a definite value for all 
arguments as well aM(b, /,)=(gM(^, t» l)+gM(b, t» 2) ) /m M{b). Now we need only to 
specify the position and velocity of the box at some f, such as to in order for J ^ ib , to) 
to have definite values at all other times as well ((v^f^, r,)=aM(£, t ^ t .+ ^ ib ,  to) and 
iM (b, to)=V22LM(b, tD t f+ ^ ib ,  to)t,+rM(b, to)). Until the inputs of the model are 
specified, the inclined plane model, therefore, does not instantiate a structure. 
Rather, it instantiates what following van Fraassen (, p .44) I will call a structure- 
type. I will call structure-tokens those structures that are instances of a certain 
structure-type. So, the inclined plane model instantiates a structure-token only 
when a specific set of inputs of the model are specified.
111.2.7.2 The Relevant Structure o f  the Soap-Box Derby System
Consider now the soap-box derby system. The system can be seen as instantiating a 
structure-type as well. Each token o f that structure type is a structure of the form 
S = « A S, 7s, V, R, T>y r5, msy P, gs>, where As is a non-empty set of objects that 
contans one and only one o f the racers, 7s is an interval o f real numbers, V is a 
three-dimensional vector space over real numbers, R  is the set o f real numbers, 1* is 
the set of positive integers. The domain of i5 is the Cartesian product of As and 7s, 
A ^T * , and its co-domain is V. The functions r5, Vs and as associate the racer in As 
and a time-value f,-e I s with, respectively, the magnitude of its position, velocity 
and acceleration at that time on a certain run of the derby. The domain of the 
function ras is As and its co-domain is the set of positive real numbers, R*. The 
function ms associates the racer in As with the magnitude o f its mass. The domain 
o f P is the product o f (AsxA s)x T x T  and its co-domain is V. Informally, P 
associates ordered pairs of objects in the domain, a time and an integer with one of 
the forces that the first exerts on the second one at that time. The domain of gf is 
Asx 7 x /+ and its co-domain is V. The function gf associates the racer in As and a
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time that has magnitude /,e 7s with one of the external forces acting on it at that 
time on a specific run o f the derby.
We can therefore think of the value of the functions in each token of the 
structure-type of the soap-box derby system as representing the value o f that 
quantity at a certain time in a specific run of the system for a specific racer. This 
means that in each token o f the structure-type of the system the function rs{J{b)> 
f t , ) )  associates the j -th racer that takes part to the derby with its exact position at 
the time denoted by t, on its £-th run {^{ fb ) , f t ) )= ^{ fb ) , f t f } j k ) .  I will call this 
token o f the structure-type S, Sy*.
Since morphisms are only defined for structure-tokens, not structure-types, if 
we want to apply the notion o f a morphism to a case like that o f the inclined plane 
model and the soap-box derby, in which the relevant structures of both the vehicle 
and the target are structure-types, we have to make sense of the notion of a 
morphism between structure-types. Here, I will call the inputs o f  the system those 
aspects o f the system that correspond to the aspects of the model that I have called 
the inputs of the model. For example, since the inputs o f the inclined plane model 
include the mass, initial position, and initial velocity of the box, the inputs of the 
soap-box derby system will include the mass, initial position and velocity of the 
racer denoted by the box. On each run o f each racer, these inputs will have definite 
values. Therefore, for each structure-token Sy*, the functions, ms(fb))jk, the initial 
position, rs(fb), fto))jk, the initial velocity, ^ i f b ) ,  fto))jk etc. will have certain 
specific values. The token of the structure-type o f the inclined plane model that 
corresponds to the structure-token Sjk, Mjk, is the one in which the value of all the 
inputs o f the model is set equal to the value of the inputs o f the system in 
structure-token Sjk (e.g. f m M{b))=ms{fb))jk, f ^ { b ,  to))=^{fb), fto))jk, ^ ( b ,  
to)=xM{J{b),f{to))jk). The structure-type of the inclined plane model, M , and that of 
the soap-box derby system are thus x-morphic if and only if, for all My* and Sy* such 
that My* is the token o f the structure-type M  that corresponds to the token S;* of 
the structure-type S, My* is x-morphic to Sy*. This will allow us to continue to talk 
o f the relevant structure o f the inclined plane model and that of the soap-box derby
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system and o f the intended morphisms among them even if these structures are 
actually structure-types and not structure tokens.
III.2.7.3 No Isomorphism Holds Between these Two Relevant Structures
I will now argue that no intended isomorphism holds between the relevant 
structure-type of the inclined plane model and that of the soap-box derby system. 
Since in the standard interpretation o f the model in terms of the system, the box 
denotes one of the racers, its position denotes the velocity of that racer, the external 
forces acting on it denote the “external” forces acting on the racer and so on, an 
intended morphism between the two structures is one that associates the box with 
one o f the racers and the elements of T, V and R  in the universe of the structure of 
the model with a counterpart in the universe o f the structure of the system (e.g. for 
every re/?, fir)=r). The intended morphism between the two structures is an 
isomorphism only if, for every r,e 7*1 and every £e T, fifi^ib, t))=^{fib), fit,)) and 
f i ^ ( b ,  th k))=gs(fib),fit,),fik)) a n d /g ™(b, tj, k))=g?(fib),fit),fik)). In other words, 
the intended morphism is an isomorphism only if the position o f the box and the 
forces acting on it at a certain time are identical to the position o f the racer and the 
forces acting on it at the same time.
Now, there seems to be no need to go too much into the details of the situation 
to realize that this is not the case. Consider, the “external” forces acting on the 
racer. First of all, unlike the gravitational force on the box in the model, the 
gravitational force that the Earth exerts on the racer is not linear but increases as 
the square of the distance between the racer and the centre of mass o f the earth 
decreases. Unlike the value of f i ^ i b ,  tj, 1)), the value of gs{f{b), fit,), f i  1)), 
therefore, changes slightly as tj increases and the racer goes downhill. Since, for all t, 
f i ^ i b ,  tj, l))^gfifib), f i t ) ,  f i \ ) ) ,  the intended morphism, f ,  cannot be an 
isomorphism as it does not meet condition [16.4] of definition (16).
Second, the normal force between the road and the racer is likely to be different 
at different times. Unlike the inclined plane, the road is likely not to be a perfectly 
straight slope and therefore the contact force the road exerts on the racers is likely 
to change as a function o f time. So, unlike the value ofy(gM(£ , tj, 2)), the value of
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g W > /U ) , / ( 2 ) ;  is likely to differ for different values o f t-„ Since, for most th it is 
likely th a t /g ™{b , th 2))=£gs(/(£),y(/y),y(2)), the intended m orphism ,/ cannot be an 
isomorphism as it does not meet condition [16.4] of definition (16). According to 
definition (22), the inclined plane model, on its standard interpretation, is 
therefore an inexact epistemic representation o f the soap-box derby system.
Third, in the inclined plane model, there are only two “external” forces acting 
on the racer. The value of the function gM(b, th k) for every k>2 is the zero vector. 
On any of the racers in the system, on the other hand, there are a number of other 
“external” forces acting on the racer that have no counterpart in the model, 
including the air friction on the surface of the racer, the aerodynamic force on the 
racer, the friction between the road and the wheels of the racer, the gravitational 
force that any massive object in the universe exerts on the racer, from the molecules 
o f air to distant galaxies, and so on. So, for some k>2 and for every r,E 7M, / g M(£ , 
th k))^£(j{b),j{t),j{k)). According to definition (22), the inclined plane model, on 
its standard interpretation, is therefore an inexact epistemic representation o f the 
soap-box derby system.
From the above considerations, it follows that the position o f the box at each 
time t,e 7™ after to are different from the position o f the corresponding racer at that 
time; or, in sym bols,/sM(£, r, ))^ss{f{b), / / ,) ) ,  for all tj>to. We can thus conclude 
that the inclined plane model is an inexact epistemic representation of the soap-box 
derby system, where an epistemic representation is inexact if and only if, for some 
"P^k, ovi denotes oTi, ..., ov „ denotes oT„, 0V, denotes oT, and "P 't denotes "A1* and 
nIy k{ov \, ..., ov „)=ov, but nF rk(oT\, ..., oTn)^ oTj.
This is far from being a peculiarity o f the representation of the soap-box derby 
provided by the inclined plane model. Approximation and idealization characterise 
most if  not all scientific models. For example, no model o f classical mechanics 
instantiates a structure that is isomorphic in the intended manner to that o f any 
real system in the sense specified above, as usually classical models do not contain a 
counterpart for most of the forces in the system and, even those forces for which 
there is a counterpart often are only an approximation of the forces in the system.
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As a result o f this, most models in classical mechanics are inexact epistemic 
representations o f their target systems.
III.2.8. W eaker  M o r p h ism s  a n d  Partially  Fa it h f u l  E piste m ic
Re p r e se n t a t io n
In the previous section, I have argued that, whereas intended isomorphism can 
account for all cases of completely faithful (analytically interpreted) epistemic 
representation, no intended isomorphism holds between the relevant structure of 
those vehicles that fall short o f being completely faithful epistemic representations 
of their targets. This is far from being a surprising result. Most sympathizers of the 
structuralist account realise that (intended) isomorphism is too strong a 
requirement in the cases o f those epistemic representations that are only partially 
faithful and seem to think that, if a structural account of faithful epistemic 
representation is to deal successfully with most cases of epistemic representation 
and in particular with scientific models, isomorphism cannot be the morphism that 
holds between the relevant structure o f the vehicle and that of the target. They all 
seem to agree however that some weaker morphism can account for partially 
faithful epistemic representation.
However, there is no agreement as to which of these weaker morphisms is the 
appropriate one. The proposed morphisms include homomorphism (see, e.g., 
Bartels 2006), A/xR-morphism (Swoyer 1989), partial isomorphism (see, e.g., 
French and Ladyman 1999 and da Costa and French 2003). In the next few 
sections, I will examine whether, by substituting the isomorphism in (H.2) with 
one of these weaker morphism that I have just mentioned, will provide us with an 
adequate account o f partially faithful (analytically interpreted) epistemic 
representation.
(23) An account of partially faithful epistemic representation is
adequate if and only if:
[23.1] it applies to all partially faithful epistemic representation 
(including those that are incorrect, incomplete, inexact such as
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the old London Underground Map and the inclined plane 
model and those that are completely faithful such as the new 
London Underground map) and
[23.2] it does not apply to any completely unfaithful epistemic 
representation of the target.
The intended morphism we are looking for is weak enough that it can hold 
between the relevant structure of the vehicle and that of the target even if the 
vehicle is not a completely faithful (analytically interpreted) epistemic 
representation of the target (even if the vehicle is an incomplete, incorrect or 
inexact partially faithful (analytically interpreted) epistemic representation of the 
target) but not so weak that it can hold between the relevant structure o f the 
vehicle and that of the target when the vehicle is a completely unfaithful 
(analytically interpreted) epistemic representation o f the target.
III.2 .9 . H o m o m o r p h is m  a n d  Partially  Fa it h f u l  E piste m ic  Re p r e se n t a t io n
The first morphism I will consider is homomorphism. This will give raise to what I 
call the intended homomorphism account o f partially faithful epistemic representation. 
According to it:
(I) a vehicle is a partially faithful analytically interpreted epistemic 
representation of a certain target for a certain user if and only 
if:
(1.1) the vehicle is an analytically interpreted epistemic 
representation of the target for the user and
(1.2) an intended homomorphism holds between the relevant 
structure of the vehicle and that of the target.
I will now argue that the intended homomorphism account can account for 
incomplete epistemic representations that are both correct and exact, but it cannot 
account for partially faithful epistemic representations that are incorrect or inexact. 
Since the old London Underground map is both incorrect and incomplete and the
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inclined plane model is inexact, the intended homomorphism account cannot 
account for the fact that the old London Underground map and the inclined plane 
model are partially faithful epistemic representations of their targets. I will 
therefore argue first that, if an intended homomorphism holds between the 
relevant structure of the vehicle and that o f the system, the vehicle may be an 
incomplete epistemic representation of the target and then that, if an intended 
homomorphism holds between the relevant structure o f the vehicle and that o f the 
system, the vehicle must be a correct and exact epistemic representation of the 
target. As usual, I will assume that the user adopts an analytic interpretation of the 
vehicle in terms o f the target.
Incompleteness. According to (21), a vehicle is an incomplete epistemic 
representation o f a target only if, for some 0T,e AT, 0V, denotes cT, according to the 
interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target /  and ov,£ Av or, for some nRtr , 
<ovi, ..., o„v>£nRkV, even if <oTi, ..., otT>GnRkT and owi denotes oT\, ..., ow„ denotes 
oTny "/?v* denotes ”RtT according to /. However, an intended homomorphism can 
hold between the relevant structure of the vehicle and that of the target even i f , for 
some 0 T/€ At , oVi denotes or, and ov,g Av or, for some ”RkT, <ovi, ..., ov„>£ nRkV, even 
if <oTi, ..., o/rT>GnRjtT and ovi denotes or 1, ..., ov„ denotes oT„, ”RVkdenotes "RkT. For 
an intended homomorphism to hold between the relevant structure of the vehicle, 
it is necessary that, for every object 0V, in the universe o f the relevant structure of 
the vehicle, the object denoted by 0V„ 0 T„ is in the universe of the relevant structure 
o f the target. However, an intended homomorphism can hold even if, for some 
object oTi in the universe of the relevant structure o f the target, there is no object in 
the universe of the relevant structure the vehicle that denotes oT;. Analogously, for 
an intended homomorphism to hold between the relevant structure of the vehicle, 
it is necessary that if "R'k denotes "Rj,T and «?vi, ..., 0 „v>e"/?*v, <oT 1, ..., 0kT>£ ”RkT, 
however it is not necessary that, if <oT 1, ..., o„T>&”RiT, <owi, ..., 0vp>e”/?v*. So, if 
an intended homomorphism holds between the relevant structure of the vehicle 
and that o f the target, the vehicle may well be an incomplete epistemic 
representation o f the target.
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Correctness. If an intended homomorphism holds between the relevant structure 
of the vehicle and the relevant structure o f the target, the vehicle cannot be an 
incorrect epistemic representation of the target. According to definition (20), if the 
vehicle was an incorrect epistemic representation o f a target, it would be the case 
that, for some oy,&Av, ov, denotes 0 T, and oT,&AT or, for some nFEk, <or ..., 
o„t>£"RkT, even if <ovi, ..., 0vp>e"/?v* and ow\ denotes or 1, ..., ov„ denotes oT„, nlEk 
denotes nRp. If this was the case, however no intended homomorphism could hold 
between the relevant structure o f the vehicle and that of the target because, 
according to definitions (15) and (19), if an intended homomorphism held 
between the relevant structure of the vehicle and the target, then every object 
0v,e Av would be associated with the object oT,e AT denoted by it and, for every 
"RJ, if <ov i, ..., oVk>€nR /k , then <or i, ..., Okr>E.nRkT. So, if an intended 
homomorphism holds between the relevant structure of the vehicle and that of the 
target, the vehicle must be a correct epistemic representation of the target.
Exactness. If an intended homomorphism holds between the relevant structure 
of the vehicle and the relevant structure of the target, the vehicle cannot be an 
inexact epistemic representation o f the target. If the vehicle was an inexact 
representation o f the target, it would be the case that, for some "Pk, ovi denotes oTi, 
..., ow„ denotes oT„, and nP k  denotes "P'k and f"P k (o w\, ..., ow„ )^P k{fowi), ..., 
f o y„)). If this was the case, however no intended homomorphism could hold 
between the relevant structure o f the vehicle and that of the target because, 
according to definitions (15) and (19), if an intended homomorphism held 
between the relevant structure o f the vehicle and that of the target, then for every 
”Pk, if ovi denotes oTi, ..., ov„ denotes oT„, an d nP k  denotes nP  k, f nPk{oJ\, • ••> ow„) 
would have to be equal to nPk{j{(E i), ...,J{ov„)). So, if an intended homomorphism 
holds between the relevant structure o f the vehicle and that of the target, the 
vehicle must be an exact epistemic representation o f the target.
The situation is analogous in the case of what we could call the intended inverse 
homomorphism account o f  partially faith fu l epistemic representation. Structure A is
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inversely homomorphic to structure B if and only if  structure B is homomorphic to 
structure A. According to the intended inverse homomorphism account:
(J) a vehicle is a partially faithful, analytically interpreted epistemic 
representation of a certain target for a certain user if and only 
if:
(J.l) the vehicle is an analytically interpreted epistemic 
representation of the target for the user and 
(J.2) an intended homomorphism holds between the relevant 
structure of the vehicle and that of the target.
The difference here is that the intended homomorphism is between the relevant 
structure of the target and that o f the vehicle not the reverse and, since 
homomorphism is not a symmetric relation, the intended inverse homomorphism 
account o f partially faithful epistemic representation is different from the intended 
homomorphism account.
I will now argue that the inverse homomorphism account of partially faithful 
epistemic representation can account for incorrect epistemic representations that 
are incorrect but are both complete and exact.
Incorrectness. According to definition (20), a vehicle is an incorrect epistemic 
representation of a target only if, for some ov/€ Av, oy, denotes oT, and oT,£ AT or, 
for some nRyk, 0vi denotes oT 1, ..., oy„ denotes oT„, '7?v*denotes nRTk and <oy\, ..., 
oy„>e”RWi but <or j, . . . ,  o „t > £ nRTk. However, an intended homomorphism can 
hold between the relevant structure o f the target and that of the vehicle even if, for 
some 0v,eAv, oy, denotes oT, and oT& AT. or, for some ”Ryk, oy\ denotes oTi, ..., oy„ 
denotes or„, "R^kdenotes nRTk and <oy i, ..., 0v*>e"/?v*, but «?iT, ..., 0T„ > g F o r  
an intended homomorphism to hold between the relevant structure o f the target 
and that o f the vehicle, it is necessary that, for every object, oT„ in the universe of 
the relevant structure of the target, the object that denotes 0 T„ oyh is in the universe 
relevant structure of the vehicle. However, there can be objects in the universe of 
the relevant structure o f the vehicle even if the objects that denote them are not in 
the relevant structure of the target. Analogously, for an intended homomorphism
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to hold between the relevant structure o f  the target and that o f the vehicle, it is 
necessary that if "RVk denotes "RTk and <oTi, . . . ,  ot „>e nRTk, <ov i, ov„>E"RVk, 
however it is not necessary that if <ovi, oy„>E”Ft'k, <or  i, ..., oT„>E”RTk• So, if an 
intended homomorphism holds between the relevant structure of the target and 
that of the vehicle, the vehicle can be an incorrect representation o f the target.
Completeness. If an intended homomorphism holds between the relevant 
structure of the target and the relevant structure of the vehicle, the vehicle cannot 
be an incomplete epistemic representation of the target. If the vehicle was an 
incomplete epistemic representation of a target, it would be the case that, for some 
oT,eA T, o', denotes oT, and oy,EAv or, for some "RTk> 0vi denotes oT\, ..., oy„ denotes 
oT„, "F'k denotes nRTk, and <oT 1, ..., OkT>€"RTk, but <0vi, ..., o„y>£”RVk- If this were 
the case, however no intended homomorphism could hold between the relevant 
structure of the target and that o f the vehicle because if an intended 
homomorphism held between the relevant structure of the target and that o f the 
vehicle, then every object ot , e  AT would be associated with the object ov,e Av that 
denotes it and, for every nRTk, if  "F'k denotes "RTt and <oTj, . . . ,  ot „ > e  "Rrk , then it 
would have to be the case that <ovi, ..., oy„>E”Ryk. So, if an intended 
homomorphism holds between the relevant structure of the vehicle and that o f the 
target, the vehicle must be a complete epistemic representation of the target.
Exactness. If an intended homomorphism holds between the relevant structure 
o f the target and that of the vehicle, the vehicle cannot be an inexact epistemic 
representation of the target. If the vehicle was an incorrect representation o f the 
target, it would be the case that, for some ”F'k, 0vi denotes oTi, ..., oy„ denotes oT„> 
and "F'k denotes nP k  and j{" F*k{<F u ...» ow„)^nF vk{f{oy]), ..., J{(E„)). If this were the 
case, however no intended homomorphism could hold between the relevant 
structure of the target and that o f the vehicle because, if an intended 
homomorphism held between the relevant structure of the target and that o f the 
vehicle, then for every ”FTk, if 0V? denotes or i, ..., ov„ denotes oT„, and "F'k denotes 
nFk-> it would have to be the case th a t^ f^ * ^ 7], ..., oT^ ="P'k{f{oJ\), ...,y (0 T„)). So, 
if an intended homomorphism holds between the relevant structure of the target
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and that o f the vehicle, the vehicle must be an exact epistemic representation of the 
target.
Each of the two accounts of partially faithful epistemic representation that I 
have examined in this subsection can only account for very specific kinds of 
partially faithful epistemic representation. However, neither can account for 
partially faithful epistemic representations that are both incorrect and incomplete 
like the old London Underground map or for partially faithful epistemic 
representations that are inexact like the inclined plane model. Both accounts are 
therefore inadequate.
III.2 .10. A /'F -M o r p h ism  a n d  Partially  Fa it h f u l  epist e m ic  r e p r e s e n t a t io n
The notion o f AAF-morphism was introduced by Chris Swoyer (1991). Unlike the 
other morphisms that we have considered so far, a A/'F-morphism is not a relation 
between set-theoretic structures but a relation between what Swoyer calls 
intensional relational system (IRS). An IRS is an ordered quadruple S =<AS, 'i?, 11 A6, 
ext>y where As is a set o f individuals, 'R? is a set of first-order relations, "T? is a set 
of second-order relations (where, as usual, properties are construed as unary 
relations), ext is a function that assigns to a relation its extension and at most one of 
As and URP is empty. Unlike the relations in a set-theoretic structure, the relations 
in an intensional relational system are not construed extensionally. This means that 
two relations may have the same extension without being the same relation 
(ext(/?,T)=ext(7?/) does not imply that R ^ R / ) .  For example, if all and only the 
London Underground stations on the Victoria line have three escalators, the 
properties of being on the Victoria Line and that o f having three escalators have the 
same extension but they are not the same property.
(24) A function, f ,  from ATU i/?TU n/?r to AvU Ii?vU ,,/?v is a A/W- 
morphism if and only if:
[24.1] A and 'F  are subsets o f 17?TU ,I/?T and at least A is not empty.
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[24.2] For all ,/?;T and UR7  in A, if < af, aiT>e ext(Rf), then
<fia]T), ..., f a f )>e exrffR? )) {fpreserves all relations in A).
[24.3] For all ]RT and "T?1 in 'F, if < fa f ), faf)> E.ext{f{R f ))■> 
then <af> ..., akT>G ext{R?) ( f  counter-preserves all relations in
n
The intended A/ W-morphism account o f partially faithful epistemic representation 
maintains that:
(K) a vehicle is a partially faithful (analytically interpreted) 
epistemic representation o f a certain target for a user if and 
only if:
(K. 1) the vehicle is an analytically interpreted epistemic 
representation of the target for that user and 
(K.2) an intended A/'F-morphism holds between the relevant 
IRS of the target and that o f the vehicle.
In this subsection, I will argue that the intended A/'F-morphism is not a successful 
accounting of partially faithful epistemic representation. A first, minor problem is 
that A/'F-morphism does not allow a certain kind o f incomplete representation to 
be partially faithful epistemic representation. A A/'F-morphism is a function from 
ATU l/?rU lli?T to Avu l/?vU ll/?v. This means that the intended A/'F-morphism 
associates every object in AT with the object that denotes it in Av. However, an 
epistemic representation can still be partially faithful even if for some objects in AT, 
the objects that denote them are not in Av. For example, some stations on the 
London Underground network have no counterpart on the old London 
Underground map, but nevertheless we consider the latter a partially faithful 
epistemic representation of the former. This problem can easily be avoided by 
modifying the definition o f A/'F-morphism so that a A/'F-morphism is a function, 
f  from a non-empty subset o^the universe of the relevant IRS of the target.
A second, much more serious problem arises from the very notions of 
preservation and counter-preservation o f a relation (from conditions [24.2] and
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[24.3] of the definition o f a A/'F-morphism). A relation among objects in the 
universe o f the relevant IRS of the target (e.g. the relation being connected by 
Metropolitan Line trains in the London Underground network) is preserved if and 
only if, for any two stations, if  those stations are connected by Metropolitan line 
trains, then the circles or tabs that denote those stations are connected by a maroon 
line, it is counter-preserved if and only if, for any two circles or tabs, if those circles 
or tabs are connected by a maroon line, then the stations they denote are connected 
by Metropolitan Line trains. So, if the relation being connected by Metropolitan Line 
trains is preserved, it is sound to infer that two stations are not connected by 
Metropolitan Line trains if the circles or tabs that denote them are not connected 
by a maroon line; if the relation is counter-preserved, it is sound to infer that two 
stations are connected by Metropolitan Line trains if  the circles or tabs that denote 
them are connected by a maroon line.
According to the intended A/'F-morphism account, a vehicle is a partially 
faithful epistemic representation o f a target only if  some properties of or relations 
among objects in the target are counter-preserved. The rationale behind this 
requirement is that, if the A/'F-morphism holds, then it is possible to explain why 
some of the inferences performed by the user are sound— they are sound because if 
the relation holds among the objects in the vehicle, the relation denoted by it also 
holds among the objects in the target that are denoted by those objects in the 
vehicle— and therefore why the epistemic representation in question is a partially 
faithful one.
However, the requirement is too strong— an epistemic representation may be 
partially faithful even if no property or relation in the target is counter-preserved. 
On the old London Underground map, for example, the circles labelled ‘Aldgate’ 
and ‘Hammersmith’ are connected by a maroon line but the corresponding stations 
are not connected to by Metropolitan Line trains. Therefore the relation being 
connected by Metropolitan Line trains is not counter-preserved by any intended 
A/'F-morphism between the relevant IRS of the map and that of the network. 
Nevertheless, one can perform many sound inferences from the fact that circles or
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tabs are connected by a maroon line to the fact that the stations denoted by them 
are connected by Metropolitan line trains. So, one can perform sound inferences 
from the fact that a certain relation holds among certain objects in the vehicle to 
the fact that the relation denoted by it holds among the objects in the target 
denoted by them even if the relation is not counter-preserved. Therefore, even if no 
relation among objects in the target is counter-preserved, the vehicle may still be a 
partially faithful epistemic representation o f the target if, for some objects in the 
vehicle, from the fact that a certain relation, R, holds among them, it is sound to 
infer that the relation denoted by R  holds between the objects in the target that are 
denoted by those objects.
Here it is important to note that an account of partially faithful epistemic 
representation is meant to identify by virtue of what an epistemic representation is 
a faithful one not by virtue of what the user knows or believes it is a faithful one. A 
user may not be able to determine which o f the inferences from the fact that circles 
or tabs are connected by a maroon line to the fact that the stations denoted by 
them are connected by Metropolitan line trains are sound and which are not, but 
the representation is still faithful to some degree if some of the inferences from it to 
the target are sound.
This intended A/'F-morphism conception is not even successful in accounting 
for one of the cases that Swoyer seems to have in mind when introducing the 
notions of preservation and counter-preservation— the case of topographical maps. 
Swoyer correctly points out:
[...] it is a basic geometrical fact that a two-dimensional projection 
of a sphere cannot depict all its features without distortion, so 
when we use flat maps to represent the Earth, something has to 
give. For sixteenth-century mariners, concerned to convert lines of 
constant compass bearing (rhumb lines) into straight lines on their 
maps, Mercator’s projection, which misrepresents scale, offered the 
best compromise; for other purposes equal area maps, which
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accurately represent scale but not shape, are preferable (Swoyer 
1989, 470).
Swoyer is right in claiming that some maps use projections that counter-preserve 
some properties or relations o f the geographical area represented. For example, the 
Polar Azimuthal projection counter-preserves the distance o f every point from the 
North Pole, but it does so at the cost o f distorting shapes and areas.23 And this is a 
far from being a unique case. Projections that counter-preserve one property or 
relation do so at the cost o f extreme distortion o f other properties or relations. 
However, it is exactly for this reason that many of the projections that are most 
commonly used, such as Lambert’s Conformal Conic projection, do not counter­
preserve any property but rather attempt to minimize the distortion of as many 
properties or relations as possible (see, for example, (Fisher and Miller 1944)). 
Since maps based on these projections do not counter-preserve any property or 
relation, the intended A/'F-morphism conception cannot account for the fact that 
they are partially faithful epistemic representation of their targets.
As the case of the maps based on the Lambert’s Conformal Conic projection 
shows, a representation may be partially faithful even if none of the relations 
among objects in the universe of the target is counter-preserved by any intended 
A/'F-morphism. The intended A/'F-morphism account o f partially faithful 
epistemic representation is therefore inadequate as an account of partially faithful 
epistemic representation.
23 See (Fisher and Miller 1994), which is an excellent introduction to topographical map 
projections, or the more technical (Monmonier 1977) and (Maling 1992).
III.2.11 . Partial  Is o m o r p h is m  a n d  Partially  Fa it h f u l  E piste m ic
R e p r e se n t a t io n
III.2.11.1 The Partial Isomorphism Conception o f Partially Faithful Epistemic
Representation
According to the intended partial isomorphism conception o f partially faithful 
epistemic representation,
(L) a vehicle is a partially faithful, analytically interpreted epistemic 
representation of a certain target for a certain user if and only 
if:
(L.1) the vehicle is an analytically interpreted epistemic 
representation of the target,
(L.2) the user adopts an analytic interpretation o f the vehicle in 
terms of the target, and
(L.3) a (non-vacuous) intended partial isomorphism holds 
between the relevant structure of the vehicle and that of the 
target.
Two structures, A and B, are partially isomorphic if and only if there are two partial 
substructures of A and B that are isomorphic. The best way to introduce the notion 
o f partial substructure is to introduce the notion o f a substructure and the notion of 
a partial structure first and only then introduce the notion o f a partial substructure.
(25) A (total) structure B is a substructure o f a. (total) structure A if
and only if:
[25.1] The universe o f B, AB, is a subset of the universe o f A, AA,
[25.2] For every w-ary relation, 7?,”A, in A, there is an »-ary relation 
in B such that /?,"B = 7?,”An(AB)" (more informally, for every 
relation in A, there is a relation in B whose extension is the 
subset of the relation in A that only contains the w-tuples of 
elements that are in the universe of B).
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[25.3] For every «-ary function, Ff1*, in A, there is an w-ary function 
in B such, that, if dom(FjlA) is the domain of Fj^ and codom{Fj>K) 
is the codomain of Ff*, dom{Ffh) = dom{FjlA) n  (A®)” and 
codom{Fj,B) = codom(F]^) n  (A®)" (more informally, for every 
function in A, there is a function in B whose domain is the 
subset of the universe of A that only contains the w-tuples of 
elements that are in the universe o f B) (cf. van Dalen 1991).
A partial structure is an «-tuple P=<AP, R\mP, ..., R fp, F /p, ..., FkrF>, which is 
defined analogously to a total structure except for the fact that R\mP, ..., R fp are 
partial relations on Ap and F\pp, ..., FkrP are partial functions. A partial ra-ary 
relation, RjmP, is a triple whose first element is the set o f w-tuples o f elements o f Ap, 
sat{RFv), that satisfy the relation RFP, the second is the set of w-tuples of elements 
of Ap, dissat(RjwP), that do not satisfy the relation RjmP, the third element is the set 
of elements for which it is not specified whether they satisfy nor do not satisfy the 
relation /?,wP indet{RFp). A total relation can be thus seen as a limit case of a partial 
relation whose third component is the empty set. A partial function is a function 
that may not assign any value to some arguments within its domain.24
We can now introduce the notion of partial substructure.
(26) A partial structure B is a partial substructure o f  the total
structure A if and only if:
[26.1] The universe of B, A®, is a subset of the universe o f A, AA (so, 
for every o®,E A®, <?®,= <A)
24 It is worth noting that my definition of a partial structure differs from the notion employed 
by da Costa, French and their collaborators in one aspect, which will turn out to be crucial to my 
conception. Da Costa and French restrict their analysis to structures that contain relations but not 
functions. Obviously, this is not a problem in itself. Any n-ary function can be recasted as a («+l)- 
ary relation whose relata are the arguments of the function and its value. In fact, a partial unary 
function, f x ) ,  that does not assign a value to a certain argument, a, in its domain can be seen as a 
relation that is undefined for any ordered couple whose first component is a and whose second 
component is an element of the co-domain of the function.
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[26.2] For every w-ary relation, ”/?\, in A, there is an «-ary relation 
in B such that c("/?Sn(AB)”) and dissa t(”FPi)C\”R!<i=(d  
(informally, a certain »-tuple o f elements of the universe of B 
belongs to the set of «-tuples that satisfy a certain relation in B 
only i f  it is in the extension of the corresponding relation in A 
and it belongs to the set of «-tuples that do not satisfy that only  
i f  it is not in the extension of the corresponding relation in A.).25
[26.3] For every «-ary function, nf Ah in A, there is an «-ary function 
in B such, that, if dom(nF <,) is the domain o f and codom(nFfiii) 
is the codomain of nP"„ dom(”FRl)=(dom{nF ij)n\(Ah)n) and 
codom{nFbl) - codomiyP"^)n (A B)" (informally, for every function 
in A, there is a function in B whose domain is the subset of the 
domain of the function in A that only contains the w-tuples of 
elements that are in the universe o f B and whose codomain is the 
subset of the domain of the function in A that only contains the 
«-tuples of elements that are in the universe of B).
Since the isomorphism between the partial substructures of the relevant 
structure of the vehicle, V, and that of the target, T, is an intended isomorphism, all 
of the intendedly isomorphic partial substructures— i.e. all of the partial
25 Ler me note that this is markedly different from how French and his collaborators define these 
concepts. For example, French and Ladyman (1999) claim that a certain w-tuple of elements of the 
universe of B belongs to the set of w-tuples that satisfy a certain relation in B i f  and only if it is in 
the extension of the corresponding relation in A; it belongs to the set of w-tuples that do not satisfy 
that relation i f  and only if it is not in the extension of the corresponding relation in A. However, 
this cannot possibly be what French and Ladyman actually have in mind because, according to this 
definition, the set indelf'Rf9) would always be empty and therefore the set of partial substructures 
of A would be identical to that of the substructures of A. In order for B to be a (genuine) partial 
substructure of A it must be the case that indetf'R?) is not empty. This is accomplished by the 
definition I have put forward here but not by the one that French and his collaborators consider.
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substructures of V and T  such that an intended isomorphism holds between 
them— must meet the following conditions:
(i) If o7 denotes 0 ,T, ov‘/gA v’ and o j*  e A t * only if oyE Av and 0 ,Te  AT.
(ii) If oiy denotes o\r , ..., o„v denotes o„T, nR 7 denotes nRkT, o^ e AF*, o „
*  eA ^ , then:
[26.4] < 0 1  v\  ..., oF* >Esat(nR F*) and <0 iT’, o >Esat(nR F )
only if <0 iv, . . 0 „v>e ”Riv and <01T, . . o„J>E nR F ,
[26.5] <01^ , ...» oyr„>edissat(nRv'k) and <0iT*, ..., 0 /  >Esati”R *T‘)
only if <0 iv, ..., o„y>EnRF  and <0Ti, ..., oJ„>£ ”RkT, and
[26.6] <0 iv\  ..., 0 /  >Eindet{”RF*) and <01^ , ..., oF*>^dissat{”RF') 
only if either <0 iv, ..., o„w>EnRk/ and <0 iT, ..., o„T>EnRkT or <0 iv, ..., 
o„y>£ ”RF  and <0 / ,  ..., oJ>E "RF.
(iii)If 0 iv denotes 0 iT, ..., oF denotes o„T, oF denotes oF, "FF denotes "FF,
0 iv‘eA v‘, ...., oF’ eA ^ , 0 iT‘eA T‘, ...., and oF* eA r , then
[26.7] "FF' (oF\ ..., oF’)=o F" and "FF' (oF, ..., oF')=oF only if 
"FF (oF, ..., oF)=oF and "FF (0 iT, ..., 0T„)=0 ,T,
[26.8] "F**k(<F* 1, ..., 0 „v‘) and "F^FoF', ..., oF*) are indeterminate 
only if "FF {oF, ..., oF)±oF or "FF (0 / ,  ..., oF)±oF.
Two particularly important intendedly isomorphic partial substructures of the 
relevant structures V and T  are, V* and T*, which are what I will call the maximal 
intendedly isomorphic partial substructures.
(27) If V and T  are the relevant structure of, respectively, a
vehicle, V, and a target, T, relative to a certain interpretation of the 
vehicle in terms of the target /, V* and T*, are the maximal 
intendedly isomorphic partial substructures of respectively V and T  if 
and only if:
[27.1] V* is a partial substructure o f V;
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[27.2] T* is a partial substructure of T,
[27.3] If, according to /, o,y denotes 0}, and 0 , T* eA r  if
and only if  <?/veA v and 0 ,Te  AT.
[27.4] If, according to /, 01v denotes 0 iT, ..., 0 „v denotes o„T, "Rj^ 
denotes "RkT, o^eA**, — , 0^  eA ^ , then:
[27.4.1] <01^ , ..., 0 /*  >esat{nRiD  and <0 iT*, ..., 0  „ T* 
>Gsat{nRkr *) if and only if <0 iv, ..., o„y> e”Rk/ and «?iT, ..., 
oJ> enRkT,
[27.4.2] <01^ , ..., 0 „v’ > e dissat{nR^*) and <0 iT\  ..., 0*T‘ 
>Esat{nR ^')  if and only if <0 iv, ..., 0 „v>£"/?*v and <0iT, ...,
0 nT>g ”RkT, and
[27.4.3] <0 iv\  ..., o„v'>Gindet{nRkV*) and <0 iv\  ...,
o^'>Edissat{”RA') if and only if either <0 iv, ..., 0 „v> e ”/&v 
and <0 iT, ..., 0„T>g'7&T or <0 ]V, ..., o„v>£nR*v and <0 jT, ...,
0„T>e "/&T
[27.5] If, according to I, 0iv denotes 0 iT, ..., o„y denotes 0 *T, 0 /v 
denotes 0 ,T, "FFdenotes "FJ, eA ^ , 0 iT*eAT‘,
 , and 0 „T* gA t *, then
[27.5.1] ”F r  {o?\ ..., 0.v> 0 / r and •FiT* (0>T\  ..., 0„T> 0 ,T* if 
and only i f "FA (o\v, ..., o„y)=o? and ”AtT (01 7  ..., 0 nT)=0 ,T,
[27.5.2] nFkV' (oiv‘, ..., 0V”„) and "i7/*  (0T‘i, ..., 0T\ )  are 
indeterminate if and only if "F^ (0iv, ..., or
"FkT(oT\, ..., 0Tn)^0T/.
Clearly V* and T* are intendedly isomorphic. Moreover, V* and T* are 
maximal in the sense that any intendedly partial substructures of V  and T  are either 
identical with V* and T* or are proper partial substructures of V* and T*. Let me 
illustrate this with a concrete example. Consider the case o f the old London
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Underground map, which is both incomplete and incorrect. First o f all, the map 
contains circles and tabs that do not denote any station on the network (e.g. the tab 
labelled ‘Dover Street’) and the network contains stations that are not denoted by 
any station in the map (e.g. Bethnal Green station). The maximally intendedly 
isomorphic partial substructures of the relevant structures of the map and the 
network will thus be those substructures whose universes contain respectively all 
and only those circles and tabs that denote stations and all and only those stations 
that are denoted by circles or tabs on the map. So, whereas the universe of the 
relevant structure of the vehicle contains the tab labelled ‘Dover Street’ and that of 
the relevant structure of the target contains Bethnal Green station, the universe of 
the maximally intendedly isomorphic partial substructure o f the vehicle does not 
contain the tab labelled ‘Dover Street’ and that o f the maximally intendedly 
isomorphic partial substructure of the target does not contain Bethnal Green 
station.
Second, some circles and tabs have certain properties and are in certain 
relations, even if the stations denoted by those circles and tabs do not have the 
corresponding properties or do not stand in the corresponding relation. For 
example, the circles labelled ‘Aldgate’ and ‘Hammersmith’ are connected by a 
maroon line even if the stations denoted by those circles, Aldgate station and 
Hammersmith station, are not connected by Metropolitan Line trains. Whereas, in 
the relevant structure of the target, the couple <tab labelled ‘Aldgate’, circle labelled 
‘Hammersmith’> belongs to the set of all couples o f circles or tabs that are 
connected by a maroon line and the couple <Aldgate, Hammersmith> does not 
belong to the set of couples that are connected by Metropolitan Line trains, in the 
maximally intendedly isomorphic partial substructures, the couple <tab labelled 
‘Aldgate’, circle labelled ‘Hammersmith’> belongs to the set of couples for which it 
is undetermined whether they satisfy nor do not satisfy the relation being connected 
by a maroon line and the couple <Aldgate, Hammersmith> belongs to the set of 
couples o f stations for which it is undetermined whether they satisfy nor do not 
satisfy being connected by Metropolitan Line trains. Analogously, some stations have
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certain properties and are in certain relations, despite the fact that the circles and 
tabs on the old map that denote those stations do not have the corresponding 
properties or do not stand in the corresponding relation.
To put it figuratively, the maximally intendedly isomorphic partial substructures 
o f the relevant structures contain all and only those bits of each relevant structure 
that have an intended counterpart in the other structure. That is, an object in the 
universe of the relevant structure of the vehicle is contained in the universe o f the 
maximally intendedly isomorphic partial substructure o f the relevant structure of 
the vehicle only if the object denoted by it according to the interpretation adopted 
by the user is contained in the universe of the relevant structure o f the target and 
vice versa— an object in the universe of the relevant structure o f the target is 
contained in the universe of the maximally intendedly isomorphic partial 
substructure of the relevant structure of the target only if the object that denotes it 
according to the interpretation adopted by the user is contained in the universe of 
the relevant structure of the vehicle. A certain «-tuple that satisfies a certain relation 
in the relevant structure of the vehicle is in the set o f »-tuples that satisfy the 
corresponding relation in the maximally intendedly isomorphic partial substructure 
o f the relevant structure of the vehicle only if the w-tuple of objects in the relevant 
structure of the target denoted by them are in the relation denoted by that relation 
and so on.
7/7.2.11.2 The Partial Success o f the Intended Partial Isomorphism Account
Leaving aside the crucial issue of inexactness and the proviso that the partial 
isomorphism be non-vacuous until the next section, I will now argue that the 
intended partial isomorphism account of partially faithful epistemic representation 
can account successfully for analytically interpreted epistemic representations that 
are incomplete, incorrect or both.
Incorrectness. A vehicle is an incorrect epistemic representation of a target if and 
only if, for some ov,e Av, ov, denotes oT, and 0 T,<£AT or, for some nRVk, 0vi denotes 
0 Ti, ..., oy„ denotes or„, nRyk denotes nRTk and <ovi, ..., ov„>e"RPt. but <oTi, ..., 
o„T>£”RTk. However, an intended partial isomorphism can hold between the
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relevant structure of the vehicle and that of the target even if, for some ov,E Av, oyt 
denotes oT, and oT,gAT or, for some ovi denotes oTi, ..., ov„ denotes oT„, "Ft*/, 
denotes ”RTk and <owi, ..., 0V*>€'7?V*, but <oTi, ..., oT„>€"Rrk- For an intended 
partial isomorphism to hold between the relevant structure o f the vehicle and that 
of the target, an object can be an element o f the universe of the relevant structure 
of the vehicle even if the objects that denotes it is not in the relevant structure of 
the target— the first object will simply not be in the universe of the maximal 
intendedly isomorphic partial substructure o f the vehicle. Analogously, for an 
intended partial isomorphism to hold between the relevant structure of the vehicle 
and that of the target, it is not necessary that, if ov 1 denotes oT j, ..., oy„ denotes oT„, 
nRVk denotes "RTk, and <oy 1, ..., o'/„>e”Fl/k, then <oTi, ..., oT„>e”RTk- If <0vi, •••> 
ow„>GnRyk and <or 1, ..., oT„>E”RTk, it will simply be the case that <ov' j, ..., 
oy'n>Eindet("R/tk) and <oT' i, or\>&indet{nRT‘k). So, if an intended partial 
isomorphism holds between the relevant structure o f the target and that of the 
vehicle, the vehicle can be an incorrect representation o f the target.
Incompleteness. A vehicle is an incomplete epistemic representation o f a target if 
and only if, for some ot,e  AT, <?v, denotes <?T, and ov,£ Av or, for some ”RTk, ov\ 
denotes oT 1, ..., ov„ denotes oT„, ”Rykdenotes nRTk and <o\T> ..., oT„>enRTk. but «?vi, 
..., o ^ > ^ nFt/k. However, an intended partial isomorphism can hold between the 
relevant structure of the vehicle and that o f the target even if, for some oT,E AT, ov, 
denotes or, and ov,EAv or, for some nRTk, <?vi denotes oTi, ..., ov„ denotes oT„, 
denotes ”RTk and <oTi, ..., OkT>€nRkT, but <owi, ..., oy/„>£nRwir. For an intended 
partial isomorphism to hold between the relevant structure of the vehicle and that 
of the target, an object can be an element of the universe of the relevant structure 
of the target even if the objects that denotes it is not in the relevant structure of the 
vehicle— the first object will simply not be in the universe of the maximal 
intendedly isomorphic partial restructure  o f the target. Analogously, for an 
intended partial isomorphism to hold between the relevant structure o f the vehicle 
and that o f the target, it is not necessary that, if ov \ denotes oT 1, ..., ov„ denotes oT„, 
nRyk denotes "RkT and <oTi, ..., or„>&”RkT, <oy 1, ..., ov„>E”Ft/k. If <0Ti, •••>
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oT„ > e ”RkT and <ov 1, ov„>«£ ”/?'*, it will simply be the case that <0 ^ 1,
0 v*n>E indet{nFt/'k) and <0 T*i, ..., 0 T*„>eindet{nIF*k). So, if an intended partial 
isomorphism holds between the relevant structure o f the target and that of the 
vehicle, the vehicle can be an incomplete representation o f the target.
III.2.12. Pa r t ia l  I s o m o r p h is m  a n d  It s  L im it  C ases
The partial isomorphism conception, not only seems to be able to deal with cases 
of incorrect and incomplete representation such as that o f the old London 
Underground and today’s network, but it also provides an explanation o f why the 
other less successful proposals that we have considered so far succeed where they 
do. Isomorphism is a limit case of partial isomorphism in which the isomorphic 
partial substructures o f the relevant structures of the vehicle and the target are the 
structures themselves (i.e. the universe of both structures are identical with the 
universe of their partial substructures and for all relations the set of w-tuples for 
which it is undetermined whether the w-tuples satisfy or do not satisfy the structure 
in question is empty).
The intended partial isomorphism account would thus be able to account for 
the success of the intended isomorphism conception as a conception of completely 
faithful epistemic representation. Intended isomorphism between the relevant 
structures of the vehicle and the target is a limit case of intended partial 
isomorphism between the two— it is the case in which the relevant structure o f the 
vehicle and the target are themselves the maximal intendedly isomorphic partial 
substructures— analogously to the way in which completely faithful epistemic 
representation is the limit case of partially faithful epistemic representation— it is 
the case in which all inferences form the vehicle to the target are sound.
In analogous manner, the intended partial isomorphism conception allows us to 
explain why the intended homomorphism and intended counter-homomorphism 
conception are successful where they are successful. Intended homomorphisms and 
intended inverse homomorphisms are also limit cases of intended partial 
isomorphism. They are the cases in which the relevant “partial” substructures of the
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vehicle (in the case of intended homomorphism) and the target (in the case of 
intended inverse homomorphism) are identical to their relevant total structures.
This flexibility comes at a (small) price— one of the limit cases o f partial 
isomorphism threatens to undermine the intended partial isomorphism conception 
of partially faithful epistemic representation and calls for the proviso I mentioned 
above. This is the case in which, for all relations and functions in the substructure 
and all 72-tuples, it is undetermined whether the 72-tuple satisfies or does not satisfy 
the relation (i.e. the case in which, for all R,nP, both sat{R"p)=0  and dissat{RinV)=0) 
and the value of the function for that 72-tuple is undetermined. This case is a threat 
for the partial intended partial isomorphism conception because, if this limit case 
of partial isomorphism holds between the relevant structures o f the vehicle and the 
target, then the user would not be able to draw from the vehicle any true 
conclusion about the target. If this limit case of intended partial isomorphism was 
allowed, completely unfaithful epistemic representation would count as partially 
faithful on the intended partial isomorphism account. To avoid becoming vacuous, 
the intended partial isomorphism account o f faithful epistemic representation has 
to rule out this case as a case of partially faithful epistemic representation. This is 
the rationale behind the proviso that the intended partial isomorphism be non- 
vacuous.
(28) A partial isomorphism is non-vacuous if and only if:
[28.1] Av* is not empty and
[28.2]
[28.2.1] for some nR7' (if there are any), s a t^ R ^ ')^0  or 
dissat{”FF',)^ 0 , or
[28.2.2] for some ”F ^  (if there are any), nF^'(o]V\  ..., o„v*) has 
a determinate value for some 0 ]V\  ..., 0^ .
I will now argue that, if  the intended partial isomorphism that holds between 
the relevant structure of the vehicle and that o f the target is non-vacuous, then it 
must be the case that it is possible to perform some sound inferences from the
155
vehicle to the target— and therefore the vehicle cannot be a completely unfaithful 
epistemic representation of the target. If an intended partial isomorphism holds 
between the vehicle and the target, then an intended isomorphism must hold 
between the maximal intendedly isomorphic partial substructure of the vehicle and 
that of the target. If the intended partial isomorphism is non-vacuous, then it must 
be the case that the universes of the maximal intendedly isomorphic partial 
substructures of the vehicle and the target are not empty. So, there must be at least 
one object in the universe of the maximal intendedly isomorphic partial 
substructure of the vehicle. Since an intended isomorphism holds between the two 
substructures, each of the objects in the universe of the maximal intendedly 
isomorphic partial substructure of the vehicle denotes one and only one object in 
the universe of the maximal intendedly isomorphic partial substructure of the 
target. From the definition of a non-vacuous intended partial isomorphism it 
follows that in the maximal intendedly isomorphic partial substructure o f the 
vehicle there must be at least one w-ary relation that is determined for at least one 
72-tuple o f objects or one 72-ary function whose value is determined for at least one 
«-tuple of arguments.
I will now argue that if one of these two conditions holds, then there is at least 
one sound inference from the vehicle to the target and, therefore, the vehicle 
cannot be a completely unfaithful epistemic representation of the target. If there is 
one 72-ary relation "Rk^ that is determined for one 72-tuple o f objects, 0 iv‘, ..., 
and an intended isomorphism holds between the maximal intendedly isomorphic 
partial substructure o f the vehicle and that o f the target, it follows that, in the 
maximal intendedly isomorphic partial substructure o f the target, the objects 
denoted by, respectively, o\v', ..., and 0 „v* are either in sat(nRT'k) or dissat(nRT'il), 
where denotes nRkT. From the construction of the maximal intendedly
isomorphic partial substructures of the vehicle and the target it follows that either 
both <oiv, ..., oy„>e"R?/k and «?]T, ..., o„T>GnRkT (if <01^ ,  ..., 0 «v*>esat(”/?v**) and 
<0 iT*, ..., oJ^esa t^R ^k))  or <01v, ..., o„y>&”Rkw and <oT 1, ..., oT„>£”RkT (if <o** 1, 
..., o„y*>€sat{',R?r ir) and <0 iT\  ..., o„r*>esat{nRkT*)). In either case, there is at least
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one sound inference from the vehicle to the target— the inference from the fact 
that 0 iv, 0 *v are (are not) in the relation "RF to the fact that 0 iT, 0 *T are (are
not) in the relation nRkr.
If there is an w-ary function whose value is determined for at least one »-tuple of 
arguments and an intended isomorphism holds between the maximal intendedly 
isomorphic partial substructure of the vehicle and that of the target, it follows that 
o1^ ,  0 „V*)=0V*, and "/7*T’(oiT*, 0lfT*)=0T*,- for some «-tuple of objects,
01^ , ..., oF*. From the construction of the maximal intendedly isomorphic partial 
substructures of the vehicle and the target it follows that "F'kio?, ..., o„v)=o? and 
nFrk(oT\y ..., 0T„)=0T;. So, there is at least one sound inference from the vehicle to 
the target— the inference from the fact that the value of the function "F^k is 0V, for 
the arguments 0 iv, ..., o„ to the fact that that the value of the function "Frk is 0 T, 
for the arguments 0 Ti, ..., o„T.
It follows that if the intended isomorphism between the maximal intendedly 
isomorphic partial substructures, V* and T*, of, respectively, the relevant structure 
o f the vehicle, V, and that o f the target, T, is non-vacuous, the vehicle cannot be a 
completely unfaithful epistemic representation of the target and therefore it must 
be to some degree a faithful epistemic representation of the target.
III .2 .13. Partial  Is o m o r p h is m  a n d  In e x a c t n e s s
The intended partial isomorphism conception seems to be very successful in 
accounting for epistemic representations that are both incomplete and inaccurate. 
However, in this subsection, I will argue that the intended partial isomorphism 
conception is not equally successful in accounting for inexact representations. The 
case of inexact representations is particularly important for our purposes because 
inexactness seems to be a pervasive kind of unfaithfulness in models from 
mathematised sciences. We have seen this to be the case with the case o f the 
inclined model and the soap-box derby. In that case, we had reasons to believe that 
the model was inexact in the sense that, for example, for some k and some ft,
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f ^ i b y  tjj k))±gs(f{b), j{k)) (i.e. that some of the external forces on the box
differed from the forces they denoted on the racer).
The problem, I think, is not that the intended partial isomorphism account of 
partially faithful epistemic representation cannot somehow accommodate inexact 
epistemic representations. Indeed, the intended partial isomorphism account has a 
strategy for dealing with inexact epistemic representations. The problem, I think, is 
that the strategy in question is not a good strategy.
From the definition o f the maximal intendedly isomorphic partial substructures 
o f the vehicle and the target, it follows that:
(i) ’’FF' {oF*, ..., oF')=oF and nFF*(oF', ..., <?„T‘)=<?,T* if and only if both 
"FF (oF, ..., 0 „v)=0 ,v and ”FF{oF, ..., o„r)=o? and
(ii) nFF' (01 v\  ..., 0F*) and "FF'ioF', ..., oj*) are indeterminate if and only 
if"FF (o\v, ..., oF)±oF or nFkT(o\T, ..., o j)  ±o7.
If we adopt the convention that if "Fv**(0v*i, ..., (F'n) and nFr'k(oT'\y ..., oT\ )  are 
both indeterminate, then J{nFF' (oF', ..., oF'))=nFF*{j{oF), ..., J{oF')), then an 
intended partial isomorphism can hold among the relevant structures o f the vehicle 
and the target even if the vehicle is an inexact representation o f the target (where an 
epistemic representation is inexact if, for some "F'k, 0vi denotes oT 1, ..., (F„ denotes 
0 T„, 0V, denotes 0 T, and nFJk denotes nFTk and nF /k{<F\, ..., 0vn)^ov, or nF Tk(oT\i ..., 
0T„)^0T,).
However, if this is the case, nF r k{o^ 1, ..., 0V*„) and ”Fr*k(or*i, ..., oT'„) will be 
indeterminate in the maximal intendedly isomorphic partial substructure of the 
vehicle and the target and, since we have assumed that if "/7V**(0v*i, ..., iF „) and 
"F1"k{oT'\, ..., oT'„) are both indeterminate, then "F**k{<F' 1, ..., 0V\)="/'T**(0 T* 1, ..., 
0 T’„), an intended isomorphism can hold between the maximal intendedly 
isomorphic partial substructure o f the vehicle and that of the target.
It is important to note that this strategy treats inexactness as a case of 
incorrectness. An »-ary function nF ,kWr\y ..., 0V„)=0V, can be construed as an (w+1)- 
ary relation <ov 1, ..., ov„, oVj>e{n+l)RVk and a partial function whose value is
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indeterminate for the arguments ovi, ..., oy„ can be seen as a partial relation <oyi, 
ov„, oVi>& undet(^x)RVk) for all ov„
However, while treating inexactness as a kind o f incorrectness may be a 
satisfactory strategy for dealing with some cases o f inexactness, it is not the best 
strategy to deal with most of them. To see why in the case of scientific models, it is 
convenient to distinguish between approximations and idealizations. Some think 
that idealization is a kind of approximation. However, the rationale behind 
approximations and idealizations seems to be slightly different.
For example, the rationale behind not including in the inclined plane model a 
counterpart for forces such as the gravitational attraction of distant galaxies on the 
racer seems to be that their influence on the racer is negligible— their magnitude 
while different from zero is so close to zero that the effect o f these forces on the 
racer is likely to be smaller than we are able to detect. The rationale behind not 
including in the model a counterpart for forces such as the air friction, on the other 
hand, is that these forces, even if not negligible, are very complicated to model and, 
often, the gain in faithfulness that derives from including a counterpart for them in 
the model is not worth the effort to do so.
Here I will call cases such as the first approximations and cases such as the 
second idealizations.26 My contention is that the intended partial isomorphism 
strategy, which may be satisfactory in cases o f idealization, is not equally 
satisfactory in cases o f approximation. When it comes to approximations, it does 
matter that, even if j{nP /k{ow\, ..., ov„)^”FT^ (/fovi), ...,j{o v„)),fl.’’F'k(ov\, ..., <?vn) and
"FVk{J{d/1) ,    are “close enough”. For example, if the inclined plane model
is to be a faithful epistemic representation of the soap-box derby, then it matters 
that the gravitational force exerted by every massive object in the universe on the 
racer is close to zero even if it is not identical to zero because in the model all the
26 Obviously, I do not mean to offer an account of approximation or idealization; nor do I 
intend to offer a criterion to demarcate idealizations and approximations. I use ‘approximation’ and 
‘idealization’ simply as two convenient labels to distinguish between two kinds of unfaithfulness.
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forces on the box other than the gravitational force and the normal force exerted by 
the plane are set to zero.
More generally, the reason for distinguishing between incorrectness and 
inexactness is that the latter comes in degrees. A user can draw conclusions that are 
strictly speaking false from inexact and incorrect epistemic representations alike. 
However, inexact epistemic representations, unlike incorrect epistemic 
representations, may allow their users to draw conclusions that are “closer to the 
truth” or “farther from the truth” (in the sense mentioned in Section 1.2.5 above).
So, for example, the position function of the box at a certain time and that of 
the racer at the corresponding time may differ more or less significantly and, 
everything else being equal, the less significant this difference is, the model would 
seem to be a more faithful epistemic representation of its target because the less 
significant the difference between the velocity function of the box at a certain time 
and that o f the racer at the corresponding time, the more likely it is that a user 
would consider the inference from the velocity function o f the box at a certain time 
to that o f the racer at the corresponding time approximately true (and therefore is 
closer to the truth in the sense discussed in 1.2.5).
On an account of partially faithful epistemic representation that considers 
inexactness a kind of incorrectness, however, all inexact representations would seem 
to be equally unfaithful. So, for example, no matter how small the difference 
between the difference between the velocity function of the box at a certain time 
and that o f the racer at the corresponding time, the conclusion is equally incorrect. 
The problem of inexactness, which is so crucial in the case of models, can only be 
dealt with adequately by a conception that acknowledges the specific nature of 
inexact representations. In the next section, I intend to develop such a conception.
III.2.14. T h e  St r u c t u r a l  S im il a r it y  A c c o u n t  o f  Pa r t ia l l y  Fa it h f u l
EPISTEMIC REPRESENTATION
In the rest o f this chapter, I will develop a version o f the structural conception of 
faithful epistemic representation that I call the structural similarity account o f
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fa ithful epistemic representation. The structural similarity account of faithful
epistemic representation maintains that
(M) a vehicle is a partially faithful, analytically interpreted epistemic 
representation of a certain target for a certain user if and only 
if:
(M .l)th e  vehicle is an analytically interpreted epistemic 
representation of the target for that user and 
(M.2) there is a partial substructure of the relevant structure of 
the vehicle V and a partial substructure of the relevant 
structure of the target T  such that an intended non-vacuous 
partial quasi-isomorphism holds between the relevant structure 
of the vehicle and that of the target.
A quasi-isomorphism is a morphism that is defined exactly like an isomorphism 
except for the fact that, for every nF ik and nF&k , f nFAk{oA, ..., o„A)) does not need to 
be equal to nFB)r{f{o]A), . . . , f o „A)) for A to be quasi-isomorphic to B, they only need 
to be “close enough”. Various forms of quasi-isomorphism are obtained from the 
definition of isomorphism (definition (16)) by substituting condition [16.4] with a 
weaker condition. Here I will develop one version of the notion o f quasi­
isomorphism. However, there may be other versions o f quasi-isomorphism that suit 
the purposes of the structural similarity account equally well as the one I suggest 
here.
If  f ”FAk(oA\f ..., <Ar)) and ”P k i fd \ ) ,  •••, f d n)) are scalars or vectors, the 
deviation between f?F"k{ch\, and 1), ...,f(A„)) is the non-negative
real number d  such that
Here M denotes the
absolute value o f x, if x  is a scalar, and the non-negative norm of |x|, if x  is a vector. 
(Note that by dividing the difference between "F^jifo^x), ...,ybA,))) and 1,
..., <A,)) by "Pi(/(<A), . . . , f o A„))) we make the deviation between nFRj{f{oA 1), ...,
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fo^r)))  and "F'Mtf'S, oh„)) independent from the magnitude of nFRj(J{oA]), . . . ,
M M
(29) A function, f  from AA onto AB is a quasi-isomorphism o f
maximum deviation m if and only if:
[29.1] For every 0 ,B€ AB, there is an oAe  AA such thaty(0 A)=0 B.
[29.2] For every o,Be A B, if/( 0 A)=0 B and f o k A)=o*, then o A=oA.
[29.3] For all i?Aand R*, <o\A, ..., 0A>e7?Aif and only if < f o A), . . . ,  
f o k A)>e  7?B.
[29.4] for all ”/? \ and "T?8*, <(A\, ..., oA„>enRAk if  and only if <fo^\),
. . . ,/** ,)> €
[29.5] for all and and "F®i, ..., "Z8, such thaty^FV fA , ...,
<A,) and nf &v.(J{o^  1), ..., fo^^i) are either scalars or vectors,
( \ " F \ ( f ( o \  ) , . . . , f ( o \ ) )  1 - 1 f { ' F Kk(o\ | ) 2 ;;;
\aF * k ( f ( o \ ) , . . . , f ( o \ ) ) \
[29.6] fi'jPkich], . . . ,  oA„) is indeterminate if and only if nP\SJ{o^\), 
. . . , / 0 A„)) is indeterminate.
[29.7] /".F'kOA, ..., --m/ A ) ) ,  otherwise.
A (non-vacuous) partial quasi-isomorphism holds between two structures if and 
only if a quasi-isomorphism holds between two (non-vacuous) partial substructures 
of those structures.
One of the crucial differences between the structural similarity account and the 
intended partial isomorphism account is that the intended morphism that holds 
between the partial substructures is an intended quasi-isomorphism rather than an 
intended isomorphism. Another crucial difference is that, on the structural 
similarity account, the maximal intendedly isomorphic partial substructures o f the 
vehicle, V*, and that of the target, T*, are different from the ones put forward by 
the intended partial isomorphism account.
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(30) If  V and T  are the relevant structure o f the vehicle, V, and the
target, T, relative to a certain interpretation, 7, o f the vehicle in terms
of the target, V* and T*, are the maximal intendedly quasi-isomorphic 
partial substructures of, respectively, V  and T  if and only if:
[30.1] V* is a partial substructure of V;
[30.2] T* is a partial substructure o f T,
[30.3] If, according to 7, o? denotes o,T, 0V*,E Av* and o , T* gA p  if 
and only if 0 ,VE Av and 0 ,TE AT.
[30.4] If, according to 7, 0 iv denotes <?iT, ..., o„y denotes o„T, ”R*y 
denotes "RF, o F e A ^ ,  ...., o /  eA v\  then:
[30.4.1] < 0 1  v\  ..., oF" >^sat{nR F*) and <0 iT’, ..., o „ T* 
>Gsat{nRkT’) if and only if <0 iv, ..., o„y/> e”RF  and <0 iT, ..., 
o /> e ”RF,
[30.4.2] <0 iv*, ..., 0 V*„>Edissat{"IF'*) and <0 iT*, ..., o „ T*
>E sat(nR F )  if and only if <0 iv, ..., oF>£”RF  and <0Ti, ..., 
or„>£ "RF, and
[30.4.3] <0 iv\  ..., o„v'>e indet{nRF') and <01^ , ...,
0 „V*>Edissat(”RkV’) if and only if either <01v, ..., o„y> enRF  
and <0 iT, ..., oF>£”RF or <0 iv, ..., oF>£”RF  and <0 / ,  ...,
0„T>e "RF.
[30.5] If, according to 7, 0 iv denotes 0 iT, ..., oF denotes o„T, 0 ,y 
denotes 0?, "FF denotes nFkT, oF 'gAF, ...., 0 „v*£A^, 0 it ‘eA t \  
   and 0 „r GAT’, then:
[30.5.1] i f fi"FF{oF, •••> oF)) and "FF(f{oF), . . . , / 0 „v)) are 
scalars or vectors "FF*(oF*, ..., oF')=oF and "7>T* (01T’, ...,
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0,,T*)=0,T‘ if and only if
I" FkT ( f  (0]y f  ( o * )) I
[30.5.2] if (0 iv, O )  and j{o?)) are
scalars or vectors, ”/ 7*v*(0 iv\  and nFkT'{o\T\  ..., o„T‘)
are indeterminate if and only if
( l " i ;,/ ( / ( 0| v ) t . . . >/ ( 0t,v ) ) l - l / ( " F / ( 0,v t . . . t0|, v ) ) D 2
[30.5.3] if /" fv v(^iv, ..., O )  °r is not a 
scalar or a vector, ,7 r*v*(0iv\  ..., 0«v’)= tf,7* and "Af.7*(<?i7*, ...,
<?/*)= 0/7‘.
Condition [30.5] is what differentiates the definition of maximal intendedly 
quasi-isomorphic partial substructure (Definition (30)) from that of the partial 
isomorphism account’s definition of maximal intendedly isomorphic partial 
substructure (Definition (27)). According to the structural similarity account, if 
J{nF'k(oy i, ..., ow„)) and ’,Frk{f{ov i), ...,/<?v„)) are scalars or vectors, f t F fk{ow\, ..., 
ov„)) and nFt(f{ov\), ..., j{(F„)) do not need to be identical in order for the 
corresponding functions in the maximal intendedly isomorphic partial 
substructures, k{o*'\, ..., ov*„) and "7rr*^ (oT*i, ..., oT'n), not to be indeterminate.
The functions in the partial substructure, " /v’*(0v’i, ..., ov\ )  and nFvtk{oT'\, ..., 
<?**„), are not indeterminate if the deviance between ..., ow„)) and
nFk(f{ovi), ..., J{o\)) is less than or equal to D, which I take to be an ideal 
threshold between what we would consider an approximation and what we would 
consider an idealization.
So, according to the structural similarity account, for example, the inclined 
plane model is a partially faithful epistemic representation of the soap-box derby 
only if an intended non-vacuous partial quasi-isomorphism holds between the 
relevant structures o f the inclined plane model and the soap-box derby. One o f the 
intuitions that underlies the structural similarity account of faithful epistemic 
representation is that, everything else being equal, the closer to zero the average
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deviation of the quasi-isomorphism between the relevant substructure o f the 
vehicle and that of the target, the more faithful a representation of the target the 
vehicle is.
O f course, a great deal more could be said here, incorporating insights from the 
literature on approximations— in particular with respect to the choice o f the 
definition o f divergence and the purpose-relativity o f the size o f D. But I hope that 
what I have developed here is sufficient to securing the chief philosophical point in 
the thesis and to lay a reasonable foundation for further work.
III.2.15. T h e  H ie r a r c h y  o f  M o r p h is m s , St r u c t u r a l  S im il a r it y  a n d  
D e g r e e s  o f  Fa it h f u l n e s s
In this section, I will introduce the notion of structural similarity and clarify the 
relationship between the structural similarity account of faithful epistemic 
representation and the other versions of the structural conception of faithful 
epistemic representation that I have considered so far. First o f all, it is important to 
note that two structures are partially isomorphic if and only if they are partially 
quasi-isomorphic with zero maximum deviance. The structural similarity 
conception can thus explain why the intended partial isomorphism conception is 
successful insofar as it is successful— partial isomorphism is a limit case of partial 
quasi-isomorphism for m=0. Since, as I have noted in Section III.2.12, 
isomorphism and homomorphism are themselves limit cases of partial 
isomorphism, they are also limit cases o f partial quasi-isomorphism. This suggests 
that there is a hierarchy of morphisms of different strengths such that the stronger 
morphisms are limit cases of the weaker ones (see Fig. III. 1).
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Isomorphism
Inverse HomomorphismHomomorphism
Partial Isomorphism
Partial Quasi-Isomorphism
Figure III. 1. The Hierarchy o f Morphisms
We can thus introduce the notion o f (overall) structural similarity between a 
vehicle and a target (with respect to a certain interpretation of the vehicle in terms 
of the target). Intuitively, the stronger the intended morphism between the relevant 
structure o f the vehicle and that of the target, the more the vehicle and the target 
are structurally similar (with respect to a certain interpretation). Since isomorphism 
is the strongest morphism, the structural similarity between the vehicle and a target 
is maximal if an intended isomorphism holds between their relevant structures. The 
structural similarity is minimal in case the intended partial quasi-isomorphism 
meets only the one minimal set of requirements for being non-vacuous.
Between these two extremes, there is a spectrum of different degrees of 
structural similarity between a vehicle and a target.
(31) If A  and B  are two epistemic representations o f the same
target T, A is the relevant structure of A  relative to interpretation IA 
of A in terms of T, B is the relevant structure of B  relative to 
interpretation IB of B  in terms o f  T, TA is the relevant structure o f T  
relative to interpretations P  of A in terms o f T, TB is the relevant 
structure of T  relative to interpretations IB of B  in terms of T, A* is
166
the maximal intendedly quasi-isomorphic partial substructure of A, 
B* is the maximal intendedly quasi-isomorphic partial substructure 
of B, and TA* and TB* are the maximal intendedly isomorphic 
partial substructures of, respectively, TA and TB, then A  and B are 
(overall) equally structurally similar to T  (relative to interpretations Z4 
and Is) if and only if:
[31.1] the universe o f TB*, A18*, is identical to the universe o f TB*, 
A™*,
[31.2] for all nFFA*k and <0TA*i, ..., 0TA*„>esat(nI?K*k) if and
only if <oTB* i, ..., otb*„>€ sat^R™* i)  and <oTA*\, ...,
0 TA’„>e dissat{” IFA* k) if and only if <oTB*i, ..., 
oTB\>Gdissat{nRTB*k), and
[31.3] for all nF A'k and 'I***  "JZTA%(/(^*,)...,
(32) If A  and B are two epistemic representations o f the same
target T, A is the relevant structure o f A  relative to interpretation Z4 
of A in terms of T, B is the relevant structure of B relative to 
interpretation IB of B  in terms of T, TA is the relevant structure of T  
relative to interpretations Z4 of A  in terms of T, TB is the relevant 
structure o f T  relative to interpretations IB o f B  in terms of T, A* is 
the maximal intendedly quasi-isomorphic partial substructure of A, 
B* is the maximal intendedly quasi-isomorphic partial substructure 
of B, and TA* and TB* are the maximal intendedly isomorphic 
partial substructures of, respectively TA and TB, then A  is (overall) 
more structurally similar to T  than B (relative to interpretations Z4 and 
Is) if:
[32.1] the universe of TB*, A78’, is a subset o f the universe of TB*, 
A 78*,
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[32.2] for all nFFA*k and ”i?rB%,if «?TB*i, ..., <9TB*W>Gsat(nJF**k), then 
<o7A’i, oTA*„>E:sat{nRrA*k) and if <oTB*i,
orB\>edissat{nR rB,k), then <oTA*i, oTA\>edissat{nR rA*k),
[32.3] for all " i^ ^ a n d  nF™*h if nFtK*k{on *\> ..., o78*,,) is determinate, 
then nP A*k{oTA*i, ..., oTA*„) is determinate.
[32.4] for all nP A\  and " /TB% such that ”P A*kij{o^i),
i, oA\)) , " F 8* ^ 8*,), a n d / ^ V ^ n
..., <?B‘W)) are either scalars or vectors, then
(|^ TA%(/V*.f ( o A\))|-1 f { ' F K\ ( o K\ ,...,</%)I)2  ^
rJFTA%(/(«A*.),...,/(^ A*-))i
[32.5] and at least one o f the following conditions is satisfied:
[32.5.1 ] A78* is a proper subset of A7A\
[32.5.2] for some nFFA'k and "ft78’*, <o7A’i, ...,
0TA‘„>esat(nRrA’k) and «?78*i, ..., 6>78'„>e indet^FP^ i) or
<o7A’i, ..., ota*„>6 dissatinP K* k) and «?78*i, ...,
otb*„>G indet(nKrB'k),
[32.5.3] for some nF*A'k and "F™*k, "F A' k{oTA' \, ..., o7A’„) is 
determinate and nFtK*k(on *\, tf78**) is indeterminate,
[32.5.4] for some nP A\  and "T*78** such that ”/ 7rA%(/(0A*i), ...,
.... ***.)), and
J{nP'k{P* i, ..., o8%)) are either scalars or vectors,
(r^ TA%(/v*.f { 0A\ ) )  | -1 f {*FK\ ( o A\  
r ^ TA% (/(*AM ,.. ,/ (* A\ ) ) i
i - 1 fCF*\(o*% ,...,/% ) i)2
It is important to note that (32) is not a definition— it only gives us a set o f 
sufficient conditions for a vehicle yl to be more structurally similar to a target T
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than a vehicle B. Whereas it is sufficient for a couple of vehicles to meet the set of 
conditions above in order for one of them to be a more structurally similar to a 
certain target than the other, it may well not be necessary to meet that set of 
conditions. There may well be other sets o f conditions such that, if met by two 
vehicles, it would be reasonable to count the first as more structurally similar to the 
target than the second (with respect to certain interpretations of the two vehicles in 
terms of the target).
It is also important to note that the relation being equally or more structurally 
similar to T  than (with respect to certain interpretations of the two vehicles in terms 
of the target) is a partial order— there are couples of representations o f a certain 
target such that neither is more or equally structurally similar to the target than the 
other (under the interpretation o f the respective vehicles in terms of the target).
The most fundamental intuition that underlies the structural similarity 
conception of faithful epistemic representation is that the more structurally similar 
a vehicle and a target are (with respect to a certain interpretation), the more faithful 
an epistemic representation of the target the vehicle is and vice versa— the more 
faithful a representation o f the target the vehicle is, the more structurally similar a 
vehicle and a target are (with respect to a certain interpretation). More precisely, 
according to the structural similarity account o f faithful epistemic representation:
(N) If A and B are two (analytically interpreted) epistemic 
representations o f the same target T, A  and B are equally 
faithful epistemic representations of T  if and only if 
(N.l)v4 and B  are overall equally structurally similar to T  
(relative to interpretations IA and P);
and
(O) If A  and B are two (analytically interpreted) epistemic 
representations o f the same target T, A  is an overall more 
faithful epistemic representation o f T  (relative to
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interpretations F  and Is) than B  (relative to interpretations )if 
and only if
(0 .1) A  is more structurally similar to T  than B  (relative to 
interpretations IA and Is).
On the structural similarity conception, for example, the new London 
Underground map is a more faithful epistemic representation of today’s network 
than the old London Underground map by virtue o f the fact that the new map is 
more structurally similar to today’s network than the old map (with respect to the 
standard interpretation of the two maps in terms of the network). In other words, 
the new London Underground map is a more faithful epistemic representation of 
today’s network than the old London Underground map because the intended 
morphism between the relevant structure of the new map and that of the network 
(i.e. intended isomorphism) is a stronger morphism than the one between the 
relevant structure o f the old map and that of the network (i.e. intended partial 
isomorphism). In other words, in the case of the new map the maximal intendedly 
isomorphic partial structure of the relevant structure of the map and that o f the 
relevant structure o f network are identical to the very relevant structure of the map 
and that o f the network. The same, however, is not true o f the maximal intendedly 
isomorphic partial structure of the relevant structure of the map and that of the 
relevant structure of network.
What I want to emphasize here is that the idea that an intended partial quasi­
isomorphism is a relation between two structures. The maximal intendedly quasi­
isomorphic partial substructures are only supposed to highlight those portions o f 
the relevant structures of the vehicle and of the target that are intendedly quasi­
isomorphic so as to show how the structures o f which they are partial substructures 
are structurally similar. So, the more the maximal intendedly quasi-isomorphic 
partial substructures of the relevant structure of the vehicle and that of the target 
are small portions o f the relevant structures, the less we should think o f the relevant 
structures as structurally similar.
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Three remarks are in order here. First of all, the structural similarity account 
links structural similarity to the overall faithfulness o f an epistemic representation 
to its target, which should be distinguished from what I have called the specific 
faithfulness of an epistemic representation to its target. O f two representations o f a 
certain target, one can be overall more faithful than the other, if, say, one generates 
more (approximately) true conclusions than the other, and yet they can be equally 
faithful for some specific purpose, if from both we can draw some specific true 
conclusion which we happen to be interested in.
Second, it follows from the two theses above that, like the relation being equally 
or more structurally similar to T  than, the relation being (overall) an equally or more 
faithful epistemic representation o fT  than is a partial order as well. That is, there may 
be pairs of representations of a certain target such that neither is equally or more 
faithful to the target than the other. This, however, is a desired result. As I have 
argued when introducing the notion of more and equally faithful epistemic 
representation in 1.2.6, the relation being (overall) an equally or more faithful 
epistemic representation o f  T  than is a partial order as well. That this should be the 
case is obvious when we consider that there are representations o f a certain target 
that, by and large, represent different aspects of the same target. For example, on 
their standard interpretations, a view of Venice and a map of Venice both represent 
the city of Venice, but they represent largely different aspects of Venice. In a case 
like that, there seems to be no point in trying to determine which of two 
representations is more faithful to the target than the other.
Even if we only consider representations with largely the same scope, however, 
there are many cases in which we do not have any clear intuitions as how the 
unfaithfulness o f the one compares to the unfaithfulness of the other. For example, 
we do not seem to have any clear intuition as to which of two partially faithful 
epistemic representations of a certain target is more faithful if one is a slightly 
incomplete but largely correct representation o f the underground network while 
the other is a largely complete but to a certain extent incorrect representation o f it. 
Is correctness weightier than completeness? And, if so, how much completeness is it
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worth to trade off for some correctness? Since there seems to be no uncontroversial 
or context or purpose neutral answer to these questions (at least outside o f some 
specific context), it is possible to suggest that, in many cases, there is no way to 
compare the relative overall faithfulness of these two representations.
The fact that, on the structural similarity account, it is not always possible to 
determine which of two representations of a certain target is more faithful than the 
other is actually an advantage of the structural similarity account. In fact, I think 
that the best argument in favour o f the direct connection between structural 
similarity and the overall faithfulness of a representation is that the structural 
similarity conception can successfully account for those cases in which we have 
clear intuitions about the relative overall faithfulness of two representations o f a 
certain target, while it does not commit us to accepting that two representations are 
equally faithful or that one representation is more faithful that another in any cases 
in which our intuitions are not clear one way or the other. In the next section, for 
example, I will illustrate how the structural similarity conception can account for 
the fact that an inclined plane model with air friction is a more faithful epistemic 
representation o f the soap-box derby system, than the inclined plane model we 
have considered so far on the grounds that the former is more structurally similar 
to the soap-box derby than the latter.
But, what if there were cases in which our intuitions about the overall 
faithfulness of two specific representations are uncontroversial that are not covered 
by the conditions above? As an advocate of the structural similarity conception, I 
would be committed to claiming that these can still be accounted for in terms of 
the relative structural similarity of two representations. This could be done by 
adding further sets of jointly sufficient conditions for a representation to be more 
structurally similar than another to a certain target overall or, on a case-by-case 
basis, by showing that the more faithful epistemic representation is overall more 
structurally similar to the target than the less faithful one. Consider for example the 
case of two maps of the London Underground one of which is correct and 
complete except for the fact that there is no circle or tab corresponding to one
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station, say, Piccadilly Circus, the other contains a circle or a tab for every station 
on the network but many of the properties of and relations among circles and tabs 
do not have a counterpart in the corresponding properties of and relations among 
the corresponding stations. Intuitively, I think we would tend to think that, even if 
neither map is a completely faithful epistemic representation of the London 
Underground network, the first map is a much more faithful epistemic 
representation o f the network than the second one. The first map however does not 
meet condition ([32.1]) above to be more structurally similar to the network than 
the second map. However, as I have already noted, whereas it is sufficient that two 
representations meet those conditions in order for one to be more structurally 
similar to the target than the other, it is not necessary to meet that specific set of 
conditions for one to be more structurally similar than the other. Once one gets an 
intuitive grasp of the notion of structural similarity, they are likely to concede that 
the widespread incorrectness of the second map outweighs the slight 
incompleteness of the first and, therefore, the first map is more structurally similar 
to the network than the second even if neither map meets the set of conditions to 
be more structurally similar to the network than the other.
I I I .2 .16. T h e  In c l in e d  P l a n e  M o d e l  W it h  a n d  W it h o u t  A ir  F r ic t io n
In this section, I illustrate how the structural similarity conception can account for 
our intuitions that a certain model is a more faithful epistemic representation of a 
certain system than another. So far we have considered the inclined plane model as 
a partially faithful epistemic representation o f the soap-box derby system. In the 
model, there are only two forces acting on the box. The first is the gravitational 
force and the second is the normal force that the plane exerts on the box. In the 
system, on the other hand there are many more forces acting on the racer than the 
gravitational pull o f the Earth and the normal force that the road exerts on the 
wheels of the racer. This is one of the reasons why the inclined plane model is only 
a highly idealized and abstract representation o f the soap-box derby system.
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A less idealized and more faithful epistemic representation of the soap-box 
derby, for example, could be obtained by using a model in which a third force acts 
on the box— the force due to air friction. Air friction is a difficult force to model 
accurately as the force due to air friction on a certain object depends on a large 
number o f factors, including the velocity of the object, its shape, and the density o f 
air. In the inclined plane model, we set the force on the box due to air friction at U 
equal to —l/2CpA t,)2, where A is the cross-sectional area o f the box, p the
air density, and C a dimensionless constant. The structure-type of the inclined 
plane model with air friction, M A, is thus analogous to the one of the inclined 
plane model without air friction except for the fact that in the relevant structure of 
the inclined plane model with friction gMA(^, 3)=— l/2CpA vMA(^, f,)2).
Intuitively, we would tend to think that the inclined plane model with air 
friction is overall a more faithful epistemic representation of the soap-box derby 
then the inclined plane model without air friction, for the former takes into 
account one of the main factors that govern the behaviour of the racers, while 
taking also into account all other factors taken into account by the latter model. 
The structural similarity account of faithful epistemic representation vindicates the 
intuition that the inclined plane model with friction is a more faithful epistemic 
representation of the soap-box derby than the inclined plane model without 
friction. According to the structural similarity account this is due to the fact that 
the former is more structurally similar to the soap-box derby than the latter.
The inclined plane model with air friction in fact trivially meets conditions
[32.1] and [32.2] above because, respectively, the relevant structures of the two 
models contain the same objects and do not contain any properties or relations. 
The functions gu {b, th 1) and gM*(b, 2), and gM{b, th 2) and gMA(£, th 2) trivially
meet condition [32.3] because the gravitational and normal forces acting on the 
box in the two models are the same and therefore their deviation from the 
corresponding forces on the racers are the same. The divergence between the air 
friction on the box at /, (the function gMA(£, tiy 3)) and the air friction on the racer 
at the corresponding time (the function (gs{f{b), J(3))) is less than the one
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between the function g ^ b, 3) and f£(J{b), /(a ),/(3 )) (because we have assumed
that ^ ( b ,  tj,  3) is set to 0 like all forces that act on the box in the inclined plane 
model without friction other than the gravitational and the normal force). As a 
result, the divergence between position of the box at r, in the inclined plane model 
with air friction (function rMA(£, t,) and the average position of one of the racers at 
the corresponding time (rs(b, r,)) is also likely to be smaller than the one between 
the position o f the box in the inclined plane model without air friction at the same 
time and that of one o f the racers. So, the inclined plane model with air friction is 
likely to be more structurally similar to the soap-box derby than the inclined plane 
model without friction in virtue of meeting conditions [32.1], [32.2], [32.3],
[32.4]and [32.5].
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Conclusions
In this thesis, I have identified a number o f problems that are usually conflated 
under the heading of “the problem of scientific representation” and I have focussed 
on two of these problems, which, I have argued, are instances o f two more general 
problems— i.e. the problem of what makes a certain vehicle an epistemic 
representation of a certain target and the problem of what makes a certain 
epistemic representation of a certain target a faithful epistemic representation of it.
Most of this thesis was devoted to laying the foundations for a solution for each 
of these problems. According to the account o f epistemic representation that I have 
defended, the interpretational account o f epistemic representation, a vehicle is an 
epistemic representation o f a certain target for a certain user if and only if the user 
takes the vehicle to denote the target and she adopts an interpretation of vehicle (in 
terms of the target). In this thesis, I have focussed exclusively on one specific kind 
o f interpretation, which I have called analytic interpretations. Whether the account 
I have developed can be developed into a general account of epistemic 
representation crucially depends on whether every possible interpretation can be 
reconstructed as an analytic interpretation. This is one o f the crucial issues that are 
left open by this thesis and on which further work needs to be done.
One of the main advantages of the interpretational account is that it sheds light 
on the relation between epistemic representation and valid surrogative reasoning. 
As I have argued, the fact that a user adopts an interpretation of the vehicle in 
terms of the target (and takes the vehicle to stand for the target) is both that in 
virtue of what the vehicle is an epistemic representation of the target for her and 
that in virtue of what she can perform valid inferences from the vehicle to the 
target. W ithout the notion of an interpretation (or some analogous notion), the 
intimate relation between epistemic representation and valid surrogative reasoning 
remains unnecessarily mysterious.
The notion of an analytic interpretation plays also a central role in the account 
of faithful epistemic representation as it directly contributes to the solution to two 
crucial problems that have haunted the structuralist conception of (faithful)
epistemic representation and indirectly to the solution o f a third problem. The first 
problem is that of applying the notion of a morphism to objects that are not set- 
theoretic structure. As I have argued, the notion o f an analytic interpretation 
provides us with a principled way to reconstruct the vehicle and the target as set- 
theoretic structures, which I have called respectively the relevant structure of the 
vehicle and the relevant structure of the target.
The second problem is that o f determining which morphisms need to obtain 
between the relevant structure of the vehicle and that o f the target in order for the 
vehicle to be a faithful epistemic representation of the target (to a certain degree) 
because a morphism may obtain between the relevant structure of the vehicle and 
that of the target without the first being a faithful epistemic representation o f the 
target (on a certain interpretation of it). The notion of analytic interpretation 
provides us with a principled way to single out some of the morphism that may 
obtain between the relevant structure of the vehicle and that of the target as the 
intended morphism— i.e. the only ones that are relevant to the faithfulness o f the 
epistemic representation in question.
The third problem is that the notion o f the faithfulness of an epistemic 
representation comes in degrees while two structures are either 7f-morphic or they 
are not. However, the account of faithful epistemic representation that I have 
developed uses the notions of relvant structure and intended morphism to develop 
a third crucial notion that of the structural similarity between the vehicle and the 
target (under a certain interpretation of the former in terms of the latter). 
Intuitively, the stronger the strongest intended morphism between the relevant 
structure of the vehicle and that of the target is, the more structurally similar the 
vehicle and the target are. The central idea that underlies the structural similarity 
account is that the more structurally similar the vehicle and the target are under a 
certain interpretation of the former in terms of the latter, the more faithful an 
epistemic representation of the latter the former is under that interpretation. The 
account o f faithful epistemic representation that I have developed, I think, 
vindicates the intuitions that underlie two of the main conceptions of
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representation but avoids the pitfalls that characterize the other versions of these 
views that I have considered.
The account o f epistemic representation and that o f faithful epistemic 
representation that I have developed and defended in this thesis are more than just 
compelementary— they are deeply interconnected. It is only when one attempts to 
develop some of the intuitions and ideas that can be found in the literature into a 
coherent whole that one can see how everything falls into place in the overall 
picture. In this thesis, I hope to have provided a good initial sketch o f that picture.
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